Labour rights as human rights : workers' safety at work in Australian-based supply chains

The increase of buyer-driven supply chains, outsourcing and other forms of non-traditional employment has resulted in challenges for labour market regulation. One business model which has created substantial regulatory challenges is supply chains. The supply chain model involves retailers purchasing products from brand corporations who then outsource the manufacturing of the work to traders who contract with factories or outworkers who actually manufacture the clothing and textiles. This business model results in time and cost pressures being pushed down the supply chain which has resulted in sweatshops where workers systematically have their labour rights violated. Literally millions of workers work in dangerous workplaces where thousands are killed or permanently disabled every year. This thesis has analysed possible regulatory responses to provide workers a right to safety and health in supply chains which provide products for Australian retailers. This thesis will use a human rights standard to determine whether Australia is discharging its human rights obligations in its approach to combating domestic and foreign labour abuses. It is beyond this thesis to analyse Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) laws in every jurisdiction. Accordingly, this thesis will focus upon Australian domestic laws and laws in one of Australia’s major trading partners, the Peoples’ Republic of China (China). It is hypothesised that Australia is currently breaching its human rights obligations through failing to adequately regulate employees’ safety at work in Australian-based supply chains. To prove this hypothesis, this thesis will adopt a three- phase approach to analysing Australia’s regulatory responses. Phase 1 will identify the standard by which Australia’s regulatory approach to employees’ health and safety in supply chains can be judged. This phase will focus on analysing how workers’ rights to safety as a human right imposes a moral obligation on Australia to take reasonablely practicable steps regulate Australian-based supply chains. This will form a human rights standard against which Australia’s conduct can be judged. Phase 2 focuses upon the current regulatory environment. If existing regulatory vehicles adequately protect the health and safety of employees, then Australia will have discharged its obligations through simply maintaining the status quo. Australia currently regulates OHS through a combination of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ regulatory vehicles. The first part of phase 2 analyses the effectiveness of traditional OHS laws in Australia and in China. The final part of phase 2 then analyses the effectiveness of the major soft law vehicle ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR). The fact that employees are working in unsafe working conditions does not mean Australia is breaching its human rights obligations. Australia is only required to take reasonably practicable steps to ensure human rights are realized. Phase 3 identifies four regulatory vehicles to determine whether they would assist Australia in discharging its human rights obligations. Phase 3 then analyses whether Australia could unilaterally introduce supply chain regulation to regulate domestic and extraterritorial supply chains. Phase 3 also analyses three public international law regulatory vehicles. This chapter considers the ability of the United Nations Global Compact, the ILO’s Better Factory Project and a bilateral agreement to improve the detection and enforcement of workers’ right to safety and health.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Self-defence against terrorism in the post 9/11 world

In 1986 the then United States Secretary of State George Shultz asserted that: It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train and harbor terrorists or guerrillas. At that time the United States’ claim of a right to use military force in self-defence against terrorism2 received little support from other states.3 The predominant view then was that terrorist attacks committed by private or non-state actors were a form of criminal activity to be combated through domestic and international criminal justice mechanisms. The notion that such terrorist acts should be treated as ‘armed attacks’ triggering a victim state’s right of self-defence was not accepted by the majority of states. To suggest, as Shultz had done, that a state not directly responsible for terrorist acts could have its territorial integrity violated by military action targeting terrorists located within that state, was a controversial proposition in 1986. However, some fifteen years later, when the United States and a coalition of allies launched a military campaign in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 (hereafter ‘9/11’) terrorist attacks, there was virtually unanimous international support for the use of force.

The role of legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms in ensuring a fair and effective asylum process

A good faith reading of core international protection obligations requires that states employ appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a fair and effective asylum process. Restrictive asylum policies instead seek to ‘denationalize’ the asylum process by eroding access to national statutory, judicial and executive safeguards that ensure a full and fair hearing of an asylum claim. From a broader perspective, the argument in this thesis recognizes hat international human rights depend on domestic institutions for their effective implementation, and that a rights-based international legal order requires that power is limited, whether that power is expressed as an instance of the sovereign right of states in international law or as the authority of governments under domestic constitutions.

Making coups history

International support is capable of making the difference between the successful defense of democracy and its ignominious defeat. Indeed, the perceived probability of both support for democratically chosen leaders and opposition to their attackers can fundamentally shift the balance in the domestic struggle between them. Nevertheless, although changes to international law and international relations justify a greater international role in preventing and deterring coups and erosions, not all responsibility for protecting democracy should be assigned to the international community. Indeed, the first line of defense should be a democracy’s own domestic initiatives, with the main role of the international community being to support a domestic response to threats to democracy.

Israel's airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar facility : a test case for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence?

This article analyses the legality of Israel’s 2007 airstrike on an alleged Syrian nuclear facility at Al-Kibar—an incident that has been largely overlooked by international lawyers to date. The absence of a threat of imminent attack from Syria means Israel’s military action was not a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defence. Yet, despite Israel’s clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force there was remarkably little condemnation from other states, suggesting the possibility of growing international support for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This article argues that the muted international reaction to Israel’s pre-emptive action was the result of political factors, and should not be seen as endorsement of the legality of the airstrike. As such, a lack of opinio juris means the Al-Kibar episode cannot be viewed as extending the scope of the customary international law right of self-defence so as to permit the use of force against non-imminent threats. However, two features of this incident—namely, Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its airstrike, and the international community’s apparent lack of concern over legality—are also evident in other recent uses of force in the ‘war on terror’ context. These developments may indicate a shift in state practice involving a downgrading of the role of international law in discussions of the use of force. This may signal a declining perception of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum, at least in cases involving minor uses of force.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies