Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Hierarchy of interactive functions in father-mother-baby three-way games

In developmental research, the family has mainly been studied through dyadic interaction. Three-way interactions have received less attention, partly because of their complexity. This difficulty may be overcome by distinguishing between four hierarchically embedded functions in three-way interactions: (1) participation (inclusion of all participants), (2) organization (partners keeping to their roles), (3) focalization (sharing a common focus) and (4) affective contact (being in tune). We document this hierarchical model on a sample of 80 families observed in the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation across four different sites. Hierarchy between functions was demonstrated by means of Guttman scalability coefficient. Given the importance of the child's development in a threesome, the pertinence of this model for family assessment is discussed.

Benchmarking therapeutic drug monitoring software: A systematic evaluation of available computer tools

Introduction: Therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) aims at optimizing treatment by individualizing dosage regimen based on measurement of blood concentrations. Maintaining concentrations within a target range requires pharmacokinetic and clinical capabilities. Bayesian calculation represents a gold standard in TDM approach but requires computing assistance. In the last decades computer programs have been developed to assist clinicians in this assignment. The aim of this benchmarking was to assess and compare computer tools designed to support TDM clinical activities.¦Method: Literature and Internet search was performed to identify software. All programs were tested on common personal computer. Each program was scored against a standardized grid covering pharmacokinetic relevance, user-friendliness, computing aspects, interfacing, and storage. A weighting factor was applied to each criterion of the grid to consider its relative importance. To assess the robustness of the software, six representative clinical vignettes were also processed through all of them.¦Results: 12 software tools were identified, tested and ranked. It represents a comprehensive review of the available software's characteristics. Numbers of drugs handled vary widely and 8 programs offer the ability to the user to add its own drug model. 10 computer programs are able to compute Bayesian dosage adaptation based on a blood concentration (a posteriori adjustment) while 9 are also able to suggest a priori dosage regimen (prior to any blood concentration measurement), based on individual patient covariates, such as age, gender, weight. Among those applying Bayesian analysis, one uses the non-parametric approach. The top 2 software emerging from this benchmark are MwPharm and TCIWorks. Other programs evaluated have also a good potential but are less sophisticated (e.g. in terms of storage or report generation) or less user-friendly.¦Conclusion: Whereas 2 integrated programs are at the top of the ranked listed, such complex tools would possibly not fit all institutions, and each software tool must be regarded with respect to individual needs of hospitals or clinicians. Interest in computing tool to support therapeutic monitoring is still growing. Although developers put efforts into it the last years, there is still room for improvement, especially in terms of institutional information system interfacing, user-friendliness, capacity of data storage and report generation.

Benchmarking therapeutic drug monitoring software: A systematic evaluation of available computer tools

Objectives: Therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) aims at optimizing treatment by individualizing dosage regimen based on blood concentrations measurement. Maintaining concentrations within a target range requires pharmacokinetic (PK) and clinical capabilities. Bayesian calculation represents a gold standard in TDM approach but requires computing assistance. The aim of this benchmarking was to assess and compare computer tools designed to support TDM clinical activities.¦Methods: Literature and Internet were searched to identify software. Each program was scored against a standardized grid covering pharmacokinetic relevance, user-friendliness, computing aspects, interfacing, and storage. A weighting factor was applied to each criterion of the grid to consider its relative importance. To assess the robustness of the software, six representative clinical vignettes were also processed through all of them.¦Results: 12 software tools were identified, tested and ranked. It represents a comprehensive review of the available software characteristics. Numbers of drugs handled vary from 2 to more than 180, and integration of different population types is available for some programs. Nevertheless, 8 programs offer the ability to add new drug models based on population PK data. 10 computer tools incorporate Bayesian computation to predict dosage regimen (individual parameters are calculated based on population PK models). All of them are able to compute Bayesian a posteriori dosage adaptation based on a blood concentration while 9 are also able to suggest a priori dosage regimen, only based on individual patient covariates. Among those applying Bayesian analysis, MM-USC*PACK uses a non-parametric approach. The top 2 programs emerging from this benchmark are MwPharm and TCIWorks. Others programs evaluated have also a good potential but are less sophisticated or less user-friendly.¦Conclusions: Whereas 2 software packages are ranked at the top of the list, such complex tools would possibly not fit all institutions, and each program must be regarded with respect to individual needs of hospitals or clinicians. Programs should be easy and fast for routine activities, including for non-experienced users. Although interest in TDM tools is growing and efforts were put into it in the last years, there is still room for improvement, especially in terms of institutional information system interfacing, user-friendliness, capability of data storage and automated report generation.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Experimental analysis and computer prediction of CTF/NFI transcription factor DNA binding sites.

Accurate prediction of transcription factor binding sites is needed to unravel the function and regulation of genes discovered in genome sequencing projects. To evaluate current computer prediction tools, we have begun a systematic study of the sequence-specific DNA-binding of a transcription factor belonging to the CTF/NFI family. Using a systematic collection of rationally designed oligonucleotides combined with an in vitro DNA binding assay, we found that the sequence specificity of this protein cannot be represented by a simple consensus sequence or weight matrix. For instance, CTF/NFI uses a flexible DNA binding mode that allows for variations of the binding site length. From the experimental data, we derived a novel prediction method using a generalised profile as a binding site predictor. Experimental evaluation of the generalised profile indicated that it accurately predicts the binding affinity of the transcription factor to natural or synthetic DNA sequences. Furthermore, the in vitro measured binding affinities of a subset of oligonucleotides were found to correlate with their transcriptional activities in transfected cells. The combined computational-experimental approach exemplified in this work thus resulted in an accurate prediction method for CTF/NFI binding sites potentially functioning as regulatory regions in vivo.

Data Acquisition and Computer Plotting of Delamtect Data, HR-269, 1985

The overall system is designed to permit automatic collection of delamination field data for bridge decks. In addition to measuring and recording the data in the field, the system provides for transferring the recorded data to a personal computer for processing and plotting. This permits rapid turnaround from data collection to a finished plot of the results in a fraction of the time previously required for manual analysis of the analog data captured on a strip chart recorder. In normal operation the Delamtect provides an analog voltage for each of two channels which is proportional to the extent of any delamination. These voltages are recorded on a strip chart for later visual analysis. An event marker voltage, produced by a momentary push button on the handle, is also provided by the Delamtect and recorded on a third channel of the analog recorder.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.