Pancréatite aiguë clinique après chimio-embolisation sélective d'un carcinome hépatocellulaire [Acute clinical pancreatitis following selective transcatheter arterial chemoembolization of hepatocellular carcinoma]

Acute pancreatitis can complicate non-selective transcatheter arterial embolization of hepatocellular carcinoma with an incidence ranging from 1,7% (acute clinical pancreatitis) to 40% (biological pancreatitis). This complication is thought to be related to embolization of extrahepatic arterial collaterals.We report herein a case of acute clinical pancreatitis developing within 24 hours after a second course of selective transcatheter arterial chemo-embolization into the proper hepatic artery. Neither anatomical arterial variation nor particular risk factor for acute pancreatitis could be identified. This complication is unusual after selective arterial embolization. Because it may clinically mimick a postembolization syndrome, dosage of serum pancreatic enzymes should be performed systematically in case of abdominal pain following chemoembolization.

Natural development of stand structure in peatland Scots pine following drainage : results based on long-term monitoring of permanent sample plots

Abstract

Unexpected bleeding following eyelid tumor resection leading to the rare diagnosis of acquired haemophilia.

BACKGROUND: Our goal is to report for the first time in the literature a case of uncontrolled bleeding after an oculoplastic surgical procedure leading to the diagnosis of acquired haemophilia. HISTORY AND SIGNS: An 82-year-old patient underwent tumor excision and reconstruction of his right lower eyelid. On the same day, uncontrolled bleeding occurred that resisted optimal blood pressure control, external compression, surgical haemostasis and wound revision. Usual coagulation screening tests were normal, except for a slightly prolonged activated partial thromboplastin time. THERAPY AND OUTCOME: Extensive coagulation check was performed, which showed a severely reduced factor VIII due to the presence of an inhibitor. The bleeding was immediately stopped after administration of recombinant factor VIIa. After healing of the wound, factor VIIa treatment was replaced by immunosuppressive therapy. The factor VIII inhibitor became unmeasurable and remained so for three months after stopping the immunosuppressive therapy. CONCLUSIONS: Ophthalmologists confronted with unexpected uncontrolled bleeding should think about the possibility of blood dyscrasia, in particular acquired haemophilia.

Residuelle Lungenfunktionsveränderungen nach "Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome" (ARDS) bei Kindern [Residual lung function changes following adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) in children]

Residual lung function abnormalities have been investigated in 9 children (4 boys and 5 girls) a mean 2.7 years after surviving severe adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). All patients had been artificially ventilated for an average of 9.4 days with a FiO2 greater than 0.5 for 34 hours and maximal PEEP levels in the range of 8-20 cm H2O. Since the ARDS, 3 children had presented recurrent respiratory symptoms (moderate exertional dyspnea and cough) and 2 had had evidence of fibrosis on chest radiographs. In all patients abnormal lung functions were found, i.e. ventilation inequalities (8), hypoxemia (7), and obstructive (2) and restrictive (1) lung disease. A significant correlation between respirator therapy and residual lung function was found (duration of FiO2 greater than 0.5 in hours and inspiratory plateau pressure during respirator therapy vs. ventilation inequalities and hypoxemia).

Organ volume measurements: comparison between MRI and autopsy findings in infants following sudden unexpected death.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the accuracy of a semiautomated 3D volume reconstruction method for organ volume measurement by postmortem MRI. METHODS: This prospective study was approved by the institutional review board and the infants' parents gave their consent. Postmortem MRI was performed in 16 infants (1 month to 1 year of age) at 1.5 T within 48 h of their sudden death. Virtual organ volumes were estimated using the Myrian software. Real volumes were recorded at autopsy by water displacement. The agreement between virtual and real volumes was quantified following the Bland and Altman's method. RESULTS: There was a good agreement between virtual and real volumes for brain (mean difference: -0.03% (-13.6 to +7.1)), liver (+8.3% (-9.6 to +26.2)) and lungs (+5.5% (-26.6 to +37.6)). For kidneys, spleen and thymus, the MRI/autopsy volume ratio was close to 1 (kidney: 0.87±0.1; spleen: 0.99±0.17; thymus: 0.94±0.25), but with a less good agreement. For heart, the MRI/real volume ratio was 1.29±0.76, possibly due to the presence of residual blood within the heart. The virtual volumes of adrenal glands were significantly underestimated (p=0.04), possibly due to their very small size during the first year of life. The percentage of interobserver and intraobserver variation was lower or equal to 10%, but for thymus (15.9% and 12.6%, respectively) and adrenal glands (69% and 25.9%). CONCLUSIONS: Virtual volumetry may provide significant information concerning the macroscopic features of the main organs and help pathologists in sampling organs that are more likely to yield histological findings.

14.1T magnetic resonance spectroscopic evaluation of metabolic changes in the mouse striatum following transient middle cerebral artery occlusion

Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and spectroscopy (MRS) allow establishing theanatomical evolution and neurochemical profiles of ischemic lesions. However onlylimited MRS studies have been reported to-date in mice due to the challenges ofMRS in small organs. The aim of the current work was to study the neurochemicaland imaging sequelae of ischemic stroke in a mouse model in a horizontal bore14.1 Tesla system.ICR-CD1 mice were subjected to 30 minute transient middle cerebral artery occlusion.The extent of the lesion was determined by MRI. The neurochemical profileconsisting of the concentrations of 22 metabolites was measured longitudinallyfollowing the recovery from ischemia at 3, 8 and 24h in the striatum.Our model produced very reproducible striatal lesions which began to appear onT2-weighted images 8h after ischemia. At 24h, they were well established andtheir size correlated with lesions measured by histology. Profound changes couldbe observed in the neurochemical profiles of the core of the striatal lesions as earlyas 3h post-ischemia, in particular, we observed elevated lactate levels, decreases inthe putative neuronal marker N-acetyl-aspartate and in glutamate, and a transienttwo-fold glutamine increase, likely linked to excitotoxic release of glutamate andconversion to glutamine. With further ischemia evolution, other changes appearedat later time-points, mainly decreases of metabolites, consistent with disruption ofcellular function. It is interesting to note that glutamine tended to return to basallevels at 24h.We conclude that early changes in markers of energy metabolism, glutamate excitotoxicityand neuronal viability can be detected with high precision non-invasively inmice following stroke. Such investigations should lead to a better understanding andinsight into the sequential early changes in the brain parenchyma after ischemia,which could be used e.g. for identifying new targets for neuroprotection.

Formation of a direct arterial blood supply to the anterior pituitary gland following complete or partial interruption of the hypophyseal portal vessels

If regions of the anterior pituitary gland received systemic blood via a direct arterial blood supply these regions would escape hypothalamic regulation and thus be a sequela in endocrine disorders. Since, in the untreated rat, all of the blood supply to the anterior pituitary gland is via the hypophyseal portal vessels, we hypothesized that partial interruption of the portal vessels could provoke the establishment of a direct arterial blood supply (arteriogenesis). We utilized the injection of polystyrene microspheres (15 or 9 micron diameter) into the left ventricle of the heart to test this hypothesis. Microspheres are trapped in the first capillary plexus they reach since they are too large to traverse the capillaries. No microspheres reached the anterior pituitary gland of control rats, a finding consistent with the fact that the anterior pituitary gland receives all of its blood supply via the hypophyseal portal blood vessels. Microspheres were observed in the primary portal capillary plexus in the infundibulum (median eminence), infundibular stalk (pituitary stalk), and infundibular process (pars nervosa), the first capillary plexus which they reached. A lesion of the medial basal hypothalamus (MBH) which destroyed the long portal vessels did not result in arteriogenesis since few, if any, microspheres were observed in the anterior pituitary gland. We confirmed, using vascular casts, that these lesions resulted in the long-term destruction of the primary portal capillaries in the infundibulum and of the long portal vessels. In MBH-lesioned animals it appears that all of the blood supply of the anterior pituitary gland is via short portal vessels arising from the infundibular stem and process.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Reaktive Thymushyperplasie infolge der Therapie ACTH-produzierender Tumoren [Reactive thymus dysplasia following therapy for ACTH-producing tumors]

Surgical or conservative treatment of ACTH-producing tumors results in acute drop of the previously excessively high cortisol levels. The following associated pathophysiological changes also occur in the organism's recovery from stress, such as trauma, operation or chemotherapy of tumors. Both cases result in a regeneration of the immune system, which might even be exalted. The corresponding radiographic feature is the "rebound" enlargement of the thymus occurring about six months after remission of hypercortisolism. Histological examination reveals benign thymus hyperplasia. Especially in cases of still unknown primary tumor the appearance of this anterior mediastinal mass can lead to misdiagnosis. We present the cases of two patients with diffuse thymic hyperplasia following surgical and medical correction of hypercortisolism. One patient suffered from classic Cushing's disease responding to transsphenoidal resection of an ACTH-secreting pituitary microadenoma. Six months later CT of the chest incidentally demonstrated an anterior mediastinal mass known as thymic hyperplasia. The second patient presented with an ectopic, still unkown source of ACTH-production. Six months after medical correction of hypercortisolism CT of the thorax showed an enlargement of the anterior mediastinum. Thymectomy was performed in order to exclude thymus carcinoid. Histological examination revealed benign thymus hyperplasia with negative immunostaining. CONCLUSION: Radiologists and clinicians should be familiar with the pathophysiological changes resulting from precipitously dropping cortisol levels in order to prevent diagnostic errors and unnecessary operations.

Residual venous obstruction, alone and in combination with D-dimer, as a risk factor for recurrence after anticoagulation withdrawal following a first idiopathic deep vein thrombosis in the prolong study.

OBJECTIVE: This study aims to assess the predictive value of residual venous obstruction (RVO) for recurrent venous thrombo-embolism (VTE) in a study using D-dimer to predict outcome. DESIGN: This is a multicentre randomised open-label study. METHODS: Patients with a first episode of idiopathic VTE were enrolled on the day of anticoagulation discontinuation when RVO was determined by compression ultrasonography in those with proximal deep vein thrombosis (DVT) of the lower limbs. D-dimer was measured after 1 month. Patients with normal D-dimer did not resume anticoagulation while patients with abnormal D-dimer were randomised to resume anticoagulation or not. The primary outcome measure was recurrent VTE over an 18-month follow-up. RESULTS: A total of 490 DVT patients were analysed (after excluding 19 for different reasons and 118 for isolated pulmonary embolism (PE)). Recurrent DVT occurred in 19% (19/99) of patients with abnormal D-dimer who did not resume anticoagulation and 10% (31/310) in subjects with normal D-dimer (adjusted hazard ratio: 2.1; p = 0.02). Recurrences were similar in subjects either with (11%, 17/151) or without RVO (13%, 32/246). Recurrent DVT rates were also similar for normal D-dimer, with or without RVO, and for abnormal D-dimer, with or without RVO. CONCLUSIONS: Elevated D-dimer at 1 month after anticoagulation withdrawal is a risk factor for recurrence, while RVO at the time of anticoagulation withdrawal is not.

An assurance-based model to holistically assess the information security posture

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Evaluating Information Security Posture within an organization is becoming a very complex task. Currently, the evaluation and assessment of Information Security are commonly performed using frameworks, methodologies and standards which often consider the various aspects of security independently. Unfortunately this is ineffective because it does not take into consideration the necessity of having a global and systemic multidimensional approach to Information Security evaluation. At the same time the overall security level is globally considered to be only as strong as its weakest link. This thesis proposes a model aiming to holistically assess all dimensions of security in order to minimize the likelihood that a given threat will exploit the weakest link. A formalized structure taking into account all security elements is presented; this is based on a methodological evaluation framework in which Information Security is evaluated from a global perspective. This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One: Information Security Evaluation issues consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the purpose of this research purpose and the Model that will be proposed. In this chapter we raise some questions with respect to "traditional evaluation methods" as well as identifying the principal elements to be addressed in this direction. Then we introduce the baseline attributes of our model and set out the expected result of evaluations according to our model. Chapter 2 is focused on the definition of Information Security to be used as a reference point for our evaluation model. The inherent concepts of the contents of a holistic and baseline Information Security Program are defined. Based on this, the most common roots-of-trust in Information Security are identified. Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the difference and the relationship between the concepts of Information Risk and Security Management. Comparing these two concepts allows us to identify the most relevant elements to be included within our evaluation model, while clearing situating these two notions within a defined framework is of the utmost importance for the results that will be obtained from the evaluation process. Chapter 4 sets out our evaluation model and the way it addresses issues relating to the evaluation of Information Security. Within this Chapter the underlying concepts of assurance and trust are discussed. Based on these two concepts, the structure of the model is developed in order to provide an assurance related platform as well as three evaluation attributes: "assurance structure", "quality issues", and "requirements achievement". Issues relating to each of these evaluation attributes are analysed with reference to sources such as methodologies, standards and published research papers. Then the operation of the model is discussed. Assurance levels, quality levels and maturity levels are defined in order to perform the evaluation according to the model. Part Two: Implementation of the Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) according to the Information Security Domains consists of four chapters. This is the section where our evaluation model is put into a welldefined context with respect to the four pre-defined Information Security dimensions: the Organizational dimension, Functional dimension, Human dimension, and Legal dimension. Each Information Security dimension is discussed in a separate chapter. For each dimension, the following two-phase evaluation path is followed. The first phase concerns the identification of the elements which will constitute the basis of the evaluation: ? Identification of the key elements within the dimension; ? Identification of the Focus Areas for each dimension, consisting of the security issues identified for each dimension; ? Identification of the Specific Factors for each dimension, consisting of the security measures or control addressing the security issues identified for each dimension. The second phase concerns the evaluation of each Information Security dimension by: ? The implementation of the evaluation model, based on the elements identified for each dimension within the first phase, by identifying the security tasks, processes, procedures, and actions that should have been performed by the organization to reach the desired level of protection; ? The maturity model for each dimension as a basis for reliance on security. For each dimension we propose a generic maturity model that could be used by every organization in order to define its own security requirements. Part three of this dissertation contains the Final Remarks, Supporting Resources and Annexes. With reference to the objectives of our thesis, the Final Remarks briefly analyse whether these objectives were achieved and suggest directions for future related research. Supporting resources comprise the bibliographic resources that were used to elaborate and justify our approach. Annexes include all the relevant topics identified within the literature to illustrate certain aspects of our approach. Our Information Security evaluation model is based on and integrates different Information Security best practices, standards, methodologies and research expertise which can be combined in order to define an reliable categorization of Information Security. After the definition of terms and requirements, an evaluation process should be performed in order to obtain evidence that the Information Security within the organization in question is adequately managed. We have specifically integrated into our model the most useful elements of these sources of information in order to provide a generic model able to be implemented in all kinds of organizations. The value added by our evaluation model is that it is easy to implement and operate and answers concrete needs in terms of reliance upon an efficient and dynamic evaluation tool through a coherent evaluation system. On that basis, our model could be implemented internally within organizations, allowing them to govern better their Information Security. RÉSUMÉ : Contexte général de la thèse L'évaluation de la sécurité en général, et plus particulièrement, celle de la sécurité de l'information, est devenue pour les organisations non seulement une mission cruciale à réaliser, mais aussi de plus en plus complexe. A l'heure actuelle, cette évaluation se base principalement sur des méthodologies, des bonnes pratiques, des normes ou des standards qui appréhendent séparément les différents aspects qui composent la sécurité de l'information. Nous pensons que cette manière d'évaluer la sécurité est inefficiente, car elle ne tient pas compte de l'interaction des différentes dimensions et composantes de la sécurité entre elles, bien qu'il soit admis depuis longtemps que le niveau de sécurité globale d'une organisation est toujours celui du maillon le plus faible de la chaîne sécuritaire. Nous avons identifié le besoin d'une approche globale, intégrée, systémique et multidimensionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information. En effet, et c'est le point de départ de notre thèse, nous démontrons que seule une prise en compte globale de la sécurité permettra de répondre aux exigences de sécurité optimale ainsi qu'aux besoins de protection spécifiques d'une organisation. Ainsi, notre thèse propose un nouveau paradigme d'évaluation de la sécurité afin de satisfaire aux besoins d'efficacité et d'efficience d'une organisation donnée. Nous proposons alors un modèle qui vise à évaluer d'une manière holistique toutes les dimensions de la sécurité, afin de minimiser la probabilité qu'une menace potentielle puisse exploiter des vulnérabilités et engendrer des dommages directs ou indirects. Ce modèle se base sur une structure formalisée qui prend en compte tous les éléments d'un système ou programme de sécurité. Ainsi, nous proposons un cadre méthodologique d'évaluation qui considère la sécurité de l'information à partir d'une perspective globale. Structure de la thèse et thèmes abordés Notre document est structuré en trois parties. La première intitulée : « La problématique de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information » est composée de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 introduit l'objet de la recherche ainsi que les concepts de base du modèle d'évaluation proposé. La maniéré traditionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité fait l'objet d'une analyse critique pour identifier les éléments principaux et invariants à prendre en compte dans notre approche holistique. Les éléments de base de notre modèle d'évaluation ainsi que son fonctionnement attendu sont ensuite présentés pour pouvoir tracer les résultats attendus de ce modèle. Le chapitre 2 se focalise sur la définition de la notion de Sécurité de l'Information. Il ne s'agit pas d'une redéfinition de la notion de la sécurité, mais d'une mise en perspectives des dimensions, critères, indicateurs à utiliser comme base de référence, afin de déterminer l'objet de l'évaluation qui sera utilisé tout au long de notre travail. Les concepts inhérents de ce qui constitue le caractère holistique de la sécurité ainsi que les éléments constitutifs d'un niveau de référence de sécurité sont définis en conséquence. Ceci permet d'identifier ceux que nous avons dénommés « les racines de confiance ». Le chapitre 3 présente et analyse la différence et les relations qui existent entre les processus de la Gestion des Risques et de la Gestion de la Sécurité, afin d'identifier les éléments constitutifs du cadre de protection à inclure dans notre modèle d'évaluation. Le chapitre 4 est consacré à la présentation de notre modèle d'évaluation Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) et la manière dont il répond aux exigences de l'évaluation telle que nous les avons préalablement présentées. Dans ce chapitre les concepts sous-jacents relatifs aux notions d'assurance et de confiance sont analysés. En se basant sur ces deux concepts, la structure du modèle d'évaluation est développée pour obtenir une plateforme qui offre un certain niveau de garantie en s'appuyant sur trois attributs d'évaluation, à savoir : « la structure de confiance », « la qualité du processus », et « la réalisation des exigences et des objectifs ». Les problématiques liées à chacun de ces attributs d'évaluation sont analysées en se basant sur l'état de l'art de la recherche et de la littérature, sur les différentes méthodes existantes ainsi que sur les normes et les standards les plus courants dans le domaine de la sécurité. Sur cette base, trois différents niveaux d'évaluation sont construits, à savoir : le niveau d'assurance, le niveau de qualité et le niveau de maturité qui constituent la base de l'évaluation de l'état global de la sécurité d'une organisation. La deuxième partie: « L'application du Modèle d'évaluation de l'assurance de la sécurité de l'information par domaine de sécurité » est elle aussi composée de quatre chapitres. Le modèle d'évaluation déjà construit et analysé est, dans cette partie, mis dans un contexte spécifique selon les quatre dimensions prédéfinies de sécurité qui sont: la dimension Organisationnelle, la dimension Fonctionnelle, la dimension Humaine, et la dimension Légale. Chacune de ces dimensions et son évaluation spécifique fait l'objet d'un chapitre distinct. Pour chacune des dimensions, une évaluation en deux phases est construite comme suit. La première phase concerne l'identification des éléments qui constituent la base de l'évaluation: ? Identification des éléments clés de l'évaluation ; ? Identification des « Focus Area » pour chaque dimension qui représentent les problématiques se trouvant dans la dimension ; ? Identification des « Specific Factors » pour chaque Focus Area qui représentent les mesures de sécurité et de contrôle qui contribuent à résoudre ou à diminuer les impacts des risques. La deuxième phase concerne l'évaluation de chaque dimension précédemment présentées. Elle est constituée d'une part, de l'implémentation du modèle général d'évaluation à la dimension concernée en : ? Se basant sur les éléments spécifiés lors de la première phase ; ? Identifiant les taches sécuritaires spécifiques, les processus, les procédures qui auraient dû être effectués pour atteindre le niveau de protection souhaité. D'autre part, l'évaluation de chaque dimension est complétée par la proposition d'un modèle de maturité spécifique à chaque dimension, qui est à considérer comme une base de référence pour le niveau global de sécurité. Pour chaque dimension nous proposons un modèle de maturité générique qui peut être utilisé par chaque organisation, afin de spécifier ses propres exigences en matière de sécurité. Cela constitue une innovation dans le domaine de l'évaluation, que nous justifions pour chaque dimension et dont nous mettons systématiquement en avant la plus value apportée. La troisième partie de notre document est relative à la validation globale de notre proposition et contient en guise de conclusion, une mise en perspective critique de notre travail et des remarques finales. Cette dernière partie est complétée par une bibliographie et des annexes. Notre modèle d'évaluation de la sécurité intègre et se base sur de nombreuses sources d'expertise, telles que les bonnes pratiques, les normes, les standards, les méthodes et l'expertise de la recherche scientifique du domaine. Notre proposition constructive répond à un véritable problème non encore résolu, auquel doivent faire face toutes les organisations, indépendamment de la taille et du profil. Cela permettrait à ces dernières de spécifier leurs exigences particulières en matière du niveau de sécurité à satisfaire, d'instancier un processus d'évaluation spécifique à leurs besoins afin qu'elles puissent s'assurer que leur sécurité de l'information soit gérée d'une manière appropriée, offrant ainsi un certain niveau de confiance dans le degré de protection fourni. Nous avons intégré dans notre modèle le meilleur du savoir faire, de l'expérience et de l'expertise disponible actuellement au niveau international, dans le but de fournir un modèle d'évaluation simple, générique et applicable à un grand nombre d'organisations publiques ou privées. La valeur ajoutée de notre modèle d'évaluation réside précisément dans le fait qu'il est suffisamment générique et facile à implémenter tout en apportant des réponses sur les besoins concrets des organisations. Ainsi notre proposition constitue un outil d'évaluation fiable, efficient et dynamique découlant d'une approche d'évaluation cohérente. De ce fait, notre système d'évaluation peut être implémenté à l'interne par l'entreprise elle-même, sans recourir à des ressources supplémentaires et lui donne également ainsi la possibilité de mieux gouverner sa sécurité de l'information.