'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

Russia’s Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions. OSW Commentary No. 59, 2011-07-26

Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its policies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establishment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia in its relations with the US. Russia’s participation in resolving conflicts is aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia’s Middle East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the same time, Russia’s policy in the region remains cautious – despite its return to the region, Russia has not decided to ‘play’ for the Middle East, and its position and role in the region remain limited. The balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions. However, it does not seem that they have opened up larger opportunities for Russian policy in the region. The Russian elite has been divided in its assessment of the consequences of these events. One part of it has displayed scepticism, treating the revolutions rather as a threat than a chance to strengthen their own position. The revolutions were not seen as democratisation processes, but rather as a destabilisation of the region and as posing an increased danger from radical Islam. For the other part of the elite, the revolutions were the natural consequence of the social changes occurring in the region. This internal dispute made it difficult for Russia to present a cohesive approach to the Arab revolutions, and its stance was reactive. The defensive position which Moscow adopted showed that Russia did not have the potential to mould the political situation, either in the region as a whole or its individual countries; neither did it display any willingness to do so. What Moscow is doing is positioning itself in such a way so as not to spoil relations with any other actor in the region, and to be able to exploit any possible emerging opportunities in case of further-reaching changes.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.

THE NEW WALLS AND FENCES: CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE. CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 9, June 2003

Good fences make good neighbours’ wrote the poet Robert Frost. Israel and Palestine are certainly not good neighbours and the question that arises is will a fence between Israel and Palestine turn them into ‘good neighbours’. This paper deals with the Israeli decision to construct a fence that will divide Israel and the West Bank. Almost all public debate of the wall in Israel has been limited to the security aspects. In light of the success enjoyed so far by the wall or fence around the Gaza Strip in preventing suicide bombers from getting through, the defence for needing a similar wall around the West Bank seems like an easy task. One of the main proponents of the wall concept in Israel is Dan Scheuftan, whose book on the subject has served as a guide for policy-makers. The paper provides a critique of Scheuftan’s book. The paper addresses various aspects of the wall and focuses on the different consequences of building a barrier between the two entities. Significant attention is paid to the economic consequences of the wall. The paper also looks at other issues such as the impact the wall will have on future attempts of peace-making. The paper attempts to show that the prevention of Palestinian access to Israel – the main goal of the wall – may not really have the hoped for effect of enhancing Israel’s security

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Social Citizenship and Institution Building: EU-Enlargement and the Restructuring of Welfare States in East Central Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Paper, No. 01.2, April 2001

With the EU-enlargement process well underway, this paper focuses on social citizenship as a conceptual frame for analyzing the restructuring of social institutions in applicant countries in East Central Europe. So far, comparative welfare state analysis has concentrated mainly on the developed economies of the OECD-countries; there is little systematic analytical work on the transitions in post-communist Europe. Theoretically, this paper builds on comparative welfare state analysis as well as on new institutionalism. The initial hypothesis is built on the assumption that emerging patterns of social support and social security diverge from the typology described in the comparative welfare state literature inasmuch as the transformation of postcommunist societies is distinctly different from the building of welfare states in Europe. The paper argues that institutionbuilding is shaped by and embedded in the process of European integration and part of governance in the EU. Anticipating full membership in the European Union, the applicant countries have to adapt to the rules and regulations of the EU, including the "social acquis." Therefore, framing becomes an important feature of institutional changes. The paper seeks to identify distinct patterns and problems of the institutionalization of social citizenship.

Russia’s ‘Middle East’: the escalation of religious conflicts in the Northern Caucasus. OSW Commentary Number 207/04.04.2016

The eastern part of the Northern Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) is becoming an increasingly distinct region in cultural, civilisational and social terms when compared to the rest of the Russian Federation. The situation on the ground there bears greater resemblance to the Middle East than to Russia: Islam is the key factor organising socio-political life, and conflicts inside the Muslim community, often involving bloodshed, are the driving power of developments in the region. The conflict is between the two main branches of Islam in the Northern Caucasus: Sufism linked to the official clergy and government, and Salafism which is gaining more and more supporters among young people in the Caucasus. Tension, including clashes over mosques, attacks, mass detentions, etc. has been observed mainly in Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Tab. 3: Differentiation of eroded material in the Arctic Russian Seas

Volumes of Holocene (10 000 years) terrigenous sediments and annnal sediment supply in the Laptev Sea were evaluated from average thickness of the Holocene veneer. Volumes of deposits supplied from various sediment sourees and by different proeesses (abrasion of hinterland and island shores, river discharge, eolian input, drifting ice) were diseriminating of deposition in the eoastal zone, at river/sea barrier, and in the shelf basin itself. Accumulation by drifting iee and the role of local sea bottom erosion were also considered. Total amount of sediments transported from the Laptev Sea shelf to Amundsen and Nansen Basins of the Aretie Ocean was compared with other Russian Aretie seas.

(Table 1) Composition of bituminous substances in sediments from the East Pacific Rise

Bitumoid contents in metalliferous sediments from axial parts of the East Pacific Rise (EPR) have been studied. Maximal concentrations of bitumoid matter and aromatic hydrocarbons have been found in the axial zones of the EPR as a result of hydrothermal processes and accumulation of endogenous matter in the sediments. Distribution of bitumoids and hydrocarbons coincides with deposition of ore minerals that indicates similarity of their sources.

Polyaromatic hydrocarbons in sediments from the Barents and White Seas

Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are common environmental contaminants which can be derived from anthropogenic sources, such as combustion and discharges from extraction and transport, and natural processes, including leakage and erosion of fossil carbon. Natural PAH sources contribute, along with biological activities and terrestrial run-off, to the organic carbon content in sediments.The Barents Sea region is far from many anthropogenic sources of PAH, but production and trans-shipment of hydrocarbons is increasing. We present data for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) concentrations in bottom sediments from 510 stations in the Barents and White Seas, and along the northern coast of Norway.

Description of, and 238U, 234U, 232Th and 230Th measurements on a nodule from R/V Sonne station SO79_62KD, Central East Pacific Ocean

Two diagenetic manganese nodules from the Peru Basin were investigated by thermal ionization mass spectrometry and high resolution alpha spectrometry for uranium and thorium. The TIMS concentrations for nodule 62KD (63KG) vary as follows: 0.12-1.01 ppb (0.06-0.59) 230Th, 0.51-1.98 ppm (0.43-1.40) 232Th, 0.13-0.80 ppb (0.09-0.49) 234U, and 1.95-13.47 ppm (1.66-8.24) 238U. Both nodules have average growth rates of ~110 mm per million years. However, from the variations of excess 230Th with depth we estimate partial accumulation rates which range from 50 to 400 mm per million years. The 234U dating method cannot be applied due to remobilization of U from the sediment and subsequent incorporation into the nodules' crystal lattice, reflected by decay corrected 234U values far above the ocean water value. Sections of fast nodule growth are related to those layers having high Mn/Fe ratios (up to 200) and higher densities. As a possible explanation we develop a scenario that describes similar glacial/interglacial trends in both nodules as a record of regional changes of sediment and/or deep water chemistry.

Composition of airborne material from yellow snow fallen in the Russian North

Large amounts of dust responsible for bright colors of atmospheric precipitation in the temperate, subpolar and polar zones of the northern hemisphere have been rarely observed. In the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty first century in the Northern European Russia such events were not registered up to March 25-26, 2008. At that time in some parts of the Arkhangel'sk region, Komi Republic, and Nenets Autonomous Area atmospheric precipitation as sleet and rain responsible for sand- and saffron colors of ice crust formation on the snow surface was observed. During detailed mineralogical, geochemical, pollen, diatom and meteorological investigations it was established that semidesert and steppe regions of the Northwest Kazakhstan, Volgograd and Astrakhan' regions, and Kalmykia are the main sources of the yellow dust.