Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

Bootstrapping pairs in Distance-Based Regression

La regressió basada en distàncies és un mètode de predicció que consisteix en dos passos: a partir de les distàncies entre observacions obtenim les variables latents, les quals passen a ser els regressors en un model lineal de mínims quadrats ordinaris. Les distàncies les calculem a partir dels predictors originals fent us d'una funció de dissimilaritats adequada. Donat que, en general, els regressors estan relacionats de manera no lineal amb la resposta, la seva selecció amb el test F usual no és possible. En aquest treball proposem una solució a aquest problema de selecció de predictors definint tests estadístics generalitzats i adaptant un mètode de bootstrap no paramètric per a l'estimació dels p-valors. Incluim un exemple numèric amb dades de l'assegurança d'automòbils.

A comment on the cost of capital for investments with non-homogeneous components

In this paper, the expression for the cost of capital is derived when net and replacement investments exhibit differences in their effective prices due to a different fiscal treatment. It is shown that, contrary to previous results in the literature, the cost of capital should be constructed under an opportunity cost criterion rather than a historical one. This result has some important economic consequences, since the optimizing firm will take into account not only the effective price for the new investments but also consider the opportunity cost of replacing them.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Un modelo de riesgo de crédito basado en opciones compuestas con barrera. Aplicación al mercado continuo español

In this work the valuation methodology of compound option written on a downand-out call option, developed by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), has been applied to deduce a credit risk model. It is supposed that the firm has a debt structure with two maturity dates and that the credit event takes place when the assets firm value falls under a determined level called barrier. An empirical application of the model for 105 firms of Spanish continuous market is carried out. For each one of them its value in the date of analysis, the volatility and the critical value are obtained and from these, the default probability to short and long-term and the implicit probability in the two previous probabilities are deduced. The results are compared with the ones obtained from the Geskemodel (1977).

User cost of capital with delayed investment grants

The usual assumption when considering investment grants is that grant payments are automatic when investments are undertaken. However, evidence from case studies shows that there can exist some time lag until funds are received by granted firms. In this paper the effects of delays in grant payments on the optimal investment policy of the firm are analyzed. It is shown how these delays lead not only to a higher financing cost but to an effective reduction in the investment grant rate, and in some cases, how benefits from investment grants could be canceled due to interactions with tax effects.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Term structure of interest rates. European financial integration

In this paper we estimate, analyze and compare the term structures of interest rates in six different countries over the period 1992-2004. We apply the Nelson-Siegel model to obtain the term structures of interest rates at weekly intervals. A total of 4,038 curves are estimated and analyzed. Four European Monetary Union countries¿Spain, France, Germany and Italy¿are included. The UK is also included as a European non-member of the Monetary Union. Finally the US completes the analysis. The goal is to determine the differences in the shapes of the term structure of interest rates among these countries. Likewise, we can determine the most usual term structure shapes that appear for each country.*****

Time of ruin in a risk model with generalized Erlang (n) interclaim times and a constant dividend barrier

In this paper we analyze the time of ruin in a risk process with the interclaim times being Erlang(n) distributed and a constant dividend barrier. We obtain an integro-differential equation for the Laplace Transform of the time of ruin. Explicit solutions for the moments of the time of ruin are presented when the individual claim amounts have a distribution with rational Laplace transform. Finally, some numerical results and a compare son with the classical risk model, with interclaim times following an exponential distribution, are given.

The relationship of capitalization period length with market portfolio composition and betas

Beta coefficients are not stable if we modify the observation periods of the returns. The market portfolio composition also varies, whereas changes in the betas are the same, whether they are calculated as regression coefficients or as a ratio of the risk premiums. The instantaneous beta, obtained when the capitalization frequency approaches infinity, may be a useful tool in portfolio selection.

Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case

This paper derives the HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation for sophisticated agents in a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem with non-constant discounting in a continuous setting, by using a dynamic programming approach. A simple example is used in order to illustrate the applicability of this HJB equation, by suggesting a method for constructing the subgame perfect equilibrium solution to the problem.Conditions for the observational equivalence with an associated problem with constantdiscounting are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the case of free terminal time. Strotz¿s model (an eating cake problem of a nonrenewable resource with non-constant discounting) is revisited.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.