Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Betting on Hitler: The value of political connections in Nazi Germany

This paper examines the value of connections between German industry andthe Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporarysources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns,we find that one out of seven firms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies,had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers Party. Firmssupporting the Nazi movement experienced unusually high returns, outperformingunconnected ones by 5% to 8% between January and March 1933. These resultsare not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimatorsand definitions of affiliation.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

Increasing political returns and rural-urban migrations

This paper analyzes the different equilibria in rural-urban migrationsand political redistribution that result from the interaction betweenincreasing political returns, the distribution of land, and creditmarket imperfections. Governments that put a special weight on thewelfare of urban workers when setting agricultural prices generate apolitical externality in the urban sector, giving peasants anincentive to migrate in anticipation of policy determination. Ifcredit markets are imperfect, land ownership confers higherproductivity to peasants, who require large price changes to migrate.In this context, land inequality would lead to large migrations and tolarge policy change, while an egalitarian land distribution would leadto no migration and to a small policy change. This interaction shedslight on the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia atthe outset of World War II.

Exposition de l'enfant a des violences domestiques. Un modèle pluridisciplinaire de détection, d'evaluation et de prise en charge [Children's exposure to domestic violence. A multidisciplinary model of detection, assessment and management].

Children psychological abuse is difficult to identify. However, its consequences on child development can be as serious as physical and sexual abuses. It is therefore essential, to implement in our hospitals, structures whose missions are successively to detect victims, evaluate them on somatic and psychological levels, and elaborate a therapy. We propose a model for the achievement of these objectives through collaboration between the Medical Unit of Violence, the Pediatric CAN Team and the Unit of Les Boréales.

Going Public in the European Union: Action Repertoires of Western European Collective Political Actors

As a result of the Europeanization of politics and the increasing role of the public sphere, political actors in Western Europe are currently facing a double strategic challenge. Based on data from seven West European countries and the European Union, the authors analyze how state actors, political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations cope with this double challenge at both the national and the supranational level. Results indicate that the classic repertoire of inside strategies at the national level is still the most typical for all actors, but media-related strategies are also prominent at the national level. The Europeanization of repertoires is mainly determined by institutional factors and by the actors' power, whereas the public arena plays an equally important role for all types of actors, in all countries and at both the national and the EU level.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

The political consequences of unemployment

We analyze the channels by which an ill-functioning labor market changes the preferences of the people for public policy and therefore the decisions that are made. We not only discuss labour market reform but other important aspects of policy making such as the size and structure of government spending. Theclass of mechanisms that we highlight can be summarized as the very existence of unemployment generating political support for "sclerosis". This may help to explain the timid pace of reform, in particular the fact that any recovery sends them at the backfront of the political agenda, and the sometimes violent opposition generated by some measures, as we have seen mostly in France.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Dieu obscur : le sexe, la cruauté et la violence dans l'Ancien Testament

Le Dieu de l'Ancien Testament peut choquer les lecteurs de la Bible : il noie sa création sous le déluge, il exige d'Abraham qu'il sacrifie son fils, il élimine les premiers-nés des Egyptiens la nuit précédant l'exode ou supprime impitoyablement les Israélites qui s'étaient adonnés au culte du veau d'or. Au cours des siècles, nombre de chrétiens ou philosophes ont rejeté tout ou partie de l'Ancien Testament à cause de ces traits divins qui ne concordent pas, loin s'en faut, avec certaines images du Dieu bon et doux du Nouveau Testament. Alors, peut-on aujourd'hui croire ou (re)croire à un Dieu macho, cruel, despotique ou même purificateur ethnique ? Thomas Römer propose de relire les passages litigieux à la lumière des dernières recherches en Ancien Testament. Pour l'auteur, les traits à première vue rébarbatifs que Dieu arbore ici et là veulent préserver la foi de tout ronron dogmatique en lui instillant les visions inattendues d'un Dieu en prise avec la vie réelle de l'humanité. Cet ouvrage est une réédition largement revue et augmentée de l'ancienne version parue 1996. Il accueille un nouveau chapitre sur le Dieu moralisateur et l'homme pécheur.