A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Game story, une histoire des jeux vidéo

Compte rendu de l'exposition « Game Story. Une histoire du jeu vidéo » qui s'est tenue au Grand Palais à Paris du 10 novembre 2011 au 9 janvier 2012, envisagée à partir du champ de l'histoire et de la théorie du cinéma en termes de discours historique sur un « nouveau média » ainsi que dans une optique intermédiale.

Measuring the efficiency in Spanish municipal refuse collection services

The objective of this study is to analyse the technical or productive efficiency ofthe refuse collection services in 75 municipalities located in the Spanish regionof Catalonia. The analysis has been carried out using various techniques. Firstly we have calculated a deterministic parametric frontier, then a stochastic parametric frontier, and finally, various non-parametric approaches (DEA and FDH). Concerning the results, these naturally differ according to the technique used to approach the frontier. Nevertheless, they have an appearance of solidity, at least with regard to the ordinal concordance among the indices of efficiency obtained by the different approaches, as is demonstrated by the statistical tests used. Finally, we have attempted to search for any relation existing between efficiency and the method (public or private) of managing the services. No significant relation was found between the type of management and efficiencyindices

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Work-at-Home Scams:So You Didn’t Order That? Protecting yourself from unauthorized credit card charges, August 2012

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: So You Didn’t Order That? Protecting yourself from unauthorized credit card charges

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition