Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

The Demobilized Body: Transgressions of Personal Space and Political Participation

Grounded in the intersection between gender politics and electoral studies, this dissertation examines the demobilizing effects of violations of personal space (in the form of domestic violence, control over mobility, emotional abuse, and sexual harassment) on the propensity to vote. Using quantitative methods across four survey datasets concerning Lebanon, the United States, Morocco, and Yemen, this research concludes that cross-regionally, familial control over mobility reduces the propensity to vote among women. Conversely, mechanisms of empowerment such as education and employment increase the propensity to vote.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF REFUGEE INTEGRATION THROUGH SOCIAL & SUPPORT SERVICES

This dissertation studies refugee resettlement in the United States utilizing the Integration Indicator’s framework developed by Ager and Strang for the U.S. context. The study highlights the U.S. refugee admissions program and the policies in the states of Maryland and Massachusetts while analyzing the service delivery models and its effects on refugee integration in these locations. Though immigration policy and funding for refugee services are primarily the domain of the federal government, funds are allocated through and services are delivered at the state level. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which operates under the Department of Health and Human Services, was established after the Refugee Act of 1980 to deliver assistance to displaced persons. The ORR provides funds to individual states primarily through The Refugee Social Service and Targeted Assistance Formula Grant programs. Since the inauguration of the ORR three primary models of refugee integration through service delivery have emerged. Two of the models include the publicly/privately administered programs, where resources are allocated to the state in conjunction with private voluntary agencies; and the Wilson/Fish Alternative programs, where states sub-contract all elements of the resettlement program to voluntary agencies and private organizations —in which they can cease all state level participation and voluntary agencies or private organizations contract directly from the ORR in order for all states to deliver refugee services where the live. The specific goals of this program are early employment and economic self-sufficiency. This project utilizes US Census, state, and ORR data in conjunction with interviews of refugee resettlement practitioners involved in the service delivery and refugees. The findings show that delivery models emphasizing job training, English instruction courses, institutional collaboration, and monetary assistance, increases refugee acclimation and adaptation, providing insight into their potential for integration into the United States.

The Origins and Legacy of a Currency Board in Argentina

This is a qualitative case study of the adoption of a currency board in Argentina in 1991. It presents a discursive analysis and intellectual history of four overlaying and mutually influencing stories of Convertibility’s adoption. It is (1) the story of how Menem aligned himself to the Washington Consensus as a means to win a Presidential election. This ideological alignment influences and is influenced by a (2) reconstitution of the Peronist Party’s historically entrenched identity. This in turn re-fashion the whole system of interest articulation and relative power of interest groups in Argentina. The adoption of a currency board also marks the pace of (3) the entrenchment neoliberal interests across a domestic network of neoliberal think-tanks, technocrats, politicians, and “technopoles” articulating neoliberal interests outside of the Washington Consensus, within an International Neoliberal Network. Argentina’s adoption of a currency board falls in line with the Corner Solutions, a neoliberal doctrine promoted to influence developing countries to adopt two forms of exchange rate regimes that allow for less government involvement, including a currency board. Argentina starts as a test country and then becomes (4) an ideological stepping stone to help promote the creation of currency boards across more “developing” countries. These stories are not sequential but concurrent, and they help advance an alternative critique of neoliberalism that focuses on specifics to induce case-specific lessons versus a theory claiming to provide any universal truth.

THERE GOES THE ELECTORAL NEIGHBORHOOD: LOCAL NETWORKS, ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE (UN) FAIRNESS OF ELECTIONS

During the last two decades there have been but a handful of recorded cases of electoral fraud in Latin America. However, survey research consistently shows that often citizens do not trust the integrity of the electoral process. This dissertation addresses the puzzle by explaining the mismatch between how elections are conducted and how the process is perceived. My theoretical contribution provides a double-folded argument. First, voters’ trust in their community members (“the local experience”) impacts their level of confidence in the electoral process. Since voters often find their peers working at polling stations, negative opinions about them translate into negative opinions about the election. Second, perceptions of unfairness of the system (“the global effect”) negatively impact the way people perceive the transparency of the electoral process. When the political system fails to account for social injustice, citizens lose faith in the mechanism designed to elect representatives -and ultimately a set of policies. The fact that certain groups are systematically disregarded by the system triggers the notion that the electoral process is flawed. This is motivated by either egotropic or sociotropic considerations. To test these hypotheses, I employ a survey conducted in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala during May/June 2014, which includes a population-based experiment. I show that Voters who trust their peers consistently have higher confidence in the electoral process. Whereas respondents who were primed about social unfairness (treatment) expressed less confidence in the quality of the election. Finally, I find that the local experience is predominant over the global effect. The treatment has a statistically significant effect only for respondents who trust their community. Attribution of responsibility for voters who are skeptics of their peers is clear and simple, leaving no room for a more diffuse mechanism, the unfairness of the political system. Finally, now I extend analysis to the Latin America region. Using data from LAPOP that comprises four waves of surveys in 22 countries, I confirm the influence of the “local experience” and the “global effect” as determinants of the level of confidence in the electoral process.

New worlds and new churches: The Orthodox Church(es) and the European Union

The Orthodox church(es) share a common commitment to the unity of dogma and spirituality. There is, however, no doctrinal formulation that comes close to a form of political theology at a pan-Orthodox level. This means that the Orthodox churches’ attitude towards the European Union (EU) is driven by their ecclesial diversity and by complex inter-ecclesial relations. More fundamentally they share a fragmented and plural, theological objection to the very ideas of Europe and the West. This has been further complicated by the emergence of a substantial Orthodox diaspora from Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East living across the breadth of the European continent. Consequently the ecclesial identity and self-perception of the autocephalous Orthodox churches is changing. These churches are becoming increasingly transnational and extra-territorial. With this, their perception of Europe and the West, as seen through the eyes of their diaspora communities, is altering from “threat” to “home” (Makrides and Uffelmann, 2003). The growing diaspora will not only impact the Christian demographics of Europe but will also transform the Eastern Churches’ view of Europe and the EU (Leustean, 2009; 2011; 2013; 2014a; 2014b).

La santidad compartida: la encrucijada del Islam y la ortodoxia cristiana en los Balcanes, reflejos en Bulgaria

In this doctoral thesis with the title: “The Shared Holiness: The crossroad of Islam and the Christian Orthodoxy in the Balkans, reflections in Bulgaria”, presented by VLADISLAVA SPASOVA ILIEVA, under the direction of Dr. MONTSERRAT ABUMALHAM MAS, and Dr. PEDRO BÁDENAS DE LA PEÑA, we reflect upon the crossroads between the populations in the Balkans, whose conversion into States was significantly influenced by their belonging to the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires. Known as the crossroads of several cultures, the area was the destination of a massive influx of pagan Slaves, as well as the meeting point of Islam and Christianity. Considering the bidirectionality of the processes, we shall focus on the mutual enrichment brought about in the encounter between the religiosities of the Balkans, and we will discuss these points from different perspectives. In the common Balkan-Anatolian space, we turn our attention to the ancient hermits, with the aim of showing the complicity in the relations of coexistence, whether Islamic-Christian, Turkish-Byzantine, Turkish-Bulgarian, or Ottoman-Balkan, and a possible scheme, that could be valid for both social and spiritual growth of the person, as well as for the development of an ethnic or religious community, when sharing the same space with other populations, communities or ethnicities...

Análisis de mujeres cachemires como sujetos subalternos en la representación institucional de India y Paquistán a partir del fenómeno de desaparición forzada (1989-2008)

El interés de esta monografía es analizar las consecuencias de la representación institucional de India y Paquistán en la disputa territorial por Cachemira durante el periodo de 1989 a 2008. Puntualmente, se analiza y explica cómo la representación institucional prestada individualmente por India y Paquistán validó sus intereses como agentes de poder en la región, pasó por alto las necesidades de la población cachemir y fomentó la práctica de la desaparición forzada, lo que en consecuencia convirtió a las mujeres cachemires en un grupo subalterno. Para tal objetivo, se hará uso de la teoría postcolonialista, específicamente el enfoque subalternista de la autora Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak ya que permite explicar adecuadamente el proceso mediante el cual las mujeres cachemires se convirtieron en un grupo subalterno.

Predicamento de seguridad yemení

Con el inicio del periodo Post-Guerra Fría el Sistema Internacional comienza a experimentar un incremento en el fortalecimiento de su componente social; la Sociedad de Estados alcanza un mayor nivel de homogenización, el estado, unidad predominante de esta, comienzan atravesar una serie de transformaciones que obedecerán a una serie de cambios y continuidades respecto al periodo anterior. Desde la perspectiva del Realismo Subalterno de las Relaciones Internacionales se destacan el proceso de construcción de estado e inserción al sistema como las variables que determinan el sentimiento de inseguridad experimentado por las elites estatales del Tercer Mundo; procesos que en el contexto de un nuevo y turbulento periodo en el sistema, tomara algunas características particulares que darán un sentido especifico al sentimiento de inseguridad y las acciones a través de las cuales las elites buscan disminuirlo. La dimensión externa del sentimiento de inseguridad, el nuevo papel que toma la resistencia popular como factor determinante del sentimiento de inseguridad y de la cooperación, así como del conflicto, entre los miembros de la Sociedad Internacional, la inserción como promotor de estrategias de construcción de Estado, son alguno de los temas puntuales, que desde la perspectiva subalterna, parecen salir a flote tras el análisis del sistema en lo que se ha considerado como el periodo Post-Guerra Fría. En este sentido Yemen, se muestra como un caso adecuado no solo para poner a prueba las postulados de la teoría subalterna, veinte años después de su obra más prominente (The third world security Predicament), escrita por M. Ayoob, sino como un caso pertinente que permite acercarse más a la comprensión del papel del Tercer Mundo al interior de la Sociedad Internacional de Estados.

Desafíos de la movilización social para generar transformaciones en las instituciones: la movilización fallida en Egipto periodo 2010-2013

Este estudio de caso busca evaluar los alcances y limitaciones que tiene la movilización social para lograr transformaciones en las instituciones a partir del estudio de la movilización social en Egipto durante el período 2010-2013. Se analiza y se explica en qué sentido las instituciones de movimiento lento, como las estructuras de poder y estructuras mentales, han frustrado lo acontecido en Egipto conocido como la primavera árabe. Siguiendo la perspectiva de las instituciones de Gérard Roland y Alejandro Portes, se avanza hacia el resultado de la investigación de que las instituciones de movimiento lento tienen en cuenta aspectos estructurales de una sociedad tales como el poder y la cultura. Por ello, no pueden ser cambiadas con facilidad ya que cuentan con bases sólidas que han sido construidas mediante procesos históricos fundamentados en ideologías y valores.