Potencial de mercado y estructura espacial de los salarios en las regiones españolas, 1955-1995

En este artículo se examina la relación existente entre los salarios de las regiones españolas y su potencial de mercado en el período 1955-1995. Se prueba la existencia de una estructura espacial de los salarios, en la que los salarios disminuyen al alejarnos de las regiones de renta elevada. Este resultado refuerza la hipótesis de la existencia de una dinámica aglomerativa en España durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Sin embargo, el efecto del potencial de mercado sobre los salarios disminuye en la segunda parte del período (1975-1995). Este resultado es consistente con la apertura de una senda de dispersión en la localización de la actividad industrial a partir de mediados de los setenta

Were Spanish migrants attracted by industrial agglomerations?: an analysis for the interwar years in the light of the new economic geography

In this paper we examine whether access to markets had a significant influence onmigration choices of Spanish internal migrants in the inter-war years. We perform astructural contrast of a New Economic Geography model that focus on the forwardlinkage that links workers location choice with the geography of industrial production,one of the centripetal forces that drive agglomeration in the NEG models. The resultshighlight the presence of this forward linkage in the Spanish economy of the inter-warperiod. That is, we prove the existence of a direct relation between workers¿ localizationdecisions and the market potential of the host regions. In addition, the direct estimationof the values associated with key parameters in the NEG model allows us to simulatethe migratory flows derived from different scenarios of the relative size of regions andthe distances between them. We show that in Spain the power of attraction of theagglomerations grew as they increased in size, but the high elasticity estimated for themigration costs reduced the intensity of the migratory flows. This could help to explainthe apparently low intensity of internal migrations in Spain until its upsurge during the1920s. This also explains the geography of migrations in Spain during this period,which hardly affected the regions furthest from the large industrial agglomerations (i.e.,regions such as Andalusia, Estremadura and Castile-La Mancha) but had an intenseeffect on the provinces nearest to the principal centres of industrial development.

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Modelos de tasas de interes en Chile: una revisión

Con este trabajo revisamos los Modelos de niveles de las tasas de intereses en Chile. Además de los Modelos de Nivel tradicionales por Chan, Karoly, Longstaff y Lijadoras (1992) en EE. UU, y Parisi (1998) en Chile, por el método de Probabilidad Maximun permitimos que la volatilidad condicional también incluya los procesos inesperados de la información (el modelo GARCH ) y también que la volatilidad sea la función del nivel de la tasa de intereses (modelo TVP-NIVELE) como en Brenner, Harjes y la Crona (1996). Para esto usamos producciones de mercado de bonos de reconocimiento, en cambio las producciones mensuales medias de subasta PDBC, y la ampliación del tamaño y la frecuencia de la muestra a 4 producciones semanales con términos(condiciones) diferentes a la madurez: 1 año, 5 años, 10 años y 15 años. Los resultados principales del estudio pueden ser resumidos en esto: la volatilidad de los cambios inesperados de las tarifas depende positivamente del nivel de las tarifas, sobre todo en el modelo de TVP-NIVEL. Obtenemos pruebas de reversión tacañas, tal que los incrementos en las tasas de intereses no eran independientes, contrariamente a lo obtenido por Brenner. en EE. UU. Los modelos de NIVELES no son capaces de ajustar apropiadamente la volatilidad en comparación con un modelo GARCH (1,1), y finalmente, el modelo de TVP-NIVEL no vence los resultados del modelo GARCH (1,1)

Herramientas estadísticas para el estudio de perfiles de riesgo

En este documento se ilustra de un modo práctico, el empleo de tres instrumentos que permiten al actuario definir grupos arancelarios y estimar premios de riesgo en el proceso que tasa la clase para el seguro de no vida. El primero es el análisis de segmentación (CHAID y XAID) usado en primer lugar en 1997 por UNESPA en su cartera común de coches. El segundo es un proceso de selección gradual con el modelo de regresión a base de distancia. Y el tercero es un proceso con el modelo conocido y generalizado de regresión linear, que representa la técnica más moderna en la bibliografía actuarial. De estos últimos, si combinamos funciones de eslabón diferentes y distribuciones de error, podemos obtener el aditivo clásico y modelos multiplicativos

The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Testing the bivariate distribution of daily equity returns using copulas: an application to the Spanish stock market

In this paper we deal with the identification of dependencies between time series of equity returns. Marginal distribution functions are assumed to be known, and a bivariate chi-square test of fit is applied in a fully parametric copula approach. Several families of copulas are fitted and compared with Spanish stock market data. The results show that the t-copula generally outperforms other dependence structures, and highlight the difficulty in adjusting a significant number of bivariate data series

Option valuation as an expectation in the complex domain: The Black-Scholes case

It is very well known that the first succesful valuation of a stock option was done by solving a deterministic partial differential equation (PDE) of the parabolic type with some complementary conditions specific for the option. In this approach, the randomness in the option value process is eliminated through a no-arbitrage argument. An alternative approach is to construct a replicating portfolio for the option. From this viewpoint the payoff function for the option is a random process which, under a new probabilistic measure, turns out to be of a special type, a martingale. Accordingly, the value of the replicating portfolio (equivalently, of the option) is calculated as an expectation, with respect to this new measure, of the discounted value of the payoff function. Since the expectation is, by definition, an integral, its calculation can be made simpler by resorting to powerful methods already available in the theory of analytic functions. In this paper we use precisely two of those techniques to find the well-known value of a European call

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative