O princípio da ofensividade como complemento necessário à regra da legalidade penal no Estado Democrático de Direito

As ideias políticas e filosóficas que influenciaram a criação da regra da legalidade penal e do princípio da ofensividade têm origem no Iluminismo. Principalmente durante a Idade Média e o Antigo Regime, confundia-se crime com pecado e as pessoas podiam ser punidas por mero capricho do soberano, sem que existisse lei. As arbitrariedades eram gritantes. A finalidade de ambas as teorias surgidas no período da Ilustração, portanto ao pregarem que era necessária a existência de lei prévia para que alguém fosse punido (regra da legalidade) e que o crime pressupunha uma lesão a direito ou bem jurídico de terceiro (princípio da ofensividade) , era a mesma: limitar o poder punitivo. No entanto, a regra da legalidade penal foi muito mais absorvida pelo discurso dogmático-jurídico do que o princípio da ofensividade, sendo oportuno, pois, analisar as razões pelas quais isso ocorreu. Algumas delas serão analisadas neste estudo como, por exemplo, a ausência de previsão explícita desse princípio nas Constituições, a suposta incompatibilidade desse princípio com a separação de poderes e com a própria regra da legalidade penal e a insegurança jurídica que a aplicação de princípios poderia gerar. Além disso, há um fator político de destaque: a consolidação da burguesia exigia a imposição de limites formais ao poder estatal, mas não limites materiais. Outro fator importante foi o advento do positivismo criminológico, no final do século XIX, que, ao confundir crime com doença, retornou ao paradigma do direito penal do autor que havia vigorado na Idade Média. Finalmente, para demonstrar o que impediu a consolidação do princípio da ofensividade especificamente no Brasil, será analisada a influência da doutrina europeia na dogmática nacional.

Reforma del estado como mecanismo de control en democracia delegativa: caso reforma judicial Ecuador 2007-2014

The object of this doctoral thesis is the analysis of the political and administrative purpose that is given to the reform process of a vital sector of State powers within the framework of delegate democracy, such as the administration of Justice. The object is also to analyze if State reform in a diminished or non-liberal surrounding increase or improve conditions of democracy in a given situation, based on the constitutional “what should be”, or if what occurs is a process of “seizure” of the functions of State, which becomes an institutional risk. Finally, we will examine the real and effective existence of a horizontal accountability process through the use of institutional resources, which would evidence the existence of an incomplete model of democracy. This analysis implies the relationship between two institutions within public administration: State Reform, as an act of change in State structure in order to improve qualitatively the outcomes and outputs of public policies, and in sum, to make the system work better. This, as it will be examined later, is the case of Latin America as a response of the State to three processes in crisis: fiscal, as in government intervention or in the form of bureaucratic administration. In that scheme of things, this thesis examines the present state of the art in public administration science of this process to prove that in delegate democracy, this type of instruments disregard the constitutive elements of democracy and serve, especially in critical areas of the administration, allowing for Power to dismiss Law. This research seeks to contribute towards an area seldom analyzed regarding public administration doctrine under the light of the theory of law, which is the connection between previous conditions or principal inputs of an execution process of a democracy and, on the other hand, regarding the effects of introducing a reform within models of a changing democracy and new concepts of the rule of law. While reviewing writings regarding State reform, it is clear that no approximations have been previously made in reference to prior conditions of the political system in order to begin operating a reform which respects fundamental rights as an object of this procedure. Furthermore, no analysis has been found regarding structural change of strategic areas in State services as to the effect caused on democratic exercise and the outcome in an open society...

Constitucionalismo principialista y constitucionalismo garantista

En este artículo, el autor presenta las diferencias más relevantes entre el neoconstitucionalismo y el constitucionalismo garantista. En primer lugar, afirma que el constitucionalismo puede ser concebido de dos formas opuestas: como una superación del positivismo jurídico en sentido tendencialmente iusnaturalista o como su expansión o perfeccionamiento, realizando para llevar a cabo esta labor una revisión terminológica. En segundo lugar, el autor considera que si las constituciones incorporan principios de justicia de carácter ético-político desaparece el principal rasgo distintivo del positivismo jurídico: la separación entre Derecho y moral o entre validez y justicia. A continuación, considera al constitucionalismo garantista como un iuspositivismo reforzado, completando al Estado de Derecho porque comporta el sometimiento al Derecho y al control de constitucionalidad. En cuarto lugar, el autor afirma que la tesis de que todo ordenamiento jurídico satisface objetivamente algún «mínimo ético» no es más que la vieja tesis iusnaturalista, que termina por convertirse en la actual versión del legalismo ético que es el constitucionalismo ético, en virtud del cual los principios constitucionales se pretenden objetivamente justos. En quinto lugar, el autor realiza una crítica a la contraposición entre principios y reglas, en los que se basa una concepción de la constitución y del constitucionalismo opuesta a la concepción positivista y garantista. En sexto lugar, el autor afirma que la idea de que los principios constitucionales son siempre objeto de ponderación y no de aplicación genera un peligro para la independencia de la jurisdicción y para su legitimación política. Finalmente, el autor considera que el constitucionalismo conlleva un debilitamiento y virtualmente un colapso de la normatividad de los principios constitucionales, así como una degradación de los derechos fundamentales establecidos en ellas a meras recomendaciones genéricas de carácter ético-político.

Current challenges in EU politics. A perspective from North Rhine-Westphalia. ZEI Discussion Paper C216, 2013

I would like to briefly recapitulate where Europe stands today, and what has been achieved. Because I maintain that in the EU’s 27 Member States we have, despite the failings and shortcomings we all bemoan, reached a level of unity, prosperity and rule of law unheard of in the history of this continent, and possibly of the world. As far as territory is concerned: the European Economic Community started out with six members. The late Bronislaw Geremek, former Foreign Minister of Poland and an eminent historian, used to point out that this, at the time, corresponded in size and shape roughly to the empire of Charlemagne, one of the greatest unified territories the continent has ever known. And yet, a mere 55 years after the Treaty of Rome we have gone far beyond that. Today’s European Union encompasses 27 countries, more than 4 million square kilometers in territory and 500 million people. When it comes to Europe’s policies, at present, all eyes are on the Euro and the future of our common monetary and financial policy. But within our common space, we have achieved so much more than a common currency for a majority of Member States.

Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 54, 25 February 2013

EU-Russia cooperation in the framework of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, launched almost a decade ago in 2003, has borne fruit more in the security aspects than the justice and liberty-related policy areas. This study assesses the uneven cooperation on justice and home affairs between the EU and Russia, while delving into the intersection between cooperation on justice, liberty and security and the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law in EU-Russia relations. The study concludes by proposing a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament for playing a more active role in this important field of cooperation between the EU and Russia.

A admissibilidade jurídico-penal do crime de burla por omissão

O estudo da problemática da admissibilidade jurídico-penal do crime de burla por omissão, enquadrando-se na órbitra dos crimes comissivos por omissão, impõe, a título de questão prévia, a análise do conteúdo e alcance da cláusula de equiparação da omissão à acção, ínsita no art. 10.º do C.P, e, bem assim, a indagação do seu fundamento e da sua compatibilidade com o princípio jurídico-constitucional da legalidade das normas incriminadoras e suas exigências de determinação típica decorrentes dos princípios nullum crimen sine (prævia) lege e nulla poena sine (prævia) lege., matéria a que nos debruçaremos na Parte I da presente dissertação e que deverá ser essencialmente entendida à luz do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana e da necessidade de um equilíbrio entre a certeza e a segurança jurídicas com a tutela de determinados bens-jurídicos fundamentais, enquanto pilares essenciais de qualquer Estado de Direito Democrático. Na parte II, tentaremos determinar o significado e alcance da conduta enganosa e astuciosa do crime de burla, previsto e punido pelo n.º 1 do art.º 217.º do C.P., desbravando, antes de mais, a sua evolução normativa até aos tempos hodiernos, após o que definiremos a estrutura normativa do tipo. Buscaremos, de seguida, uma aproximação ao conceito de engano e a determinação das formas e modalidades que a conduta enganosa e astuciosa poderá assumir: Exigirá a conduta típica uma mise-en-scène perpetrada pelo agente ou poderá bastar-se com uma mera mentira? Alcançada a sua (possível) determinação, estaremos já em condições de nos debruçarmos sobre a problemática da admissibilidade jurídico-penal da burla por omissão, altura em que, sob uma perspectiva crítica e acompanhada da análise igualmente crítica de casos, avançaremos com argumentos favoráveis e contrários a essa admissibilidade, sem, naturalmente, deixarmos de auscultar a tendência de entendimento da nossa Jurisprudência.

Deploying the energy incentive: reinforcing EU integration in South-East Europe. CEPS Policy Brief No. 296, July 2013

This Policy Brief urges the European Union to consider reinforcing the Energy Community by further Europeanising the Energy Community Treaty. It argues that the level of dysfunctionality with respect to the rule of law and corruption will make it very hard to establish a pathway for accession for most Balkan states. However, the demand across the region for a sustainable, competitive and stable energy sector creates an ‘energy incentive’ that the Union can leverage to improve the rule of law and adherence to European rules. Furthermore, a juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty will also strengthen the hand of those parties supporting energy liberalisation rules across the region, such as independent businesses, consumers and NGOs. In addition, there is likely to be significant spill-over effects from decisions of a European Energy Community Court operating in the region on the rule of law in general and the accession process in particular.

Egypt and the EU: where next? CEPS Commentary, 4 November 2013

EU diplomats are still struggling to keep abreast of events in Egypt. A reconstruction of the police state – bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE – is the exact opposite of what the EU tried to achieve under the Presidency of Mohamed Morsi, namely long-term stability based on respect for democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the EU has so far not imposed any sanctions against members of the military regime led by General al-Sisi. Instead, it is trying to build an inclusive political dialogue to restore a democratic process. Is this what the EU should do? The answer is, quite plainly, ‘Yes’– at least for the moment.

EU-Turkey Relations: Turning vicious circles into virtuous ones. CEPS Policy Brief No. 317, 26 March 2014

The coming weeks and months will be decisive for the general tenor of politics in Turkey. The country faces local elections this March, presidential elections in August and general elections next June, while top-level political scandals compound the deterioration in the state of democracy and rule of law. At the same time, stagnation in Turkey’s accession process continues to sour relations with the EU. In this new Policy Brief, Steven Blockmans puts forward a number of recommendations to help drive the EU accession process forward, namely the early opening of negotiation chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security), in line with the EU’s so-called New Approach. In that way reform could not just be assured on paper, but a track record in implementation could be established throughout the process. To achieve this, member states, and Cyprus in particular, need to be persuaded to end their opposition to formulating benchmarks for the opening of accession negotiating chapters 23 and 24.

What can the Better Regulation Commissioner do for the EU? CEPS Commentary, 29 September 2014

This commentary welcomes the creation and prominence given by President Juncker to the new post of First Vice-President in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as among the most interesting of several novelties contained in the proposed Commission and overdue. After all, as the authors point out, better regulation has been underpinning the Commission’s core business, namely, EU regulation, for over a decade. At the same time, however, they warn that Commissioner-designate Frans Timmermans is receiving an extremely challenging mandate which pose many difficulties to overcome.

Turkey votes: Part II - Erdoğan reloaded. EPC Commentary, 3 April 2014

On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

Why the EU must reengage with Turkey. EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

Democratic values and basic rights in Turkey are hanging by a thread. Over the past eighteen months the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms have been eroded which has left many Turks anxious over the direction in which their country is heading. With Turkey’s accession negotiations de facto frozen, the EU finds itself with little leverage over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkey’s leadership has become increasingly belligerent, with its EU related narrative overflowing with resentment. Because Turkey’s accession negotiations are irreversibly intertwined with Turkey-EU cooperation in other areas, this has had a negative impact on the broader relationship between both sides. Recent examples include the issue of foreign fighters traveling from Europe to Syria via Turkey. Each side has accused the other of not doing enough to stem the flow. Likewise, following the decision of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to ban the import of agricultural goods from countries that have placed sanctions on Moscow, the EU asked Turkey to demonstrate solidarity, as a “candidate country”, and not to increase exports of agricultural products to Russia. Turkey rejected this request and is reportedly working on strengthening trade ties with Moscow. Turkey remains an important partner in a number of key areas including trade, energy, foreign and security policy and migration. At a time when the EU faces crises in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East neighbourhoods is crucial. Hence the vision and plans of the EU’s new leadership, in particular new Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, how to shape relations with Ankara is particularly significant. The Union’s current policy is counterproductive and is further eroding trust and cooperation rather than enhancing it. It needs to be turned around.

The EU’s Enlargement Agenda – Credibility at stake? CEPS Policy Brief No. 324, 31 October 2014

Despite the proven success of the EU’s enlargement policy over the past few years, criticism within the EU member countries has grown. While the European Commission’s enlargement strategy for 2014-15 reaffirms the importance of placing fundamental reforms relating to rule of law, economic governance and public administration reform at the heart of the negotiation process, the latest Progress Reports present a rather bleak picture on the state of reforms in the candidate countries. Major efforts are required to maintain the credibility of the enlargement policy and demonstrate to an increasingly sceptical public that the transformative power of the EU continues to work. To achieve this, the EU needs to reinvigorate its strategy by adopting a more consistent and determined approach.

Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implantation. Natolin Research Paper 03/March 2011

While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region has now gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and beyond, not least because of security considerations. The ENP undoubtedly represents a step forward in the EU’s policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, yet its implementation highlights major differences between the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. The Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which is now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS. The paper highlights five main conclusions and recommendations: • Political, economic, social and diplomatic developments in the South Caucasus in the 2000's highlight both diverging trends and the persistence of tensions between the three countries. They also have different aspirations vis-à-vis the EU and different records in ENP implementation. The EU should therefore mainly rely upon an individual approach towards each country. • While bilateral relations should form the basis of the EU's approach, most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not confined to national borders and require regional solutions. This applies primarily, but not exclusively, to the unresolved conflicts. The EU should promote targeted regional cooperation including, inter alia, confidence-building measures to address indirectly the protracted conflicts and measures supporting drivers of change, which play a critical role in the confidence-building process; • Under the ENP, especially since the opening of negotiations for association agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform have become prominent in the EU's relations with all three Caucasus countries. At the same time, the priorities identified when the ENP was launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. The EU should more clearly prioritise good governance and the rule of law as the basis of both the ENP and successful reforms; • In all partner countries (but even more so in the South Caucasus), ENP implementation has been adversely affected by poor administrative capacities and weak institutional coordination. The EU should increasingly focus on institutional reform/capacity building in its support to partner countries and ensure that the link between the ENP and domestic reform processes is strengthened; • In the South Caucasus the EU has recently concentrated on a few assistance tools such as budget support, Twinning and TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly bring an added value, they should be better combined with tools allowing for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors, e.g. EIDHR/NSA.

Algeria's Failed Transitions to a Sustainable Polity: Coming to yet another crossroads. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 8/October 2011

Algeria is so far the only country in North Africa not to have experienced sustained mass protests calling for political change. The government in Algiers has by no means remained indifferent to the groundbreaking events in neighbouring countries, but it is responding to this sweeping wave of change at its own pace. This paper argues that, despite its apparent stability, the Algerian polity suffers from underlying currents of instability that risk undermining the long-term sustainability of the state. It identifies the failure of the country’s political and economic transitions and its implications as the most serious challenge confronting the Algerian state today. Unless a) the process of democratic transition that was initiated in 1989 is refined and put back on track, leading to the advent and consolidation of the rule of law, popular enfranchisement and total civilian control of the military; and b) the efforts to diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons are intensified and made more coherent, Algeria will remain susceptible to future instability. This is all the more pertinent given that the country is heading towards a crossroads where the issue of generational transition will also become imperative for the current leadership to deal with.