Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location

This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs¿ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.

Rotação de culturas no sistema plantio direto em Tibagi (PR): I - Sequestro de carbono no solo

Os manejos conservacionistas, como o sistema plantio direto (SPD), podem ser considerados uma atividade com potencial para sequestrar C no solo. Os objetivos deste trabalho foram quantificar os estoques de C no solo e, juntamente com a dedução das emissões de óxido nitroso (N2O), calcular o sequestro de C do solo sob SPD com diferentes tempos de implantação em duas sucessões de culturas. O experimento foi instalado na Fazenda Santa Branca, em Tibagi (PR), em um Latossolo Vermelho distroférrico de textura argilosa. Os tratamentos, dispostos em faixas não casualizadas com parcelas subdivididas, foram: plantio direto por 12 anos com sucessões milho/trigo e soja/trigo (PD12 M/T e PD12 S/T, respectivamente) e por 22 anos (PD22 M/T e PD22 S/T, respectivamente). Os estoques de C no solo aumentaram com o tempo de implantação do SPD; o incremento no C do solo em 10 anos foi de 35 %, com uma taxa anual de acúmulo de 1,94 t ha-1 ano-1 . A simulação do estoque de C do solo com o uso do modelo unicompartimental mostrou que o elevado aporte de resíduos culturais e a rotação de culturas com uso de leguminosas reduziram a mineralização da matéria orgânica, o que favoreceu o acúmulo de C no solo. As emissões de N2O foram 25 % mais elevadas na sucessão milho/trigo, em relação à soja/trigo, e os diferentes tempos de SPD não promoveram aumento das emissões do N2O. O balanço entre a taxa de acúmulo de C e a emissão de óxido nitroso mostrou que o sistema apresentou saldo positivo no acúmulo de C no solo, o que significou o sequestro de CO2 de 6 t ha-1 ano-1 .

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly

Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location

This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs¿ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.

Effects of differential taxation on factor accumulation and growth

In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale growth model.The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention

A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes

[cat] En aquest treball extenem les reformes lineals introduïdes per Pfähler (1984) al cas d’impostos duals. Estudiem l’efecte relatiu que els retalls lineals duals d’un impost dual tenen sobre la distribució de la desigualtat -es pot fer un estudi simètric per al cas d’augments d’impostos-. Tambe introduïm mesures del grau de progressivitat d’impostos duals i mostrem que estan connectades amb el criteri de dominació de Lorenz. Addicionalment, estudiem l’elasticitat de la càrrega fiscal de cadascuna de les reformes proposades. Finalment, gràcies a un model de microsimulació i una gran base de dades que conté informació sobre l’IRPF espanyol de l’any 2004, 1) comparem l’efecte que diferents reformes tindrien sobre l’impost dual espanyol i 2) estudiem quina redistribució de la riquesa va suposar la reforma dual de l’IRPF (Llei ’35/2006’) respecte l’anterior impost.

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets : Does Spain behave differently?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.

Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Parents’ Investments and Education Returns

[cat] Aquest article analitza la relació entre els ingressos dels pares i l’educació dels seus fills. En un context d’altruïsme perfecte, el model descriu les decisions dels pares sobre quant consumir i quant invertir en l’educació dels seus fills. El model prediu que els rendiments de l’educació en termes de sous haurien de ser lineals. Usant aquest model en una economia competitiva, es mostra com el resultat depèn dels subsidis o impostos del govern sobre l’educació. El compromís habitual igualtat-eficiència apareix en aquest context. Finalment, el model dóna intuïcions sobre la relació entre educació i productivitat.

La licitud de l’interès: evolució històrica d’un tema de moral econòmica

[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent