Mental Health and Mental Illness in Later Life: The Ecology of Theory and Practice

Theoretical and practical concerns shape our conceptualizations of mental health and mental illness later in life. Together, these concerns form an ecology of theory and practice, shaping our expectations of later life and our efforts with an din behalf of older adults. Introduces a series of article which highlights several aspects of mental health and mental illness in later life to provide an understanding of the challenges faced by the aged in maintaining mental health.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Locally Efficient Estimation in Censored Data Models: Theory and Examples

In many applications the observed data can be viewed as a censored high dimensional full data random variable X. By the curve of dimensionality it is typically not possible to construct estimators that are asymptotically efficient at every probability distribution in a semiparametric censored data model of such a high dimensional censored data structure. We provide a general method for construction of one-step estimators that are efficient at a chosen submodel of the full-data model, are still well behaved off this submodel and can be chosen to always improve on a given initial estimator. These one-step estimators rely on good estimators of the censoring mechanism and thus will require a parametric or semiparametric model for the censoring mechanism. We present a general theorem that provides a template for proving the desired asymptotic results. We illustrate the general one-step estimation methods by constructing locally efficient one-step estimators of marginal distributions and regression parameters with right-censored data, current status data and bivariate right-censored data, in all models allowing the presence of time-dependent covariates. The conditions of the asymptotics theorem are rigorously verified in one of the examples and the key condition of the general theorem is verified for all examples.

Experimental results on gravity driven fully condensing flows in vertical tubes, their agreement with theory, and their differences with shear driven flows' boundary-condition sensitivities

This doctoral thesis presents the experimental results along with a suitable synthesis with computational/theoretical results towards development of a reliable heat transfer correlation for a specific annular condensation flow regime inside a vertical tube. For fully condensing flows of pure vapor (FC-72) inside a vertical cylindrical tube of 6.6 mm diameter and 0.7 m length, the experimental measurements are shown to yield values of average heat transfer co-efficient, and approximate length of full condensation. The experimental conditions cover: mass flux G over a range of 2.9 kg/m2-s ≤ G ≤ 87.7 kg/m2-s, temperature difference ∆T (saturation temperature at the inlet pressure minus the mean condensing surface temperature) of 5 ºC to 45 ºC, and cases for which the length of full condensation xFC is in the range of 0 < xFC < 0.7 m. The range of flow conditions over which there is good agreement (within 15%) with the theory and its modeling assumptions has been identified. Additionally, the ranges of flow conditions for which there are significant discrepancies (between 15 -30% and greater than 30%) with theory have also been identified. The paper also refers to a brief set of key experimental results with regard to sensitivity of the flow to time-varying or quasi-steady (i.e. steady in the mean) impositions of pressure at both the inlet and the outlet. The experimental results support the updated theoretical/computational results that gravity dominated condensing flows do not allow such elliptic impositions.

Dynamics of settling charged particles in turbulence : theory and experiments

It has been proposed that inertial clustering may lead to an increased collision rate of water droplets in clouds. Atmospheric clouds and electrosprays contain electrically charged particles embedded in turbulent flows, often under the influence of an externally imposed, approximately uniform gravitational or electric force. In this thesis, we present the investigation of charged inertial particles embedded in turbulence. We have developed a theoretical description for the dynamics of such systems of charged, sedimenting particles in turbulence, allowing radial distribution functions to be predicted for both monodisperse and bidisperse particle size distributions. The governing parameters are the particle Stokes number (particle inertial time scale relative to turbulence dissipation time scale), the Coulomb-turbulence parameter (ratio of Coulomb ’terminalar speed to turbulence dissipation velocity scale), and the settling parameter (the ratio of the gravitational terminal speed to turbulence dissipation velocity scale). For the monodispersion particles, The peak in the radial distribution function is well predicted by the balance between the particle terminal velocity under Coulomb repulsion and a time-averaged ’drift’ velocity obtained from the nonuniform sampling of fluid strain and rotation due to finite particle inertia. The theory is compared to measured radial distribution functions for water particles in homogeneous, isotropic air turbulence. The radial distribution functions are obtained from particle positions measured in three dimensions using digital holography. The measurements support the general theoretical expression, consisting of a power law increase in particle clustering due to particle response to dissipative turbulent eddies, modulated by an exponential electrostatic interaction term. Both terms are modified as a result of the gravitational diffusion-like term, and the role of ’gravity’ is explored by imposing a macroscopic uniform electric field to create an enhanced, effective gravity. The relation between the radial distribution functions and inward mean radial relative velocity is established for charged particles.