Reshoring:opportunities and limits for manufacturing in the UK - the case of the auto sector

In recent years, offshoring and outsourcing have transformed fundamentally nationally based auto sectors into global networks of design, production and distribution across the global value chains coordinated by the major automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). As manufacturing activities tended to be shifted to low-labour cost locations in Asia, Africa and Latin America, high-end design, R&D, product development have stayed anchored mostly to high-cost and high knowledge-intensive home economy locations (perhaps with the except of some design and styling activities which are often located in major end markets around the world. However, very recently the weaknesses of and risks inherent in such global value chains (GVCs) have been exposed, triggering attempts to rethink their nature and also raising possibilities to reshore some manufacturing activities to home countries. A combination of a more competitive exchange rate (despite the very recent appreciation of sterling), increased transport costs, rising wages in key areas of China, and a greater awareness of supply chain resilience have all contributed to a perceived change in some business fundamentals. The potential for some supply chain relocalisation also links in with the servitisation of manufacturing including the auto sector and shift to a hybrid model where manufacturing and services are increasingly intertwined. However, there are limits as to how far this can go and these raise some important questions and issues over the possible role for industrial policy.

Long memory and multifractality:a joint test

The properties of statistical tests for hypotheses concerning the parameters of the multifractal model of asset returns (MMAR) are investigated, using Monte Carlo techniques. We show that, in the presence of multifractality, conventional tests of long memory tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of no long memory. Our test addresses this issue by jointly estimating long memory and multifractality. The estimation and test procedures are applied to exchange rate data for 12 currencies. In 11 cases, the exchange rate returns are accurately described by compounding a NIID series with a multifractal time-deformation process. There is no evidence of long memory.

The threat of "currency wars": A European perspective

The ‘currency war’, as it has become known, has three aspects: 1) the inflexible pegs of undervalued currencies; 2) recent attempts by floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation; 3) quantitative easing. Europe should primarily be concerned about the first issue, which relates to the renewed debate about the international monetary system. The attempts of floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation are generally justified while China retains a peg. Quantitative easing cannot be deemed a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy as long as the Fed’s policy is geared towards price stability. Current US inflationary expectations are at historically low levels. Central banks should come to an agreement about the definition of price stability at a time of deflationary pressures. The euro’s exchange rate has not been greatly impacted by the recent currency war; the euro continues to be overvalued, but less than before.

Az európai gazdasági kormányzás előtt álló kihívások. A hármas tagadás lehetetlensége (Challenges of European economic governance. The impossible trinity of denial.)

Az európai gazdasági integráció folyamata olyan kényszerhelyzetekben formálódott a múltban, amelyek a közgazdaságtudományban jól ismert lehetetlen háromság alapján is leírhatók. Az Európai Monetáris Rendszer a rögzített árfolyam-mechanizmusra és önálló jegybanki politikára épített, korlátozva a tőkemozgásokat. A Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió ugyanakkor a tőke szabad áramlásával és az árfolyamok visszavonhatatlan rögzítésével felszámolta a tagállami szintű jegybanki autonómiát. Az euróövezet működése egyszersmind arra a háromszoros tagadásra épül(t), hogy 1. nem lehetséges az euróövezetből való kilépés, 2. nem engedélyezett a kimentés és 3. nem kerülhet sor államcsődre. A 2008-ban Európát is elérő pénzügyi és gazdasági válság azonban elemi erővel mutatott rá e hármas tiltás tarthatatlanságára. A gazdasági kormányzás körül kibontakozott viták így jól közelíthetők a három tiltó szabály egyidejű érvényesülése lehetetlenségének bemutatásával, számba véve az egyes opciók költségeit és lehetséges hasznait. / === / The process of economic integration in the EU has been shaped by the well-known theorem of the impossible trinity. Accordingly, the European Monetary System was built upon a mix of a fixed exchange-rate regime and an autonomous monetary policy, thereby constraining capital mobility. In launching the EMU project, the EU countries decided to fix national currencies irrevocably and maintain full capital mobility, in exchange for delegating their monetary policy upwards to a supranational level. The introduction of the Euro zone, however, has simultaneously meant denial of the following three elements: (1) exit, (2) bail-out, and (3) default. Nevertheless, the 2008–9 financial and economic crisis has demonstrated mercilessly that these three pillars are incompatible with each other. So the current debates on reshaping economic governance in the EU can be modelled by introducing the “impossible trinity of denial”, concentrating on the benefits and the costs of each option.

Megmenthető-e az euróövezet? (Can the eurozone be saved?)

Az euró válságának szélesebb globális összefüggései vannak, mind a kiváltó okait, mind a nemzetközi pénzügyi rendszer működésének hiányosságait illetően. Az európai monetáris integráció szilárd reálgazdasági alapokon nyugszik. Az euró teljesítménye mind az árstabilitás, mind az árfolyamok ingadozása tekintetében megfelelőnek tekinthető. Az euróválság szuverénadósság-válság, és leginkább a zóna egyes (déli) országait érinti. Az euróválság okai többrétűek: ezek között az eurózóna hibás konstrukcióját, téves koncepcionális feltételezéseit, a politikai kompromisszumokkal folyamatosan megnyomorított működését említhetjük leginkább. A közös pénz önmagában nem oka a válságnak és nem is bűvös ellenszer. A hibás gazdaságpolitikáért belül ugyanúgy bűnhődni kell, mint kívül. Görögország, vagy Írország elsősorban nem azért került válságba, mert tagjai az eurózónának, hanem mert hibás gazdaságpolitikát folytattak. Nem zárható ki az eurózóna szétesése, de kicsi az esélye. / === / The euro crisis has broad global connections, both in terms of deficiencies of the international monetary system, and of the crisis of the global financial markets. The European monetary integration is based on strong real-economic foundations. The performance of the euro has been satisfactory both in terms of price and exchange rate stability. The present crisis is a sovereign debt crisis, and it is concentrated mainly on some Southern members. The causes of the crisis are manifold: wrong institutional and policy structures, mistaken conceptual assumptions, and the distortion of its operation by continuous political compromises. The contradictions between common monetary policy and the national fiscal policies, the failure of disciplining role of the markets, the weakness of control of national fiscal policies, the dangers of "one size fits all" monetary policy, the failure of finding the proper national policy mixes, particularly in terms of income and structural policies, and the underestimation of social and cultural differences, can be particularly stressed. The common monetary policy failed to secure the necessary equilibrium among liquidity, stability and growth. Greece and Ireland got in crisis not because they are members of the euro zone, but because of their mistaken economic policies. The collapse of the euro zone cannot be excluded, but the chances of it are limited.

Kiigazítás recesszió nélkül. Esettanulmány a magyar stabilizációról = Adjustment without recession: A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilization

1995. március 12-én a magyar kormány és a központi bank szigorú kiigazítási és stabilizációs programot hirdetett meg. A cikk az első eredmények számbavételére tesz kísérletet. A program meghirdetése előtt Magyarország két egymást követő év- ben hatalmas fizetésimérleg-hiányt mutatott fel, és nemzetközi megítélése romlani kezdett. A program radikális intézkedései nyomán elkerülhetővé vált a mexikói vál- sághoz hasonló pénzügyi katasztrófa. Sok makrogazdasági mutató jól érzékelhető javulást jelez: lényegesen csökkent a kereskedelmi mérleg és a folyó fizetési mérleg hiánya, a költségvetés elsődleges egyenlege pozitív lett. Az ilyesféle stabilizációs programokat rendszerint súlyos visszaesés és a munkanélküliség nagy növekedése kíséri. Magyarország elkerülte ezeket a mellékhatásokat: a GDP drasztikus vissza- esés helyett valamelyest tovább növekedett, és a munkanélküliség változatlan ma- radt. A javulásnak nagy ára volt: az életszínvonal erőteljes csökkenése, az infláció felgyorsulása, bár a magyarországi infláció még mindig a kézben tartott, mérsékelt infláció sávjában maradt. A cikk ismerteti a program heterodox módszereit: 1. nagy leértékelés, az előre meghirdetett csúszó árfolyam rezsimjének bevezetése, valamint ideiglenes import- vámpótlék kivetése; 2. határozott jövedelempolitika, amely 12 százalékos reálbércsök- kenést kényszerített ki; 3. fiskális intézkedések, köztük jóléti jogosultságok csök- kentése (a program meghirdetése előtt ezek a jogosultságok tabuk voltak); 4. a hitel- kínálat átcsoportosítása a vállalati szektor javára, a jövedelmezőség növekedése; 5. feszített (bár nem mértéktelenül feszített) monetáris politika, amely lehetővé tette a sikeres vállalatok expanzióját; 6. a privatizáció felgyorsítása, nagy és sikeres lépé- sek egyes kulcsszektorok (energia, telekommunikáció) privatizációjában. Végezetül a tanulmány óva int a túlzott magabiztosságtól és felhívja a figyelmet a potenciális veszélyekre. A makrogazdasági javulás még törékeny. A magyar fejlődés legbiztatóbb sajátossága a termelékenység erőteljes és folyamatos növekedése. / === / On March 12, 1995 Hungary s government and central bank announced a tough program of adjustment and stabilization. This study is an attempt to asses the first results. Before the announcement of the program Hungary had a huge current account deficit for two consecutive years, and her international reputation started to decline. The program s radical measures made it possible to avoid a Mexico-style financial catastrophe. Many macroeconomic indicators show tangible improvement: the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account have been reduced significantly, the primary budget shifted to surplus. These kinds of adjustment programs are usually associated with deep recession and a large increase of unemployment. Hungary avoided these adverse side-effects: GDP instead of a drastic decline, continued to grow somewhat, and unemployment remained unchanged. There was a high price for the improvement: a sharp decline in the standard of living, and an acceleration of inflation, although Hungary is still in the range of controlled, moderate inflation. The paper describes the heterodox instruments of the program: (1) large devaluation, followed by a new exchange rate regime of pre-announced crawling peg, and a temporary import surcharge, (2) energetic income policy, enforcing a 12% cut in real wages; (3) fiscal measures, including cuts in welfare entitlements. That happened for the first time: before the program entitlements had been regarded as taboo ; (4) reallocation of credit supply in favor of the enterprise sector; increase of profitability; (5) tight (but not excessively tight) monetary policy, allowing the expansion of successful private busi- ness; (6) acceleration of privatisation, including large and successful steps in the privatisation of some key sectors (energy, telecommunication). Finally the paper warns against excessive self- confidence and draws the attention to potential dangers. The macroeconomic improvement is still fragile. The most reassuring feature of Hungary s development is the impressive and persistent improvement of productivity.

The factors affecting the international judgement of the Forint and Zloty in the light of the financial crisis of year 2008

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shaken both money and capital markets. Its consequences have not even left European markets untouched and divided spirits in the financial world. In some countries efforts by the monetary policy to protect the national currency throughout the crisis seemed to be ineffective. In the present paper we are investigating the effect of the most important macroeconomic and economic policy factors on the exchange rate of the forint and zloty in the last decade. For an analysis of exchange rates we are relying on some preceding research results based on equilibrium exchange rate theories.

Szimulációk és érzékenységvizsgálatok a magyar gazdaság egy középméretű makromodelljével = Simulations and sensitivity analyses with a medium-sized macro model of the Hungarian economy

A tanulmányban a Pénzügyminisztérium gazdaságpolitikai főosztálya és az MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Intézete által kifejlesztett középméretű negyedéves makrogazdasági modell segítségével elemezzük a magyar gazdaság legfontosabb mechanizmusait. A modellezés során követett alapelvek és a modell blokkjainak bemutatása után egy forgatókönyv-elemzés keretében vizsgáljuk a makrogazdasági és költségvetési folyamatokat befolyásoló főbb faktorok hatásait. A - tágan értelmezett - "bizonytalansági tényezőket" három csoportba soroljuk: megkülönböztetjük a külső környezet (például árfolyam) változását, a gazdasági szereplők viselkedésében rejlő bizonytalanságokat (például a bérigazodás sebességének vagy a fogyasztássimítás mértékének bizonytalanságát), valamint a gazdaságpolitikai lépéseket (például állami bérek emelését). Megmutatjuk, hogy e kockázatok makrokövetkezményei nem függetlenek egymástól, például egy árfolyamváltozás hatását befolyásolja a bérigazodás sebessége. ______ This paper analyses the most important mechanisms of the Hungarian economy using a medium-sized quarterly macroeconomic model developed jointly by the Economic Policy Department of the Ministry of Finance and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. After introducing the fundamental principles of modelling and the building blocks of the model investigated, within a scenario analysis, the authors present the effects of the main factors behind the macroeconomic and budgetary processes. The sources of uncertainty - defined in a broad sense - are categorized in three groups: change in the external environment (e.g. the exchange rate), uncertainties in the behav-iour of economic agents (e.g. in speed of wage adjustment or extent of consumption smoothing), and economic policy decisions (e.g. the increase in public sector wages). The macroeconomic consequences of these uncertainties are shown not to be independent of each other. For instance, the effects of an exchange rate shock are influenced by the speed of wage adjustment.

Kamatlábak és árszint kis, nyitott gazdaságban = Interest rates and price levels in a small open economy

A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy a különböző kamatlábaknak milyen hatásai vannak az árszintre, illetve a nominális árakra egy nyitott elsősorban kis, nyitott gazdaságban szabad tőkeáramlás mellett. Míg a zárt gazdaságban csupán a nominális és reálkamatláb megkülönböztetése a lényeges, nyitott gazdaságban a kamatlábak vizsgálatakor meg kell fontolnunk a kamatlábparitás kérdését is. Tisztáznunk kell a reálkamatláb összetevőit, amelyben fontos szerepet kap mind az árfolyam-begyűrűzés (pass-through), mind pedig a kockázati prémium mértéke. A kamatlábhatások vizsgálatakor először azt a mechanizmust elemezzük, amely által a kamatláb befolyásolja a tartós jószágok költségét (explicit vagy implicit bérleti díját). Másodszor az exportszektor termelési döntése és a hazai kamatláb viszonyára vonatkozó mechanizmust vizsgáljuk. Belátjuk, hogy az exportáló szektor döntései függetlenek lehetnek a belföldi kamatlábaktól. Harmadszor bizonyos árazási viselkedéseket tanulmányozunk. Bebizonyítjuk, hogy a kamatláb olyan növelése, ami nem változtat a jelenlegi árfolyamon, árszintnövelő az importőr ország számára. Megfogalmazható az a nézet, hogy ha van is a kamatlábaknak keresleti hatása a zárt gazdaságban, a kis, nyitott gazdaságban ez vélhetőleg sokkal gyengébb. _____ The study examines what effects various interest rates have on the price level and nomi-nal prices in an open (primarily small) economy with free flows of capital. A closed economy calls for a distinction only between nominal and real rates of interest, but in an open economy, questions of interest-rate parity have to be considered as well. It is nec-essary to clarify the factors behind the real interest rate important for price-level pass-through and for the scale of risk premium. Analysis of interest-rate effects begins with the mechanism whereby the interest rate influences the cost of fixed assets (explicit or implicit rents). Secondly, the mechanism behind the relation of export-sector production decisions and domestic interest rates is examined. It emerges that decisions of the export sector are independent of domestic interest rates. Thirdly, certain types of pricing behav-iour are studied. It is shown that a rise in the interest rate that does not alter the present exchange rate is a price-raising factor for the importing country. It can be assumed that if the interest rate has a demand effect in a closed economy, this will presumably be much weaker in a small open economy.

Nemlineáris dinamika klasszikus növekedési modellekben (Nonlinear dynamics in classical economic growth models)

Ebben a tanulmányban a klasszikus Harrod növekedési modellt nemlineáris kiterjesztéssel, keynesi és schumpeteri tradíciók bevezetésével reprezentatív ügynök modellbe alakítjuk. A híres Lucas kritika igazolásaként megmutatjuk, hogy az intrinsic gazdasági növekedési ütemek trajektóriái vagy egy turbulens káoszba szóródnak szét, vagy egy nagyméretű rendhez vezetnek, ami elsődlegesen a megfelelő fogyasztási függvény típusától függ, s bizonyos paraméterek piaci értékei, pedig csak másodlagos szerepet játszanak. A másik meglepő eredmény empirikus, ami szerint külkereskedelmi többlet, a hazai valuta bizonyos devizapiaci értékei mellett, különös attraktorokat generálhat. _____ In this paper the classical Harrodian growth model is transformed into a representative agent model by its nonlinear extensions and the Keynesian and Schumpeterian traditions. For the proof of the celebrated Lucas critique it is shown that the trajectories of intrinsic economic growth rates either are scattered into a turbulent chaos or lead to a large scale order. It depends on the type of the appropriate consumption function, and the market values of some parameters are playing only secondary role.Another surprising result is empirical: the international trade su±cit may generate strange attractors under some exchange rate values.

The Euro Area's Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain

- Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. - In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. - The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Inflation, currency substitution and dollarization: The case of Argentina

This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades.^ First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers.^ Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other.^ Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments' inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies.^ We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones.^ We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process.^ Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions. ^

Essays on financial crises

This dissertation analyzes recent financial crises in developed and developing countries. The research emphasizes the effects of institutional factors on the international banking and currency crises and their output losses. ^ Chapter two examines the roles of regulation, supervision, and countries' institutional environment in determining the probability of banking crises for a panel of fifteen developed countries from 1975 to 1998. The results from a multivariate logit model indicated that countries with greater government involvement, less capital standard requirements, and lower lending limits on a single borrower are associated with a higher probability of banking crises. ^ Chapter three studies whether output loss in banking crisis differs in market-based or bank-based financial systems. Using existing banking crisis data for sixty-nine countries during 1970–1999, we investigate whether the underlying financial system affects the output loss. The results show that output losses are more serious in market-based economies than those in bank-based economies. Longer crisis duration tends to increase the output losses in banking crises. Finally, countries with deposit insurance and strict law enforcement have less output losses. ^ Chapter four uses macroeconomic and institutional measures to explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and the decline in stock prices for emerging countries affected by the Mexican currency crisis of 1994–95. The results show that countries with more government budget deficits, and worse reserve adequacies tend to experience large exchange rate depreciation. The institutional measures do not explain much the extent of both the exchange rate depreciation and the decline in stock prices. ^