Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Monoclonal antibodies to carcinoembryonic antigen: ionic strength as a factor in the selection of antibodies for immunoscintigraphy.

As part of an ongoing effort to improve the technique of immunoscintigraphy for the detection of human carcinomas with radiolabeled monoclonal antibodies (MABs) to carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA), we have developed a series of MABs to CEA and have studied the effects of low- and physiological molarity buffers on their CEA binding and affinity, as well as their cross-reactivity with granulocyte glycoprotein(s). These in vitro results in different buffer systems were then correlated with the use of these MABs to CEA in the detection of human colon carcinoma grafts in nude mice. Our results show that the binding of CEA by some MABs is influenced by ionic strength and that this may be an important factor in their successful use for the immunolocalization of carcinomas in vivo.

Political-ethical skill development in nursing undergraduates

This research aimed to identify political-ethical skills developed in a training process compatible with the expected profile set by the National Curriculum Guidelines for the Undergraduate Nursing Degree. A case study was conducted with units represented by 32 former students from a particular religious teaching institution who already were in the job market. The content of the interviews was analyzed using the thematic analysis technique, which resulted in the following categories: "Political-ethical skills in the formative process" and "Political-ethical skills as a product of the educational process." From the former students’ perspective, these categories reinforced the social role of the nurse and the need for students to be reflective, understanding and participative in the transformation of society.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Time Series Input Selection using Multiple Kernel Learning

In this paper we study the relevance of multiple kernel learning (MKL) for the automatic selection of time series inputs. Recently, MKL has gained great attention in the machine learning community due to its flexibility in modelling complex patterns and performing feature selection. In general, MKL constructs the kernel as a weighted linear combination of basis kernels, exploiting different sources of information. An efficient algorithm wrapping a Support Vector Regression model for optimizing the MKL weights, named SimpleMKL, is used for the analysis. In this sense, MKL performs feature selection by discarding inputs/kernels with low or null weights. The approach proposed is tested with simulated linear and nonlinear time series (AutoRegressive, Henon and Lorenz series).

Myocardial flow reserve by Rb-82 cardiac PET improves the selection of patients eligible for invasive coronary angiography

Aim: We asked whether myocardial flow reserve (MFR) by Rb-82 cardiac PET improve the selection of patients eligible for invasive coronary angiography (ICA). Material and Methods: We enrolled 26 consecutive patients with suspected or known coronary artery disease who performed dynamic Rb-82 PET/CT and (ICA) within 60 days; 4 patients who underwent revascularization or had any cardiovascular events between PET and ICA were excluded. Myocardial blood flow at rest (rMBF), at stress with adenosine (sMBF) and myocardial flow reserve (MFR=sMBF/rMBF) were estimated using the 1-compartment Lortie model (FlowQuant) for each coronary arteries territories. Stenosis severity was assessed using computer-based automated edge detection (QCA). MFR was divided in 3 groups: G1:MFR<1.5, G2:1.5≤MFR<2 and G3:2≤MFR. Stenosis severity was graded as non-significant (<50% or FFR ≥0.8), intermediate (50%≤stenosis<70%) and severe (≥70%). Correlation between MFR and percentage of stenosis were assessed using a non-parametric Spearman test. Results: In G1 (44 vessels), 17 vessels (39%) had a severe stenosis, 11 (25%) an intermediate one, and 16 (36%) no significant stenosis. In G2 (13 vessels), 2 (15%) vessels presented a severe stenosis, 7 (54%) an intermediate one, and 4 (31%) no significant stenosis. In G3 (9 vessels), 0 vessel presented a severe stenosis, 1 (11%) an intermediate one, and 8 (89%) no significant stenosis. Of note, among 11 patients with 3-vessel low MFR<1.5 (G1), 9/11 (82%) had at least one severe stenosis and 2/11 (18%) had at least one intermediate stenosis. There was a significant inverse correlation between stenosis severity and MFR among all 66 territories analyzed (rho= -0.38, p=0.002). Conclusion: Patients with MFR>2 could avoid ICA. Low MFR (G1, G2) on a vessel-based analysis seems to be a poor predictor of severe stenosis severity. Patients with 3-vessel low MFR would benefit from ICA as they are likely to present a significant stenosis in at least one vessel.

Genetic team composition and level of selection in the evolution of cooperation

In cooperative multiagent systems, agents interac to solve tasks. Global dynamics of multiagent teams result from local agent interactions, and are complex and difficult to predict. Evolutionary computation has proven a promising approach to the design of such teams. The majority of current studies use teams composed of agents with identical control rules ("geneti- cally homogeneous teams") and select behavior at the team level ("team-level selection"). Here we extend current approaches to include four combinations of genetic team composition and level of selection. We compare the performance of genetically homo- geneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, genetically homogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection, genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, and genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection. We use a simulated foraging task to show that the optimal combination depends on the amount of cooperation required by the task. Accordingly, we distinguish between three types of cooperative tasks and suggest guidelines for the optimal choice of genetic team composition and level of selection

Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Sex allocation and sex-dependent selection for body size in Trypoxylon rogenhoferi Kohl (Hymenoptera, Sphecidae)

Two populations of the wasp Trypoxylon rogenhoferi Kohl, 1884 from São Carlos and Luís Antônio, State of São Paulo, Brazil, were observed and sampled from May 1999 to February 2001 using trap-nests. This mass-provisioning wasp was used to test some aspects of optimal sex allocation theory. Both populations fit all the predictions of the models of Green and Brockmann and Grafen. Maternal provisions determined the size of each offspring, and females allocated well-stocked brood cells to daughters, the sex that benefits most being large. This strategy resulted in a difference in size between the sexes. In São Carlos, female weight at emergence was 1.18 times that of males, in Luís Antônio this value was 1.13. The brood cell volume was correlated with both wing length and weight at emergence in both sexes, and the chance that a given brood cell contained a male offspring decreased with increased brood cell volume. In T. rogenhoferi female body size was related to fitness. Larger females were able to collect more mass of spiders per day, the spiders they captured were heavier, and they provisioned more brood cells per day. They also produced larger daughters. For males, no relationship between body size and fitness was found, but the data were scarce. Since the patterns of provisioning were variable among different females in both study sites, it is possible that the females not follow a unique strategy for sex allocation. The sex ratio and/or investment ratio in the São Carlos population was female-biased and in Luís Antônio, male-biased. In spite of the influence of trap-nests diameters on male production in Luís Antônio, there is some evidence that in São Carlos population the local availability of prey and/or lower rate of parasitism may be major forces in determining the observed sex ratio, but further studies are necessary to verify such hypothesis.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.