Sex, culpability, and the defence of provocation

The partial defence of provocation is one of the most controversial doctrines within the criminal law. It has now been abolished in a number of international jurisdictions. Addressing the trajectory of debates about reform of the provocation defence across different jurisdictions, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation considers the construction and representation of subjectivity and sexual difference in legal narrations of intimate partner homicide. Undeniably, the most vexing exculpatory cultural narrative of our times is that of a woman 'asking for it'. This book explores how the process of judgment in a criminal trial involves not only the drawing of inferences from the facts of a particular case, but also operates to deliver a narrative. Law, it is argued, constructs a narrative of how the female body incites male violence. And, pursuing an approach that is informed by socio-legal studies, literary theory and feminist theories of the body, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation considers how this narrative is constructed via a range of discursive practices that position woman as a threat to masculine norms of propriety and autonomy. Once we have a clear understanding of the significance of narrative in legal decision-making, we can then formulate textual strategies of resistance to the violence of law's victim-blaming narratives by rewriting them.

Socratic ironies: reading Hadot, reading Kierkegaard

This paper examines the seemingly unlikely rapport between the ‘Christian existentialist’, radically Protestant thinker, Søren Kierkegaard and French classicist and historian of philosophy, Pierre Hadot, famous for advocating a return to the ancient pagan sense of philosophy as a way of life. Despite decisive differences we stress in our concluding remarks, we argue that the conception of philosophy in Hadot as a way of life shares decisive features with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the true ‘religious’ life: as something demanding existential engagement from its proponent, as well as the learning or recitation of accepted doctrines. The mediating figure between the two authors, the paper agrees with Irina (2012), is Socrates and his famous irony. In order to appreciate Kierkegaard’s rapport with Hadot, then (and in contrast to Gregor, who has also treated the two figures) we first of all consider Hadot’s treatment of the enigmatic ‘old wise man’ who remains central to Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. (Part 1) However, to highlight Hadot’s Socratic proximity to Kierkegaard (in contrast to Irina), we set up Hadot’s Socrates against the contrasting portrait readers can find in John M. Cooper’s recent work on Socrates and philosophy as a way of life. Part II of the essay turns back from Hadot’s and Kierkegaard’s Socrates towards Hadot’s own work, and argues—again moving beyond both Gregor and Irina’s works on Hadot and Kierkegaard—that the shape of Hadot’s ‘authorship’, including his remarkably classical style, can be understood by way of Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication. In our concluding remarks, in the spirit of Kierkegaard, we pinpoint the fundamental difference between the two thinkers, arguing that for Hadot in contrast to Kierkegaard, a stress on existential commitment in no way speaks against the philosophical defence of a form of rational universalism. Reading Hadot via Kierkegaard allows us to appreciate Hadot’s novelty as attempting to ‘squaring the circle’ between an emphasis on subjectivity and, as it were, the subjective dimensions of philosophers’ pursuit of rational universality.

Japan and the liberal global-order project: a time to stop and stare

Authority and sovereignty disappeared in the West long ago, when power absorbed them both. The effects of this artifice have become particularly noticeable since the fall of the “bipolar” system. The post-political strategy pursued by universalized liberalism has indeed voided local government through an emphasis on global governance, in so endorsing the substitution of politics with administration. This paper argues that Japan is not affected by this totalizing phenomenon notwithstanding the official transplanting of libero-juridical policies and doctrines within its polity. Through a neorealist contextualization of the Japanese “authority-power” dichotomy and comparison between Western and Japanese “output” schemes of legitimation and accountability that will transcend the boundaries of purely cultural or socio-legal accounts, I contend that the reason why Japan is not part of the liberal scheme is that it is politically governed rather than managerially administered.