Exact Nonparametric Two-Sample Homogeneity Tests for Possibly Discrete Distributions.

In this paper, we study several tests for the equality of two unknown distributions. Two are based on empirical distribution functions, three others on nonparametric probability density estimates, and the last ones on differences between sample moments. We suggest controlling the size of such tests (under nonparametric assumptions) by using permutational versions of the tests jointly with the method of Monte Carlo tests properly adjusted to deal with discrete distributions. We also propose a combined test procedure, whose level is again perfectly controlled through the Monte Carlo test technique and has better power properties than the individual tests that are combined. Finally, in a simulation experiment, we show that the technique suggested provides perfect control of test size and that the new tests proposed can yield sizeable power improvements.

An Eigenfunction Approach for Volatility Modeling.

In this paper, we introduce a new approach for volatility modeling in discrete and continuous time. We follow the stochastic volatility literature by assuming that the variance is a function of a state variable. However, instead of assuming that the loading function is ad hoc (e.g., exponential or affine), we assume that it is a linear combination of the eigenfunctions of the conditional expectation (resp. infinitesimal generator) operator associated to the state variable in discrete (resp. continuous) time. Special examples are the popular log-normal and square-root models where the eigenfunctions are the Hermite and Laguerre polynomials respectively. The eigenfunction approach has at least six advantages: i) it is general since any square integrable function may be written as a linear combination of the eigenfunctions; ii) the orthogonality of the eigenfunctions leads to the traditional interpretations of the linear principal components analysis; iii) the implied dynamics of the variance and squared return processes are ARMA and, hence, simple for forecasting and inference purposes; (iv) more importantly, this generates fat tails for the variance and returns processes; v) in contrast to popular models, the variance of the variance is a flexible function of the variance; vi) these models are closed under temporal aggregation.

Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

ARMA Representation of Integrated and Realized Variances

This paper derives the ARMA representation of integrated and realized variances when the spot variance depends linearly on two autoregressive factors, i.e., SR SARV(2) models. This class of processes includes affine, GARCH diffusion, CEV models, as well as the eigenfunction stochastic volatility and the positive Ornstein-Uhlenbeck models. We also study the leverage effect case, the relationship between weak GARCH representation of returns and the ARMA representation of realized variances. Finally, various empirical implications of these ARMA representations are considered. We find that it is possible that some parameters of the ARMA representation are negative. Hence, the positiveness of the expected values of integrated or realized variances is not guaranteed. We also find that for some frequencies of observations, the continuous time model parameters may be weakly or not identified through the ARMA representation of realized variances.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The shunt from the cyclooxygenase to lipoxygenase pathway in human osteoarthritic subchondral osteoblasts is linked with a variable expression of the 5-lipoxygenase-activating protein

Affiliation: Unité de recherche en Arthrose, Centre de recherche du Centre Hospitalier de l'Université de Montréal, Hôpital Notre-Dame

From Smeed's Single-Damage Fixed-Form Three-Variable Model to Multinational and Multiprovincial Drag-Type Formulations: Does the Mystery of 1972-1973 Disapear ?

Rapport de recherche

Les erreurs de mesure sur la variable indépendante, dans le cadre de séries chronologiques.

Rapport de recherche

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.