Structural macro factors and the affine term structure of interest rates

This work consists of three essays investigating the ability of structural macroeconomic models to price zero coupon U.S. government bonds. 1. A small scale 3 factor DSGE model implying constant term premium is able to provide reasonable a fit for the term structure only at the expense of the persistence parameters of the structural shocks. The test of the structural model against one that has constant but unrestricted prices of risk parameters shows that the exogenous prices of risk-model is only weakly preferred. We provide an MLE based variance-covariance matrix of the Metropolis Proposal Density that improves convergence speeds in MCMC chains. 2. Affine in observable macro-variables, prices of risk specification is excessively flexible and provides term-structure fit without significantly altering the structural parameters. The exogenous component of the SDF is separating the macro part of the model from the term structure and the good term structure fit has as a driving force an extremely volatile SDF and an implied average short rate that is inexplicable. We conclude that the no arbitrage restrictions do not suffice to temper the SDF, thus there is need for more restrictions. We introduce a penalty-function methodology that proves useful in showing that affine prices of risk specifications are able to reconcile stable macro-dynamics with good term structure fit and a plausible SDF. 3. The level factor is reproduced most importantly by the preference shock to which it is strongly and positively related but technology and monetary shocks, with negative loadings, are also contributing to its replication. The slope factor is only related to the monetary policy shocks and it is poorly explained. We find that there are gains in in- and out-of-sample forecast of consumption and inflation if term structure information is used in a time varying hybrid prices of risk setting. In-sample yield forecast are better in models with non-stationary shocks for the period 1982-1988. After this period, time varying market price of risk models provide better in-sample forecasts. For the period 2005-2008, out of sample forecast of consumption and inflation are better if term structure information is incorporated in the DSGE model but yields are better forecasted by a pure macro DSGE model.

Interest rates mapping

The present study deals with the analysis and mapping of Swiss franc interest rates. Interest rates depend on time and maturity, defining term structure of the interest rate curves (IRC). In the present study IRC are considered in a two-dimensional feature space - time and maturity. Exploratory data analysis includes a variety of tools widely used in econophysics and geostatistics. Geostatistical models and machine learning algorithms (multilayer perceptron and Support Vector Machines) were applied to produce interest rate maps. IR maps can be used for the visualisation and pattern perception purposes, to develop and to explore economical hypotheses, to produce dynamic asset-liability simulations and for financial risk assessments. The feasibility of an application of interest rates mapping approach for the IRC forecasting is considered as well. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Le renouveau des antagonistes de l'atdostérone [The revived interest in aldosterone antagonists]

Aldosterone plays a pivotal role in sodium and water homeostasis, in particular in patients with heart failure or high blood pressure. These medications, when used on top of a standard therapy, improve the outcome of patients with heart failure and are also effective in lowering blood pressure of hypertensive patients. The major risk associated with the use of these antagonists is hyperkalemia, which can be prevented in avoiding their prescription in patients with impaired renal function. Eplerenone has the advantage, compared with spironolactone, to be better tolerated in terms of "hormonal" adverse effects.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.