Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard

This paper examines competition between generic and brand-name drugs in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. A nested logit demand model is specified for the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: statins (anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). The model is estimated with instrumental variables from a panel of monthly prescription data from 1999 to 2005. The dataset distinguishes between three different levels of patients’ copayments within the prescriptions and the results show that the greater the level of insurance that the patient has (and therefore the lower the patient’s copayment), the lower the proportion of generic prescriptions made by physicians. It seems that the low level of copayment has delayed the penetration of generics into the Spanish market. Additionally, the estimation of the demand model suggests that the substitution rules and promotional efforts associated with the reference pricing system have increased generic market share, and that being among the first generic entrants has an additional positive effect.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

The vigilance components of begging and sibling competition

The conflict between siblings over how parental resources are divided has promoted the evolution of specific behaviour to outcompete each other. Young animals look out for parents' arrival in order to start begging as quickly as possible, since a rapid begging reaction increases the likelihood of being fed before nestmates. If the young can physically intercept the parents, selection might be operating on the offspring ability to monitor parent arrival (vigilance towards parents) and any sudden modifications in siblings' behaviour (vigilance towards siblings). To investigate the adaptive value of nestling vigilance in the context of family interactions, we recorded which direction barn owl Tyto alba siblings were facing in 89 two-chick broods before the first parental feeding visit of the night. Nestlings were more vigilant towards nest entrance than expected by chance suggesting that vigilance towards parents is an important component of sibling competition. When positioned near the nest-box entrance where parents predictably deliver food, the younger individual (i.e. junior) looked more towards the entrance than its older sibling. Thus, when the likelihood of obtaining a food item is relatively high, juniors are more vigilant than seniors to detect the incoming parent. When positioned at the back of the nest, the senior looked relatively more frequently towards its sibling than the junior did in the same situation. This suggests that when the likelihood of obtaining a food item is relatively low, seniors are more vigilant than juniors to observe their sibling. Because vigilance was not related to hunger level and prey obtaining, we propose the hypothesis that vigilance towards parents and siblings only indirectly influences the outcome of sibling competition.

Speech, Language and Communication Therapy Action Plan (2011/12 - 2012/13) - Easy Read (PDF 454 KB)

Easy Read version of Speech, Language and Communication Therapy Action Plan (2011/12 - 2012/13)

Northern Ireland Speech and Language Therapy Task Force report (PDF 1,016 KB)

Speech and Language task force report

Driving competition in local gasoline markets

Relevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Speech and Language Therapy Review March 2003 (PDF 300 KB)

Workforce Planning Review

Comprehensive Review of the Speech and Language Therapy Workforce (PDF 435 KB)

Report of the Project Group

Apparent competition through facilitation between Melanoides tuberculata and Biomphalaria glabrata and the control of schistosomiasis

Interactions between two species that result in reduced growth rates for both and extinction of one of the species are generally considered cases of asymmetric interspecific competition. Exploitative or interference competition is the usual mechanism invoked. Here we describe another mechanism producing the same result, named apparent competition through facilitation (ACF), observed between Melanoides tuberculata and Biomphalaria glabrata populations. The superior competitor actually gives some benefit to the other species, whose population becomes unstable with progressively increasing oscillations, leading to extinction. A model of ACF using difference equations suggests initial dynamics distinct from traditional interspecific competition. The dynamics of two freshwater snails in the field and in laboratory experiments suggest ACF, and these relations should be considered in studies of schistosomiasis control. ACF could occur in natural populations, but might have gone undetected because the final result is similar to traditional interspecific competition.