Entrepreneurial structure of the mercantile company in pre-industrial Catalonia

The mercantile company was the basic form of enterprise in pre-industrial Catalonia. The aim of this paper is to study the formation and development of the mercantile companies in Barcelona whose end was the wholesale and retail sale of textiles in the botigues de teles (textile retail shops) throughout the eighteenth century. These firms were officially registered before a notary and their deeds reveal how these establishments were administered and managed.The study covers a sample of 121 mercantile companies, and the articles and documentation that were put into effect by 32 notaries who were active in Barcelona in the 18th century have been consulted in their entirety. From an initial selection of documentation, a total of 228 deeds registering companies have been found, 107 of which (47%) relate to the creation of companies whose various activities were centred in taverns, textile manufacturing, braiding.... While the 121 companies, which make up our sample and which account for 53% of the deeds registered with the notaries mentioned above, focused exclusively on the management of textile retail shops located in the commercial heart of the city. Thus one point of interest that the documentation reveals is that the majority of the mercantile companies registered by Barcelona notaries throughout the 18th century were establishments which traded in textiles. The first part of the article focuses on the structural characteristics of these enterprises, the number and socio-professional status of the partners and the extent of each partner s involvement in the administration and management. The second part of the article examines the capital investment made by each partner, their rights and obligations agreed on, the sharing out of profits and possible losses and the duration of the companies. The final aim of the paper is to highlight the evolution of these companies through one specific case.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

Risk management under a two-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents several applications to interest rate risk managementbased on a two-factor continuous-time model of the term structure of interestrates previously presented in Moreno (1996). This model assumes that defaultfree discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and twofactors, the long-term interest rate and the spread (difference between thelong-term rate and the short-term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Several newmeasures of ``generalized duration" are presented and applied in differentsituations in order to manage market risk and yield curve risk. By means ofthese measures, we are able to compute the hedging ratios that allows us toimmunize a bond portfolio by means of options on bonds. Focusing on thehedging problem, it is shown that these new measures allow us to immunize abond portfolio against changes (parallel and/or in the slope) in the yieldcurve. Finally, a proposal of solution of the limitations of conventionalduration by means of these new measures is presented and illustratednumerically.

A scaled difference chi-square test statistic for moment structure analysis

A family of scaling corrections aimed to improve the chi-square approximation of goodness-of-fit test statistics in small samples, large models, and nonnormal data was proposed in Satorra and Bentler (1994). For structural equations models, Satorra-Bentler's (SB) scaling corrections are available in standard computer software. Often, however, the interest is not on the overall fit of a model, but on a test of the restrictions that a null model say ${\cal M}_0$ implies on a less restricted one ${\cal M}_1$. If $T_0$ and $T_1$ denote the goodness-of-fit test statistics associated to ${\cal M}_0$ and ${\cal M}_1$, respectively, then typically the difference $T_d = T_0 - T_1$ is used as a chi-square test statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the difference on the number of independent parameters estimated under the models ${\cal M}_0$ and ${\cal M}_1$. As in the case of the goodness-of-fit test, it is of interest to scale the statistic $T_d$ in order to improve its chi-square approximation in realistic, i.e., nonasymptotic and nonnormal, applications. In a recent paper, Satorra (1999) shows that the difference between two Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistics for overall model fit does not yield the correct SB scaled difference test statistic. Satorra developed an expression that permits scaling the difference test statistic, but his formula has some practical limitations, since it requires heavy computations that are notavailable in standard computer software. The purpose of the present paper is to provide an easy way to compute the scaled difference chi-square statistic from the scaled goodness-of-fit test statistics of models ${\cal M}_0$ and ${\cal M}_1$. A Monte Carlo study is provided to illustrate the performance of the competing statistics.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

Comparative advantage and the cross-section of business cycles

Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. Since new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demands than those of poor countries. Since skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labour supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross-country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Signaling cross-talk between peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor/retinoid X receptor and estrogen receptor through estrogen response elements.

Peroxisome proliferator-activated receptors (PPARs) and retinoid X receptors (RXRs) are nuclear hormone receptors that are activated by fatty acids and 9-cis-retinoic acid, respectively. PPARs and RXRs form heterodimers that activate transcription by binding to PPAR response elements (PPREs) in the promoter of target genes. The PPREs described thus far consist of a direct tandem repeat of the AGGTCA core element with one intervening nucleotide. We show here that the vitellogenin A2 estrogen response element (ERE) can also function as a PPRE and is bound by a PPAR/RXR heterodimer. Although this heterodimer can bind to several other ERE-related palindromic response elements containing AGGTCA half-sites, only the ERE is able to confer transactivation of test reporter plasmids, when the ERE is placed either close to or at a distance from the transcription initiation site. Examination of natural ERE-containing promoters, including the pS2, very-low-density apolipoprotein II and vitellogenin A2 genes, revealed considerable differences in the binding of PPAR/RXR heterodimers to these EREs. In their natural promoter context, these EREs did not allow transcriptional activation by PPARs/RXRs. Analysis of this lack of stimulation of the vitellogenin A2 promoter demonstrated that PPARs/RXRs bind to the ERE but cannot transactivate due to a nonpermissive promoter structure. As a consequence, PPARs/RXRs inhibit transactivation by the estrogen receptor through competition for ERE binding. This is the first example of signaling cross-talk between PPAR/RXR and estrogen receptor.

Externalities and interdependent growth: Theory and evidence

I formulate and estimate a model of externalities within countriesand technological interdependence across countries. I find that externalreturns to scale to physical capital within countries are 8 percent; thata 10 percent increase of total factor productivity of a country's neighborsraises its total factor productivity by 6 percent; and that a 2 percentannual growth rate of labor productivity can be explained as an endogenousresponse to an exogenous 0.2 percent annual growth rate of total factorproductivity in the steady--state.

A two-mean reverting-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents a two--factor model of the term structure ofinterest rates. We assume that default free discount bond prices aredetermined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long--term interestrate and the spread (difference between the long--term rate and theshort--term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Assuming that both factorsfollow a joint Ornstein--Uhlenbeck process, a general bond pricing equationis derived. We obtain a closed--form expression for bond prices andexamine its implications for the term structure of interest rates. We alsoderive a closed--form solution for interest rate derivatives prices. Thisexpression is applied to price European options on discount bonds andmore complex types of options. Finally, empirical evidence of the model'sperformance is presented.

Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.

An experimental study of discharge partitioning and flow structure at symmetrical bifurcations

Recent research has examined the factors controlling the geometrical configuration of bifurcations, determined the range of stability conditions for a number of bifurcation types and assessed the impact of perturbations on bifurcation evolution. However, the flow division process and the parameters that influence flow and sediment partitioning are still poorly characterized. To identify and isolate these parameters, three-dimensional velocities were measured at 11 cross-sections in a fixed-walled experimental bifurcation. Water surface gradients were controlled, and systematically varied, using a weir in each distributary. As may be expected, the steepest distributary conveyed the most discharge ( was dominant) while the mildest distributary conveyed the least discharge ( was subordinate). A zone of water surface super-elevation was co-located with the bifurcation in symmetric cases or displaced into the subordinate branch in asymmetric cases. Downstream of a relatively acute-angled bifurcation, primary velocity cores were near to the water surface and against the inner banks, with near-bed zones of lower primary velocity at the outer banks. Downstream of an obtuse-angled bifurcation, velocity cores were initially at the outer banks, with near-bed zones of lower velocities at the inner banks, but patterns soon reverted to match the acute-angled case. A single secondary flow cell was generated in each distributary, with water flowing inwards at the water surface and outwards at the bed. Circulation was relatively enhanced within the subordinate branch, which may help explain why subordinate distributaries remain open, may play a role in determining the size of commonly-observed topographic features, and may thus exert some control on the stability of asymmetric bifurcations. Further, because larger values of circulation result from larger gradient disadvantages, the length of confluence-diffluence units in braided rivers or between diffluences within delta distributary networks may vary depending upon flow structures inherited from upstream and whether, and how, they are fed by dominant or subordinate distributaries. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

A search theory of money and commerce with Neoclassical production

This paper advances a highly tractable model with search theoretic foundations for money and neoclassical growth. In the model, manufacturingand commerce are distinct and separate activities. In manufacturing,goods are efficiently produced combining capital and labor. In commerce,goods are exchanged in bilateral meetings. The model is applied to studythe effects of inßation on capital accumulation and welfare. With realisticparameters, inflation has large negative effects on welfare even though itraises capital and output. In contrast, with cash-in-advance, a deviceinformally motivated with bilateral trading, inflation depresses capitaland output and has a negligible effect on welfare.

Market structure and hospital efficiency: Evaluating potential effects of deregulation in a national health service

In this article we examine the potential effect of market structureon hospital technical efficiency as a measure of performance controlled byownership and regulation. This study is relevant to provide an evaluationof the potential effects of recommended and initiated deregulation policiesin order to promote market reforms in the context of a European NationalHealth Service. Our goal was reached through three main empirical stages.Firstly, using patient origin data from hospitals in the region of Cataloniain 1990, we estimated geographic hospital markets through the Elzinga--Hogartyapproach, based on patient flows. Then we measured the market level ofconcentration using the Herfindahl--Hirschman index. Secondly, technicaland scale efficiency scores for each hospital was obtained specifying aData Envelopment Analysis. According to the data nearly two--thirds of thehospitals operate under the production frontier with an average efficiencyscore of 0.841. Finally, the determinants of the efficiency scores wereinvestigated using a censored regression model. Special attention waspaid to test the hypothesis that there is an efficiency improvement in morecompetitive markets. The results suggest that the number of competitors inthe market contributes positively to technical efficiency and there is someevidence that the differences in efficiency scores are attributed toseveral environmental factors such as ownership, market structure andregulation effects.