Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Demand elasticity and market power in the spanish electricity market

In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.

Two algorithms to find a power integral basis

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del fitxer adjunt."

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

The European Union Police Mission: The Beginning of a New Future for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

The creation, reform and/or restructuring of the police in post-conflict societies remains one of the key challenges for practitioners and scholars in the contemporary fields of peace and security, particularly due to the changing nature of conflicts. Since the 1990s the world has witnessed a proliferation of international police missions, with regional organisations gradually acquiring a prominent role. This paper analyses the 2003-2005 period of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much is at stake in this mission, both in terms of the development of the EU´s external identity but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s road to EU membership and sustainable peace. This paper will argue that by 2005 the balance sheet was mixed. EUPM fell short of fulfilling its overall goal of ‘Europeanising’ Bosnian police services, and of its desire to be seen as providing that additional ingredient in police matters that would set it apart from the earlier UN mission. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the Mission did not merit the harsh criticisms it was faced with. Its lack of success was not entirely the Mission’s doing. The paper focuses on three aspects: political and economic viability and sustainability, security levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and institution and capacity building. The explanatory framework used in this paper is based on the democratic policing discourse. In doing so the argument developed here will also shed light on the nature of so-called “best European practices” in police matters.

Encryption methods using formal power series rings

Recently there has been a great deal of work on noncommutative algebraic cryptography. This involves the use of noncommutative algebraic objects as the platforms for encryption systems. Most of this work, such as the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme, the Ko-Lee scheme and the Baumslag-Fine-Xu Modular group scheme use nonabelian groups as the basic algebraic object. Some of these encryption methods have been successful and some have been broken. It has been suggested that at this point further pure group theoretic research, with an eye towards cryptographic applications, is necessary.In the present study we attempt to extend the class of noncommutative algebraic objects to be used in cryptography. In particular we explore several different methods to use a formal power series ring R && x1; :::; xn && in noncommuting variables x1; :::; xn as a base to develop cryptosystems. Although R can be any ring we have in mind formal power series rings over the rationals Q. We use in particular a result of Magnus that a finitely generated free group F has a faithful representation in a quotient of the formal power series ring in noncommuting variables.

Helminth parasites of fishes from the hydroeletric power station of eletrosul (Brazil). I: Procamallanus petterae n. sp. and Spirocamallanus pintoi n. sp. (Nematoda, Camallanidae) from the reservoir of Salto Osório

Procamallanus petterae n. sp. from Plecostomus albopunctarus and Spirocamallanus pintoi n. sp. from Corydoras paleatus are described. procamallanus petterae n. sp. differs from all other species of the genus by having a buccal capsule without spiral bands, with five teeth-like structures on its base and four plate-like structures near the anterior margin; length ratio of oesophagus muscular/glandular 1:1.4; spicules short, 21µ m and 16µ m long and tails ending abruptly in a sharp point, in both sexes. Spirocamallanus pintoi n. sp. is characterized by having 6 to 8 spiral thickenings in the buccal capsule of male and 9 to 10 in female, occupying 2/3 of the length of the capsule; length of glandular oesophagus more than twice the muscular; spicules short, the right 94µ m and the left 82µ m long.