The Emission Trading Scheme reform: will the Commission's proposal save the system? EPC Policy Brief, 29 May 2015

The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by the Commission in 2001, entered into force in 2005. It was the flagship instrument of an ambitious policy aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses in the EU by making emission allowances a freely tradable ‘financial commodity’. However, in recent years, the cracks in the system have begun to show as the price of these CO2 emission allowances has dropped. In this Policy Brief, Jørgen Knud Henningsen argues that the envisaged ETS reform may not be enough to address the system’s shortcomings, and that there should be a more open discussion about its potential if it is to contribute to the EU’s goal of a largely de-carbonised economy by 2050.

Greater TTIP Ambition in Chemicals: Why and how. CEPS Special Report, 28 July 2015. Paper No. 10 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 114/July 2015.

To date, the negotiations over chemicals in the Translatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have not shown sufficient ambition. The talks have focused too much on the differences in the two ‘systems’, rather than on the actual levels of health and environmental protection for substances regulated by both the US and the EU. Given the accomplishments within the OECD and the UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), the question is whether TTIP can be any more ambitious in the area of chemicals? We find that there is no detailed or systematic knowledge about how the two levels of protection in chemicals compare, although caricatures and stereotypes abound. This is partly due to an obsessive focus on a single US federal law, the Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA), whereas in practice US protection depends on many statutes and regulations, as well as on voluntary withdrawals (under pressure from the Environmental Protection Agency) and severe common law liability. This paper makes the economic case for firmly addressing the regulatory barriers, discusses the EU’s proposals, finds that the European Parliament’s Resolution on TTIP of July 2015 lacks a rationale (for chemicals), argues that both TSCA and REACH ought to be improved (based on ‘better regulation’), discusses the link with a global regime, advocates significant improvement of market access where equivalence of health and environmental objectives is agreed and, finally, proposes to lower the costs for companies selling in both markets by allowing them to opt into the other party’s more stringent rules, thereby avoiding duplication while racing-to-the-top. The ‘living agreement’ on chemicals ought to be led by a new TTIP institution authorised to establish the level of health and environmental protection on both sides of the Atlantic for substances regulated on both sides. These findings will lay the foundation for a highly beneficial lowering of trading costs without in any way affecting the level of protection. Indeed, this is exactly what TTIP is, or should be, all about.This paper is the 10th in a series produced in the context of the “TTIP in the Balance” project, jointly organised by CEPS and the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) in Washington, D.C. It is published simultaneously on the CEPS (www.ceps.eu) and CTR websites (http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu).

TTIP’s Hard Core: Technical barriers to trade and standards. Paper No. 13 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 117/August 2015

Michelle Egan and Jacques Pelkmans provide an overview of the TBT chapter in TTIP and the various issues between the US and the EU in this area, which in turn requires extensive expositions of domestic regulation in the US and the EU. TBTs, outside heavily regulated sectors such as chemicals, automobiles or medicines (which have separate chapters in TTIP), can be caused by divergent (voluntary) standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment. Indeed, in all three the US and the EU have long experienced frictions with considerable trading costs. The 1998 Mutual Recognition Agreement about conformity assessment only succeeded in two out of six sectors. The US and European standardisation traditions differ and this paper explains why it is so hard, also economically, to realise convergence. However, the authors reject the unproductive ‘stand-off’ between US and EU negotiators on standardisation and suggest to clarify the enormous economic ‘installed base’ of prominent US standards in the world economy and build a solution from there. As to technical regulation, the prospect of converging regulation (via harmonisation) is often dim, but equivalence (given similar levels of regulatory protection) can be an option.

The EU ETS: Caught between an ideal and reality. CEPS Commentary, 8 march 2016

The EU ETS (emissions trading system) has passed its first decade of operation and has proven to be an inspiration for those who promote carbon pricing through carbon markets as a means to tackle climate change. During this period, Europe has learned important lessons from operating its own ETS and from observing the experiences of other jurisdictions with carbon markets.

Something Worth Fighting For: The Evolution of Lobbying Coalitions in the Emissions Trading System. Bruges Political Research Papers 50/2015.

This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers it primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU policy area can form and develop.

Exploring complementarities between goods and services trade in trade agreements

More than three decades of research on trade costs and goods trade have unveiled fundamental insights into the determinants, the nature and the consequences of goods trade agreements. A cottage literature has also evolved studying similar issues from a services trade perspective, but the two-way interaction between goods and services trade has not been explored formally. We bridge this gap by providing a formal treatment of the inter-linkages between goods and services trade. The model provides insights into how trade agreements impact goods and services trade. We also explore the impact of the complementarities of goods and services agreements on goods and services trade empirically using bilateral goods and services trade data for OECD and BRICS trading partners over 1995-2010.

WTO law issues of emissions trading

Based on existing research in the interface of emissions trading schemes (ETSs) and WTO law, the paper looks more closely at the design elements of an ETS that are most vulnerable to a WTO challenge, including border adjustment on importation and exportation, recycling of revenues and cross-border linking. The analysis of WTO consistency of various ETS regulatory components reveals significant legal uncertainty. One explanation is that an ETS is not yet fully established as a regulatory tool. It does not have a fixed design and its design elements vary significantly with a scheme. Moreover, ETS-related issues have never been raised in WTO disputes. This makes it hard to predict with confidence the outcome of scrutiny of an ETS by a WTO adjudicative body. In this respect, the availability of environmental and/or health exceptions for justification of ETS-related measures is of great importance.

(Table 2) Planktic foraminifera and their diversity indices of sediment surface samples from the Atlantic Ocean

Species distribution patterns in planktonic foraminiferal assemblages are fundamental to the understanding of the determinants of their ecology. Until now, data used to identify such distribution patterns was mainly acquired using the standard >150 µm sieve size. However, given that assemblage shell size-range in planktonic foraminifera is not constant, this data acquisition practice could introduce artefacts in the distributional data. Here, we investigated the link between assemblage shell size-range and diversity in Recent planktonic foraminifera by analysing multiple sieve-size fractions in 12 samples spanning all bioprovinces of the Atlantic Ocean. Using five diversity indices covering various aspects of community structure, we found that counts from the >63 µm fraction in polar oceans and the >125 µm elsewhere sufficiently approximate maximum diversity in all Recent assemblages. Diversity values based on counts from the >150 µm fraction significantly underestimate maximum diversity in the polar and surprisingly also in the tropical provinces. Although the new methodology changes the shape of the diversity/sea-surface temperature (SST) relationship, its strength appears unaffected. Our analysis reveals that increasing diversity in planktonic foraminiferal assemblages is coupled with a progressive addition of larger species that have distinct, offset shell-size distributions. Thus, the previously documented increase in overall assemblage shell size-range towards lower latitudes is linked to an expanding shell-size disparity between species from the same locality. This observation supports the idea that diversity and shell size-range disparity in foraminiferal assemblages are the result of niche separation. Increasing SST leads to enhanced surface water stratification and results in vertical niche separation, which permits ecological specialisation. Specific deviations from the overall diversity and shell-size disparity latitudinal pattern are seen in regions of surface-water instability, indicating that coupled shell-size and diversity measurements could be used to reconstruct water column structures of past oceans.

Trading under the laws of Venezuela,

At head of title: U.S. Department of Commerce. Daniel C. Roper, secretary. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Alexander V. Dye, director ...

Trading with Mexico

Mode of access: Internet.

Trading with the enemy in World War II.

Bibliography: p. 570-577.

The control of alien property. Supplement to Trading with the enemy in World War II.

Bibliography: p. 266-276.

Trading with the enemy act : interim report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (pursuant to S. Res. 245, 82d Congress)

At head of title: Committee print.

Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and related agencies appropriations for 2013 : hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, second session /

Shipping list no.: 2012-0266-P (pt. 1A), 2012-0262-P (pt. 1B), 2012-0267-P (pt. 1C), 2012-0317-P (pt. 2), 2013-0006 (pt. 3), 2013-0008-P (pt. 4), 2013-0027-P (pt. 5), 2013-0033-P (pt. 6), 2013-0042-P (pt. 7), 2013-0038-P (pt. 9).

Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and related agencies appropriations for 2012 : hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session /

Shipping list number: 2011-0276-P (pt. 1A), 2011-0274-P (pt. 1B), 2011-0283-P (pt. 1C), 2011-0318-P (pt. 2), 2011-0339-P (pt. 4), 2011-0366-P (pt. 5), 2011-0375-P (pt. 6), 2011-0367-P (pt. 7), 2011-0372-P (pt. 8), 2012-0014-P (pt. 9).