Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

Expression of foraging and Gp-9 are associated with social organization in the fire ant Solenopsis invicta.

The aim of this study was to investigate levels of expression of two major genes, the odorant binding protein Gp-9 (general protein-9) and foraging, that have been shown to be associated with behavioural polymorphisms in ants. We analysed workers and young nonreproductive queens collected from nests of the monogyne (single reproductive queen per nest) and polygyne (multiple reproductive queens) social forms of Solenopsis invicta. In workers but not young queens, the level of foraging expression was significantly associated with social form and the task performed (ie localization in the nest or foraging area). The level of expression of Gp-9 was also associated with social form and worker localization. In addition there was a higher level of expression of the Gp-9(b) allele compared with the Gp-9(B) allele in the heterozygote workers and the young nonreproductive queens. Finally, in the polygyne colonies the level of expression of foraging was not significantly associated with the Gp-9 genotype for either workers or young nonreproductive queens, suggesting that both genes have independent non-epistatic effects on behaviour in S. invicta.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

The INTERNORM project : bridging two worlds of expert- and layknowledge in standardization

This paper presents a pilot project to reinforce participatory practices in standardization. The INTERNORM project is funded by the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. It aims to create an interactive knowledge center based on the sharing of academic skills and the experiences accumulated by the civil society, especially consumer associations, environmental associations and trade unions to strengthen the participatory process of standardization. The first objective of the project is action-oriented: INTERNORM provides a common knowledge pool supporting the participation of civil society actors to international standard-setting activities by bringing them together with academic experts in working groups and by providing logistic and financial support to their participation to meetings of national and international technical committees. The second objective of the project is analytical: the standardization action initiated through INTERNORM provides a research field for a better understanding of the participatory dynamics underpinning international standardization. The paper presents three incentives that explain civil society (non-)involvement in standardization that try to overcome conventional resource-based hypotheses: an operational incentive, related to the use of standards in the selective goods provided by associations to their membership; a thematic incentive, provided by the setting of priorities by strategic committees created in some standardization organization; a rhetorical incentive, related to the discursive resource that civil society concerns offers to the different stakeholders.

Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule

The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims haveheterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care bythe injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observeat all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-bestcannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on thefirst-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care,and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. This second-bestsolution can be easily implemented by a negligence rule with second-best as duecare. We explore imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing theoptimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannotverify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is nodifference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and arule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate thefindings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Lawlegal systems.