Croatia: accession negotiations with the EU overshadowed by parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 48, 2011-02-29

In 2011 Croatia entered the final stage of its accession negotiations with the EU. The completion of these negotiations will probably coincide with the parliamentary elections which should be held in November or December this year. The elections are likely to bring about a change of government, as public support for Jadranka Kosor's cabinet and her party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) has been declining; the left-wing opposition is likely to take power. Therefore, the government’s main goal is to complete the accession negotiations in the first half of the year, in order to sign the accession treaty and hold the EU membership referendum before the parliamentary elections. The HDZ believes that only the successful completion of the accession negotiations could increase its chances of a good result in the upcoming elections. At the same time, fearing a further fall in support, the government will avoid any decisions and reforms that would be controversial for the public, especially in the sphere of the economy; such decisions could also increase Euroscepticism among the Croatian public, and result in the rejection of EU accession in the referendum. The government in Zagreb hopes that the currently implemented anti-corruption strategy and reform of the judiciary, as well as the advanced process of adaptation to EU conditions, will be enough to complete the negotiations. This strategy has a serious chance of success, considering that there is considerable support for Croatia's membership among the EU countries and institutions. Another reason is that further prolongation of the negotiations could aggravate hostility towards the EU among the Croatian public, and would be a bad sign for other Balkan states with membership aspirations. However, subordinating Croatian policies to the completion of negotiations in the first half of the year could prove to be adverse for Croatia itself in the longer term, as it would put off the necessary structural reforms.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule; The Russian power industry shortly before reforms; Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchical system. OSW Study 5/2002

Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.

Coalitions, Power and Institutional Change in Global Patent Politics. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2013

With the 1995 Agreement on Trade - related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a centralised rule - system for the international governance of patents was put in place under the general framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since then, the number of patent – related institutions has increased monotonically on the multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral levels. I will explain this case of institutional change by focusing on the norm – setting activities of both industrialised and developing countries, arguing that both groups constitute internally highly cohesive coalitions in global patent politics, while institutional change occurs when both coalitions engage in those negotiating settings in which they enjoy a comparative advantage over the other coalition. Specifically, I make the point that industrialised countries’ norm – setting activities take place on the plurilateral and bilateral level, where economic factors can be effectively translated into political outcomes while simultaneously avoiding unacceptably high legitimacy costs; whereas developing countries, on the other hand, use various multilateral United Nations (UN) forums where their claims possess a high degree of legitimacy, but cannot translate into effective political outcomes. The paper concludes with some remarks on how this case yields new insights into ongoing debates in institutionalist International Relations (IR), as pertaining to present discussions on “regime complexity”.

Multinational corporations in Brazil and Mexico : structural sources of economic and noneconomic power : report to the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate /

Mode of access: Internet.

Rules and regulations governing the administration of the Federal water power act with text of the act and of amendments of March 3, 1921, and June 23, 1930.

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of concentration of economic power.

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of concentration of economic power; monograph no. 1[-43]

Printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee.

Ramp Adaptive Metering Bottleneck Optimization (RAMBO) user's manual.

Texas Department of Transportation, Austin

Water resources and power; a report to the Congress.

Mode of access: Internet.

Veto power of president. Hearing before the Committee on the judiciary, House of Representatives. Sixty-third Congress, first session, on H.J. res. 15. September 9, 1913.

Includes list of revenue and appropriation bills vetoed by presidents of the United States, list of states in which veto power is not vested in the governor, etc., etc.

Study of monopoly power.

Emanuel Celler, chairman.

Measurement of power density from marine radar /

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of concentration of economic power; monograph no. 1[-43]

Printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee.

Ohio River. Letter from the Secretary of War transmitting pursuant to section 1 of the River and harbor act approved January 21, 1927, and section 10 of the Flood control act approved May 15, 1928, a letter from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, dated August 14, 1935, submitting a report, together with accompanying papers and illustrations, containing a general plan for the improvement of the Ohio River for the purposes of navigation and efficient development of its water power, the control of floods, and the needs of irrigation.

"Report of the Board of engineers for rivers and harbors": p. 7-19.

Investigation of concentration of economic power.

Printed for the use of the Temporary national economic committee.