Farm-level Capital: Capital positions, structures, the dynamics of farm-level investments, capital accumulation and leverage positions. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 7, October 2011

This Factor Markets Working Paper describes and highlights the key issues of farm capital structures, the dynamics of investments and accumulation of farm capital, and the financial leverage and borrowing rates on farms in selected European countries. Data collected from the Farm Account Data Network (FADN) suggest that the European farming sector uses quite different farm business strategies, capabilities to generate capital revenues, and segmented agricultural loan market regimes. Such diverse business strategies have substantial, and perhaps more substantial than expected, implications for the financial leverage and performance of farms. Different countries adopt different approaches to evaluating agricultural assets, or the agricultural asset markets simply differ substantially depending on the country in question. This has implications for most of the financial indicators. In those countries that have seen rapidly increasing asset prices at the margin, which were revised accordingly in the accounting systems for the whole stock of assets, firm values increased significantly, even though the firms had been disinvesting. If there is an asset price bubble and it bursts, there may be serious knock-on effects for some countries.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

Performance Indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets. Factor Markets Working Document No. 43, May 2013

This study attempts to develop performance indicators for the financial markets based on the findings in an earlier Factor Markets Working Paper (No. 33, “Agricultural credit market institutions: A comparison of selected European countries”) and on FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) data. Two indicators were developed. One measured the long-term economic sustainability of agricultural firms since the financial characteristics of the firms were perceived as important factors when rejecting a loan applicant. If the indicator works, it should show that a low value in this indicator is related to the performance in the financial markets. The second indicator was the loan-to-value (LTV), or debt-to-asset ratio, the reasoning behind this indicator is that low values can point to credit constraints, and in WP 33 we saw that the interviewed experts expected LTVs to be much higher than what is actually the case. We find that the first indicator can’t be used to measure the performance of the financial institutions, since we can’t show any relationship between the indicator and activities in the financial markets. However, the indicator is valuable for its measurement of the long-term financial sustainability of the agricultural sector, or of the firms. The loan-to-value indicator does imply that most countries would have room to increase the credit.

A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.

The ECB’s Latest Gimmick. Cash for loans, CEPS Policy Brief No. 341, March 2016

Among several important monetary policy initiatives decided by the European Central Bank on 10 March 2016 was the launch of a new set of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II), expanding on the previous TLTRO. In assessing this scheme, which might cost up to €24 billion, this Policy Brief finds that while it could become important, it is questionable whether it will achieve its goal of encouraging the extension of credit for new investment, as banks can easily window dress their loan book.

Projeto Aplicado “Acácias Perfume”

O presente trabalho, visa implementar uma perfumaria na província de Benguela-Angola, e tem como objetivo identificar a relevância da mesma e aferir a viabilidade económica e financeira do negócio. O setor da perfumaria e cosméticos ainda são dos menos competitivos em Benguela, contudo o segmento desta junção apresenta uma enorme margem de progressão, pois a oferta ainda é escassa, e existe uma tendência de se procurar cada vez mais estes produtos. A ideia surgiu devido a presença de uma realidade precária na oferta e procura desses produtos naquela província em geral, para além disso, alia-se o facto de não existir nenhuma perfumaria na zona onde se pretende instalar a perfumaria. Como tal, entendeu-se estar perante uma boa oportunidade de negócio. Os meios financeiros necessários foram de, 70% de capitais próprios e 30% através de empréstimo bancário, a uma taxa de juro anual de 14%. O montante total do financiamento foi de 15 306 060,00 AOA. Com base em estudos científicos, pesquisas de campo, livros, entrevistas a pessoas singulares e coletivas, e um plano financeiro aplicado bem elaborado, obtivemos resultados satisfatórios principalmente se analisarmos os três critérios de avaliação mais preponderantes de um projeto aplicado tais como o valor atual líquido de 617 051 187,75 AOA, taxa interna de rentabilidade de 56,40%, e é expectável que o período de recuperação do investimento seja aproximadamente de 3 anos. Consequentemente, foram utilizadas técnicas estratégicas académicas focadas nas características do mercado que apresentaram boas perspetivas futuras através de uma relação entre a visão do investimento o custo de oportunidade do negócio. Portanto, conclui-se que é um investimento viável, devido a características do mercado e os recursos tangíveis e intangíveis que nele ostentam, bem como as perspetivas futuras de sustentabilidade que a mesma apresenta.

Colombia, small farmer market access.

"AID project 514-0194."

Annual report - Superintendent of Banks, State of New York.

Some vols. issued with: Detailed statement.

New measures of the Great pyramid,

"Extended and corrected from the review in the ʻBanner of Israel, ̓for November and December, 1883."

Contracting problems at the Resolution Trust Corporation (Operation Western Storm) : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, March 3, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0522-P.

Annual Report.

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual report of the Bank Commissioner of the State of Vermont.

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual statement exhibiting the condition of the state banks, savings banks, institutions for savings, and trust companies.

Includes also, 1902-1907 statements of building and loan associations, 1901-1906 (Domestic and foreign building and loan associations, 1901-1904; Domestic building and loan associations, 1905-1906)

Annual report /

Mode of access: Internet.

Report.

No report published for 1916/17.