Types of Listeria monocytogenes predicted by the positions of EcoRI cleavage sites relative to ribosomal RNA sequences.

By using taxonomic characters derived from EcoRI restriction endonuclease digestion of genomic DNA and hybridization with a labeled rRNA operon from Escherichia coli, a polymorphic structure of Listeria monocytogenes, characterized by fragments with different frequencies of occurrence, was observed. This structure was expanded by creating predicted patterns through a recursive process of observation, expectation, prediction, and assessment of completeness. This process was applied, in turn, to normalized strain patterns, fragment bands, and positions of EcoRI recognition sites relative to rRNA regions. Analysis of 1346 strains provided observed patterns, fragment sizes, and their frequencies of occurrence in the patterns. Fragment size statistics led to the creation of unobserved combinations of bands, predicted pattern types. The observed fragment bands revealed positions of EcoRI sites relative to rRNA sequences. Each EcoRI site had a frequency of occurrence, and unobserved fragment sizes were postulated on the basis of knowing the restriction site locations. The result of the recursion process applied to the components of the strain data was an extended classification with observed and predicted members.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.

A historical account of types of fuzzy sets and their relationships

In this paper, we review the definition and basic properties of the different types of fuzzy sets that have appeared up to now in the literature. We also analyze the relationships between them and enumerate some of the applications in which they have been used.

Late Mogollon pottery types of the Reserve area / John B. Rinaldo, Assistant Curator, Archaeology, and Elaine A. Bluhm, Assistant, Archaeology.

v.36:no.7(1956)