A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

Simulation-Based Finite-Sample Tests for Heteroskedasticity and ARCH Effects.

A wide range of tests for heteroskedasticity have been proposed in the econometric and statistics literature. Although a few exact homoskedasticity tests are available, the commonly employed procedures are quite generally based on asymptotic approximations which may not provide good size control in finite samples. There has been a number of recent studies that seek to improve the reliability of common heteroskedasticity tests using Edgeworth, Bartlett, jackknife and bootstrap methods. Yet the latter remain approximate. In this paper, we describe a solution to the problem of controlling the size of homoskedasticity tests in linear regression contexts. We study procedures based on the standard test statistics [e.g., the Goldfeld-Quandt, Glejser, Bartlett, Cochran, Hartley, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, White and Szroeter criteria] as well as tests for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH-type models). We also suggest several extensions of the existing procedures (sup-type of combined test statistics) to allow for unknown breakpoints in the error variance. We exploit the technique of Monte Carlo tests to obtain provably exact p-values, for both the standard and the new tests suggested. We show that the MC test procedure conveniently solves the intractable null distribution problem, in particular those raised by the sup-type and combined test statistics as well as (when relevant) unidentified nuisance parameter problems under the null hypothesis. The method proposed works in exactly the same way with both Gaussian and non-Gaussian disturbance distributions [such as heavy-tailed or stable distributions]. The performance of the procedures is examined by simulation. The Monte Carlo experiments conducted focus on : (1) ARCH, GARCH, and ARCH-in-mean alternatives; (2) the case where the variance increases monotonically with : (i) one exogenous variable, and (ii) the mean of the dependent variable; (3) grouped heteroskedasticity; (4) breaks in variance at unknown points. We find that the proposed tests achieve perfect size control and have good power.

Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Substitution, and Option Pricing

This paper develops a general stochastic framework and an equilibrium asset pricing model that make clear how attitudes towards intertemporal substitution and risk matter for option pricing. In particular, we show under which statistical conditions option pricing formulas are not preference-free, in other words, when preferences are not hidden in the stock and bond prices as they are in the standard Black and Scholes (BS) or Hull and White (HW) pricing formulas. The dependence of option prices on preference parameters comes from several instantaneous causality effects such as the so-called leverage effect. We also emphasize that the most standard asset pricing models (CAPM for the stock and BS or HW preference-free option pricing) are valid under the same stochastic setting (typically the absence of leverage effect), regardless of preference parameter values. Even though we propose a general non-preference-free option pricing formula, we always keep in mind that the BS formula is dominant both as a theoretical reference model and as a tool for practitioners. Another contribution of the paper is to characterize why the BS formula is such a benchmark. We show that, as soon as we are ready to accept a basic property of option prices, namely their homogeneity of degree one with respect to the pair formed by the underlying stock price and the strike price, the necessary statistical hypotheses for homogeneity provide BS-shaped option prices in equilibrium. This BS-shaped option-pricing formula allows us to derive interesting characterizations of the volatility smile, that is, the pattern of BS implicit volatilities as a function of the option moneyness. First, the asymmetry of the smile is shown to be equivalent to a particular form of asymmetry of the equivalent martingale measure. Second, this asymmetry appears precisely when there is either a premium on an instantaneous interest rate risk or on a generalized leverage effect or both, in other words, whenever the option pricing formula is not preference-free. Therefore, the main conclusion of our analysis for practitioners should be that an asymmetric smile is indicative of the relevance of preference parameters to price options.

GLS Detrending, Efficient Unit Root Tests and Structural Change

We extend the class of M-tests for a unit root analyzed by Perron and Ng (1996) and Ng and Perron (1997) to the case where a change in the trend function is allowed to occur at an unknown time. These tests M(GLS) adopt the GLS detrending approach of Dufour and King (1991) and Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) (ERS). Following Perron (1989), we consider two models : one allowing for a change in slope and the other for both a change in intercept and slope. We derive the asymptotic distribution of the tests as well as that of the feasible point optimal tests PT(GLS) suggested by ERS. The asymptotic critical values of the tests are tabulated. Also, we compute the non-centrality parameter used for the local GLS detrending that permits the tests to have 50% asymptotic power at that value. We show that the M(GLS) and PT(GLS) tests have an asymptotic power function close to the power envelope. An extensive simulation study analyzes the size and power in finite samples under various methods to select the truncation lag for the autoregressive spectral density estimator. An empirical application is also provided.

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

L’encadrement normatif des technologies : une gestion réseautique des risques

Lors du 30è Congrès de l’Institut international de droit d’expression et d’inspiration françaises (IDEF), Le Caire, 16 au 18 décembre 2006, Pierre TRUDEL a présenté un rapport intitulé « L’encadrement normatif des technologies : une gestion réseautique des risques ». Cynthia Chassigneux, chercheure post-doctorale au CRDP a présenté un rapport sur le droit de la protection des données personnelles et de la vie privée dans le contexte de la généralisation des technologies de l’information. Jacques Frémont a prononcé le discours de présentation de la problématique générale du congrès.

Les enjeux économiques de la reconnaissance du titre exécutoire conventionnel

L’introduction éventuelle, au Québec, de la force exécutoire pour les actes notariés soulève, du point de vue économique, deux questions. La première porte sur les effets prévisibles de cette mesure, notamment sur le marché des services juridiques de rédaction d’actes. Du côté de l’offre, il convient de distinguer selon que l’acte notarié est obligatoire ou facultatif. Du côté de la demande, le changement tendrait à diminuer le coût de réalisation d’un droit. Le gain qui en résulte peut profiter, en partie, aux notaires. L’ampleur de l’effet dépend de la probabilité qu’il faille recourir à l’exécution forcée. L’effet irait dans le sens de réduire le coût du crédit et d’augmenter sa disponibilité. Pour le débiteur, l’engagement deviendrait plus risqué, mais du même coup, lui permettrait de signaler sa « crédibilité ». Les chiffres fournis dans une étude réalisée par le groupe Secor en 1995 font voir une économie plutôt modeste de ces mesures. Pour évaluer l’ampleur du désengorgement prévisible des tribunaux, il faudrait connaître l’importance des procédures essentiellement engagées pour la perception de créances. Au-delà des effets immédiats, les enjeux de cette mesure sont de deux ordres. D’abord, ils soulèvent la question de la justification d’accorder l’avantage comparatif de la force exécutoire aux actes notariés et à eux seuls. Cette question nous conduit à celle du statut d’officier public des notaires, plus précisément aux caractéristiques qui doivent être jugées essentielles pour ce statut. Car si l’on ne peut prêter au notaire une aussi grande confiance qu’au juge, il convient de s’interroger, aux fins de l’exécution forcée, sur les limites à imposer au contenu des actes ayant force exécutoire. Les réponses à ces questions présupposent des données qu’on peut difficilement obtenir autrement que par l’expérience prudente. Les chiffres disponibles permettent de prévoir des économies modestes. L’introduction de la force exécutoire doit s’accompagner de mesures de stricte surveillance, notamment en matière de conflits d’intérêt potentiels.

Le contrat en contexte d'intimité

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L'encadrement législatif des rapports pécuniaires entre époux : un grand ménage s'impose pour les nouveaux ménages

Un résumé en anglais est disponible.