Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

Summary Throughout my thesis, I elaborate on how real and financing frictions affect corporate decision making under uncertainty, and I explore how firms time their investment and financing decisions given such frictions. While the macroeconomics literature has focused on the impact of real frictions on investment decisions assuming all equity financed firms, the financial economics literature has mainly focused on the study of financing frictions. My thesis therefore assesses the join interaction of real and financing frictions in firms' dynamic investment and financing decisions. My work provides a rationale for the documented poor empirical performance of neoclassical investment models based on the joint effect of real and financing frictions on investment. A major observation relies in how the infrequency of corporate decisions may affect standard empirical tests. My thesis suggests that the book to market sorts commonly used in the empirical asset pricing literature have economic content, as they control for the lumpiness in firms' optimal investment policies. My work also elaborates on the effects of asymmetric information and strategic interaction on firms' investment and financing decisions. I study how firms time their decision to raise public equity when outside investors lack information about their future investment prospects. I derive areal-options model that predicts either cold or hot markets for new stock issues conditional on adverse selection, and I provide a rational approach to study jointly the market timing of corporate decisions and announcement effects in stock returns. My doctoral dissertation therefore contributes to our understanding of how under real and financing frictions may bias standard empirical tests, elaborates on how adverse selection may induce hot and cold markets in new issues' markets, and suggests how the underlying economic behaviour of firms may induce alternative patterns in stock prices.

High-growth cooperatives: Financial profile and key factors for competitiveness

Given the current economic environment, high-growth companies are particularly relevant for their contribution to employment generation and wealth.This paper discusses the results of a survey that was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of high-growth cooperatives through analyzing their financial profiles and then identifying key contributing factors to their growth. To do this, we compared this particular sample with other cooperatives and other high-growth mercantile companies.The results show the main drivers related to high-growth companies success. They are the competitive advantages based on the surveyed group, modern management techniques, quality and productivity, innovation and internationalization. Additionally, we have observed some financial strengths and weaknesses. In this sense, they are under capitalized companies with an unbalanced growth.

On commercial media bias

Within the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allowsfor non-localized competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets, we quantify the effect of concentration of ownership on qualityand bias of media content. A main result shows that too few commercial outlets, or better, too few separate owners of commercial outlets can lead to substantial bias in equilibrium. Increasing the number of outlets (commercial and non-commercial) tends to bring down this bias; but the strongest effect occurs when the number of owners is increased. Allowing for free entry provides lower bounds on fixed costs above which substantial commercial bias occurs in equilibrium.

Long-Term Care Insurance Companies, September 2007

The companies on this list have been approved to sell long-term-care insurance in the State of Iowa. Customer service numbers are listed for each company. Please open pdf for the numbers.

Insuring California earthquakes and the role for catastrophe bonds

The 1994 Northridge earthquake sent ripples to insurance conpanieseverywhere. This was one in a series of natural disasters such asHurricane Andrew which together with the problems in Lloyd's of Londonhave insurance companies running for cover. This paper presents a calibration of the U.S. economy in a model with financial markets forinsurance derivatives that suggests the U.S. economy can deal with thedamage of natural catastrophe far better than one might think.

Malliavin calculus in finance

This article is an introduction to Malliavin Calculus for practitioners.We treat one specific application to the calculation of greeks in Finance.We consider also the kernel density method to compute greeks and anextension of the Vega index called the local vega index.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, How to register -- and cut unwanted commercial telemarketing calls, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: How to register -- and cut unwanted commercial telemarketing calls.