Executive functions of children born very preterm--deficit or delay?

This cross-sectional study examined the performance of children born very preterm and/or at very low birth weight (VPT/VLBW) and same-aged term-born controls in three core executive functions: inhibition, working memory, and shifting. Children were divided into two age groups according to the median (young, 8.00-9.86 years; old, 9.87-12.99 years). The aims of the study were to investigate whether (a) VPT/VLBW children of both age groups performed poorer than controls (deficit hypothesis) or caught up with increasing age (delay hypothesis) and (b) whether VPT/VLBW children displayed a similar pattern of performance increase in executive functions with advancing age compared with the controls. Fifty-six VPT/VLBW children born in the cohort of 1998-2003 and 41 healthy-term-born controls were recruited. All children completed tests of inhibition (Color-Word Interference Task, Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS)), working memory (Digit Span Backwards, HAWIK-IV), and shifting (Trail Making Test, Number-Letter Sequencing, D-KEFS). Results revealed that young VPT/VLBW children performed significantly poorer than the young controls in inhibition, working memory, and shifting, whereas old VPT/VLBW children performed similar to the old controls across all three executive functions. Furthermore, the frequencies of impairment in inhibition, working memory and shifting were higher in the young VPT/VLBW group compared with the young control group, whereas frequencies of impairment were equal in the old groups. In both VPT/VLBW children and controls, the highest increase in executive performance across the ages of 8 to 12 years was observed in shifting, followed by working memory, and inhibition.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Governor Tom Judge: Early Years - The Path to Becoming Montana's 18th Governor -- Sidney Armstrong, Larry Pettit & Kent Kleinkopf “In the Crucible of Change”

The dramatic period of progressive change in Montana that is documented "In the Crucible of Change" series really exploded with the election of Governors Forrest Anderson and Tom Judge. Anderson's single term saw the dispatching of the sales tax as an issue for a long period, the reorganization of the executive branch of state government and the revision of Montana's Constitution. As a former legislator, county attorney, Supreme Court justice, and Attorney General, Anderson brought unmatched experience to the governorship when elected. Tom Judge, although much younger (elected MT’s youngest governor at age 38 immediately following Anderson), also brought serious experience to the governorship: six years as a MT State Representative, two years as a MT State Senator, four years is Lieutenant Governor and significant business experience. The campaign and election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 spurred other young Americans to service, including Tom Judge. First elected in 1960, he rose rapidly through MT’s political-governmental hierarchy until he took over the governorship in time to implement many of the changes started in Governor Anderson’s term. But as a strong progressive leader in his own right, Governor Judge sponsored and implemented significant advancements of his own for Montana. Those accomplishments, however, are the subject of other films in this series. This film deals with Tom Judge’s early years – his rise to the governorship from when he returned home after college at Notre Dame and newspaper experience in Kentucky to his actual election in November 1972. That story is discussed in this episode by three major players in the effort, all directly involved in Tom Judge’s early years and path to the governorship: Sidney Armstrong, Larry Pettit and Kent Kleinkopf. Their recollections of the early Tom Judge and the period of his advancement to the governorship provide an insider’s perspective of the growth of this significant leader of the important period of progressive change documented “In the Crucible of Change.” Sidney Armstrong, President of Sidney Armstrong Consulting, serves on the board and as the Executive Director of the Greater Montana Foundation. Formerly Executive Director of the Montana Community Foundation (MCF), she has served on national committees and participated in national foundation initiatives. While at MCF, she worked extensively with MT Governors Racicot and Martz on the state charitable endowment tax credit and other endowed philanthropy issues. A member of MT Governor Thomas L. Judge’s staff in the 1970s, she was also part of Governor Brian Schweitzer’s 2004 Transition Team, continuing to serve as a volunteer advisor during his term. In the 1980s, Sidney also worked for the MT State AFL-CIO and the MT Democratic Party as well as working two sessions with the MT Senate as Assistant Secretary of the Senate and aide to the President. A Helena native, and great granddaughter of pioneer Montanans, Sidney has served on numerous nonprofit boards, and is currently a board member for the Montana History Foundation. Recently she served on the board of the Holter Museum of Art and was a Governor’s appointee to the Humanities Montana board. She is a graduate of the International School of Geneva, Switzerland and the University of Montana. Armstrong's Irish maternal immigrant great-grandparents, Thomas and Maria Cahill Cooney, came to Virginia City, MT in a covered wagon in 1865, looking for gold. Eventually, they settled on the banks of the Missouri River outside Helena as ranchers. She also has roots in Butte, MT, where her journalist father's family, both of whom were newspaper people, lived. Her father, Richard K. O’Malley, is also the author of a well-known book about Butte, Mile High, Mile Deep, recently re-published by Russell Chatham. She is the mother of four and the grandmother of eight. Dr. Lawrence K. Pettit (Larry Pettit) (b. 5/2/1937) has had a dual career in politics and higher education. In addition to being Montana’s first Commissioner of Higher Education (the subject of another film in this series); Pettit, of Lewistown, served as legislative assistant to U.S. Senators James E. Murray and Lee Metcalf, campaign manager, head of transition team and assistant to Montana Governor Thomas L. Judge; taught political science at The Pennsylvania State University (main campus), was chair of political science at Montana State University, Deputy Commissioner for Academic Programs at the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, Chancellor of the University System of South Texas (since merged with Texas A&M University), President of Southern Illinois University, and President of Indiana University of Pennsylvania from where he retired in 2003. He has served as chair of the Commission on Leadership for the American Council on Education, president of the National Association of (University) System Heads, and on many national and state boards and commissions in higher education. Pettit is author of “If You Live by the Sword: Politics in the Making and Unmaking of a University President.” More about Pettit is found at http://www.lawrencekpettit.com… Kent Kleinkopf of Missoula is co-founder of a firm with a national scope of business that specializes in litigation consultation, expert vocational testimony, and employee assistance programs. His partner (and wife of 45 years) Kathy, is an expert witness in the 27 year old business. Kent received a BA in History/Education from the University of Idaho and an MA in Economics from the University of Utah. The Kleinkopfs moved to Helena, MT in 1971 where he was Assistant to the Commissioner of State Lands (later Governor) Ted Schwinden. In early 1972 Kent volunteered full time in Lt. Governor Tom Judge’s campaign for Governor, driving the Lt. Governor extensively throughout Montana. After Judge was elected governor, Kent briefly joined the staff of Governor Forrest Anderson, then in 1973 transitioned to Judge’s Governor’s Office staff, where he became Montana’s first “Citizens’ Advocate.” In that capacity he fielded requests for assistance from citizens with concerns and information regarding State Agencies. While on the Governor’s staff, Kent continued as a travel aide with the governor both in Montana and nationally. In 1977 Kent was appointed Director of the MT Department of Business Regulation. That role included responsibility as Superintendent of Banking and Chairman of the State Banking Board, where Kent presided over the chartering of many banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. In 1981 the Kleinkopfs moved to Missoula and went into the business they run today. Kent was appointed by Governor Brian Schweitzer to the Board of the Montana Historical Society in 2006, was reappointed and continues to serve. Kathy and Kent have a daughter and son-in-law in Missoula.

Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information

In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable information. We compare long-term contracts with short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design.

Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces

We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to the residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.