A Cooperative Management Solution to a Fishery Commons

A common property resource with open access, such as a fishery, will be used to excess when faced with sufficient demand. This will lead to an excessive amount of effort on the part of the fishery, resulting in a depletion of the stock. This paper discusses the development of a property rights regime for the Atlantic calico scallop, Argopecten gibbus, fishery of Florida. The management solution of the Calico Scallop Conservation Association (CSCA) provides an example of the assignment of property rights to a common property resource without resorting to governmental intervention. In this particular fishery, self-regulation limited early harvesting which would be uneconomic; there may be other fisheries in which self-regulation could be economically efficient and biologically appropriate. While this solution may not be applicable to all common property resources, for those cases which may be similar; the example of the CSCA provides valuable information that may be helpful in establishing a more efficient use of the resource. Some types of government facilitation may also be useful.