EU governance of the internet:analyzing Europol’s role in the development of a EU cyber crime and cyber security policies

In recent years, the European Union has come to view cyber security, and in particular, cyber crime as one of the most relevant challenges to the completion of its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given European societies’ increased reliance on borderless and decentralized information technologies, this sector of activity has been identified as an easy target for actors such as organised criminals, hacktivists or terrorist networks. Such analysis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the fight against unlawful online activities, namely through increased cooperation among law enforcement authorities (both national and extra- communitarian), the approximation of legislations, and public- private partnerships. Although EU initiatives in this field have, so far, been characterized by a lack of interconnection and an integrated strategy, there has been, since the mid- 2000s, an attempt to develop a more cohesive and coordinated policy. An important part of this policy is connected to the activities of Europol, which have come to assume a central role in the coordination of intelligence gathering and analysis of cyber crime. The European Cybercrime Center (EC3), which will become operational within Europol in January 2013, is regarded, in particular, as a focal point of the EU’s fight against this phenomenon. Bearing this background in mind, the present article wishes to understand the role of Europol in the development of a European policy to counter the illegal use of the internet. The article proposes to reach this objective by analyzing, through the theoretical lenses of experimental governance, the evolution of this agency’s activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, its positioning as an expert in the field, and the consequences for the way this policy is currently developing and is expected to develop in the near future.

The investigation of crime:the myths and the reality

Initially the study focussed on the factors affecting the ability of the police to solve crimes. An analysts of over twenty thousand police deployments revealed the proportion of time spent investigating crime contrasted to its perceived importance and the time spent on other activities. The fictional portrayal of skills believed important in successful crime investigation were identified and compared to the professional training and 'taught skills’ given to police and detectives. Police practitioners and middle management provided views on the skills needed to solve crimes. The relative importance of the forensic science role. fingerprint examination and interrogation skills were contrasted with changes in police methods resulting from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and its effect on confessions. The study revealed that existing police systems for investigating crime excluding specifically cases of murder and other serious offences, were unsystematic, uncoordinated, unsupervised and unproductive in using police resources. The study examined relevant and contemporary research in the United States and United Kingdom and with organisational support introduced an experimental system of data capture and initial investigation with features of case screening and management. Preliminary results indicated increases in the collection of essential information and more effective use of investigative resources. In the managerial framework within which this study has been conducted, research has been undertaken in the knowledge elicitation area as a basis for an expert system of crime investigation and the potential organisational benefits of utilising the Lap computer in the first stages of data gathering and investigation. The conclusions demonstrate the need for a totally integrated system of criminal investigation with emphasis on an organisational rather than individual response. In some areas the evidence produced is sufficient to warrant replication, in others additional research is needed to further explore other concepts and proposed systems pioneered by this study.

Introduction – transnational organised crime and terrorism:different peas, same pod

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists in a strategic alliance between two non-state actors, able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the degree of dangerousness that both organised crime and terrorism currently represent in the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this edited volume aims at contributing to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization.

Organised crime and the law:a comparative analysis, by Liz Campbell

Book review

Europol and the EU’s fight against organized crime: exploring the potential of experimentalist governance

While issues relating to the development, legitimacy and accountability of the European Police Office, Europol, have been intensively discussed in political and academic circles, the actual impact of Europol on policy-making in the European Union has yet to receive scholarly attention. By investigating the evolution and the role of Europol's organized crime reports, this article elaborates on whether Europol has been able to exert an influence beyond its narrowly defined mandate. Theoretically informed by the assumptions of experimentalist governance, the article argues that the different legal systems and policing traditions of EU member states have made it difficult for the EU to agree on a common understanding on how to fight against organized crime. This lack of consensus, which has translated into a set of vague and broadly formulated framework goals and guidelines, has enabled Europol to position its Organized Crime Threat Assessments as the point of reference in the respective EU policy-making area. Europol's interest in improving its institutional standing thereby converged with the interest of different member states to use Europol as a socialization platform to broadcast their ideas and to ‘Europeanize’ their national counter-organized crime policy.

The external dimension of the EU’s fight against organized crime:the search for coherence between rhetoric and practice

SSince the external dimension of the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) began to be considered, a substantial amount of literature has been dedicated to discussing how the EU is cooperating with non-member states in order to counter problems such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. According to the EU, the degree of security interconnectedness has become so relevant that threats can only be adequately controlled if there is effective concerted regional action. This reasoning has led the EU to develop a number of instruments, which have resulted in the exporting of certain elements of its JHA policies, either through negotiation or socialization. Although the literature has explored how this transfer has been applied to the field of terrorism and immigration, very little has been written on the externalisation of knowledge, practice and norms in the area of organized crime. This article proposes to bridge this gap by looking at EU practice in the development of the external dimension of organized crime policies, through the theoretical lens of the EU governance framework.

Organized crime legislation in the European Union. Harmonization and approximation of criminal law, national legislations and the EU framework decision on the fight against organised crime, by Francesco Calderoni

Book review: Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, and New York, Springer, 2010, 189 pp., £93.55 (hardcover), ISBN 978-3-642-04330-7, e-ISBN 978-3-642-04331-4

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.