The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities for Consumer Protection. Paper No. 11 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 115/July 2015

This paper examines options for regulatory cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and assesses the challenges and opportunities posed by regulatory cooperation for consumer protection. It looks at existing approaches to regulatory cooperation by referencing a range of case studies. Based on established practice and on the European Commission’s recently published proposal on regulatory cooperation, we discuss a possible approach that could be adopted in the TTIP. Against the significant potential gains from improved regulatory cooperation, one must set the significant challenges of reconciling the different regulatory philosophies of the US and the EU as well as some differences in their respective approaches to cooperation. In broad terms, this analysis finds that regulatory powers on both sides of the Atlantic will not be significantly affected by the TTIP, but suggests that European and American legislators will need to ensure that their priorities shape the TTIP regulatory cooperation agenda and not the other way around.

The status and future of consumer education.

"Purpose and development" signed: Joseph DeBrum ... [and] W. Harmon Wilson.

The Causes and Effects of Consumer Competence Perceptions

Consumers are constantly making consumption decisions and engaging in marketplace activities that require some level of competence. In other words, consumers possess and require some knowledge, skills, and abilities to engage in the marketplace and obtain what they want. But what causes consumers to infer they are or are not competent? And, what are the consequences of these competence inferences on consumer behaviour? This dissertation examines the role consumption plays in consumers’ inferences of their own competence to enhance our understanding of these issues. By integrating the literature on competence and attributions of blame, this dissertation develops a theory for when and how consumption influences self-perceptions of competence and how these self-perceptions of competence impact future consumer behaviours. Evidence from five studies suggests that consumers infer their own competence from their consumption outcomes, despite who is actually responsible for causing these outcomes. This means consumers potentially see themselves as incompetent for negative outcomes that are entirely firm-caused. This dissertation argues that people infer their own competence from firm-caused outcomes because they conflate their decisions made prior to an outcome with the cause of that outcome. This dissertation also examines how these variations in self-perceptions of competence can influence future consumer behaviours.

ADR and Justice in consumer disputes in the EU

This policy brief reports on the main conclusions from an international conference held at Wolfson College, Oxford on 18–20 April 2016, at which representatives from seven governments, ombudsmen, and academic experts assessed efforts to implement new dispute resolution mechanisms across EU Member States. The briefing also assesses the levels of trust the public holds in ombudsmen, and what drives this trust. It finds a number of mechanisms under development, and makes a range of recommendations for future approaches.

Black-White Wage Gap Among Restaurant Servers: A Replication, Extension, and Exploration of Consumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping

There is a rich history of social science research centering on racial inequalities that continue to be observed across various markets (e.g., labor, housing, and credit markets) and social milieus. Existing research on racial discrimination in consumer markets, however, is relatively scarce and that which has been done has disproportionately focused on consumers as the victims of race-based mistreatment. As such, we know relatively little about how consumers contribute to inequalities in their roles as perpetrators of racial discrimination. In response, in this paper we elaborate on a line of research that is only in its’ infancy stages of development and yet is ripe with opportunities to advance the literature on consumer racial discrimination and racial earnings inequities among tip dependent employees in the United States. Specifically, we analyze data derived from a large exit survey of restaurant consumers (n=378) in an attempt to replicate, extend, and further explore the recently documented effect of service providers’ race on restaurant consumers’ tipping decisions. Our results indicate that both White and Black restaurant customers discriminate against Black servers by tipping them less than their White coworkers. Importantly, we find no evidence that this Black tip penalty is the result of interracial differences in service skills possessed by Black and White servers. We conclude by delineating directions for future research in this neglected but salient area study.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Partisan competition, growth and the franchise

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests use the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.