Learning to share knowledge in the Italian motorsport industry

The paper outlines a perspective on learning how to share knowledge in the context of inter-firm networks and highlights the essential role of participation in collaborative activities. This perspective suggests that knowledge sharing is not something achieved through the simple transfer of resources, but rather is an ongoing social accomplishment in which network firms constitute and re-constitute knowledge while engaging in collaborative activities. Empirical support for this view is offered by an in-depth and multiyear study of the development of collaborative relationships between a leading racing car manufacturer and its suppliers in the Italian motorsport industry. The study shows that knowledge is generated over time through the instigation of three knowledge sharing processes: the promotion of a culture of working together, co-location and the use of resident engineers, and shared education and training.

Networks of learning : how motorsport companies collaborate and share knowledge:evidence from the UK and Italian motorsport industries

The motorsport industry is a high value-added and highly innovative business sector. The UK’s leading racing car manufacturers are world class centres of research, development and engineering. However, individual firms in the sector do not have the range and depth of capabilities to compete independently in motorsport’s dynamic and competitive environment. Industry attention has therefore progressively focused on how networks of collaborating firms can work together to develop new products, improve business processes and reduce costs. This report presents findings from a three year Cardiff Business School study which examined the ways in which firms collaborate as part of wider networks. The research involved gathering data from over 120 firms in the UK and Italian motorsport sectors.

Bridging the gap? Corruption, knowledge and foreign ownership

We argue that in addition to host corruption per se, as accounted for by the existing literature, an explanation of inter-country variation in FDI needs to account for the distance between the host and home corruption, which we call relative corruption. We use a large matched home-host firm-level panel data-set for 1998-2006 from CEE transition countries. Year-specific selectivity corrected estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, higher relative ‘grand’ corruption lowers foreign ownership as the returns to investment tends to be lower in more corrupt environment. However, after controlling for the selectivity bias, knowledge-intensive parent firms are found to hold controlling ownership, as the difficulty of successful joint venture looms large in more corrupt environment. Results are robust to alternative specifications.

Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission:evidence from India

Using bank-level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy, and also test whether the reaction of different types of banks to monetary policy changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank, and that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is likely to be much more effective in a tight money period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes on less risky short-term and more risky medium-term lending. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

Does ownership structure of emerging-market firms affect their outward FDI? The case of the Indian automotive and pharmaceutical sectors

This paper examines the impact of ownership structures of emerging-market firms, which are shaped by local institutions, on the decision of these firms to undertake outward FDI. Our results suggest that family firms and firms with concentrated ownerships (both ubiquitous in emerging markets) are less likely to invest overseas, and that strategic equity holding by foreign investors facilitates outward FDI. We conclude that organisational forms such as family firms, which are optimal outcomes of institutions prevailing in emerging markets, may be suboptimal in a changing business environment in which outward FDI is necessary for access to resources and markets.

Does lending behaviour of banks in emerging economies vary by ownership? Evidence from the Indian banking sector

While much has been discussed about the relationship between ownership and financial performance of banks in emerging markets, literature about cross-ownership differences in credit market behaviour of banks in emerging economies is sparse. Using a portfolio choice model and bank-level data from India for 9 years (1995–96 to 2003–04), we examine banks’ behaviour in the context of credit markets of an emerging market economy. Our results indicate that, in India, the data for the domestic banks fit well the aforementioned portfolio-choice model, especially for private banks, but the model cannot explain the behaviour of foreign banks. In general, allocation of assets between risk-free government securities and risky credit is affected by past allocation patterns, stock exchange listing (for private banks), risk averseness of banks, regulations regarding treatment of NPA, and ability of banks to recover doubtful credit. It is also evident that banks deal with changing levels of systematic risk by altering the ratio of securitized to non-securitized credit.

How important is ownership in a market with a level playing field? The Indian banking sector revisited

Private ownership of firms is often argued to lead to better firm performance than public ownership. However, the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence indicate that agency problems may affect the performance of privately owned firms. At the same time, competition and hard budget constraints can induce state-owned firms to operate efficiently. In India, banking sector reforms and deregulation were initiated in 1992, encouraging entry and establishing a level playing field for all banks. Data for the financial years 1995–1996 through 2000–2001 suggest that, by 1999–2000, ownership was no longer a significant determinant of performance. Rather, competition induced public-sector banks to eliminate the performance gap that existed between them and both domestic and foreign private-sector banks.

Does ownership always matter? Evidence from the Indian banking industry

Existing empirical evidence on the ownership-performance issue is weighted towards the property rights hypothesis that private enterprises are superior to public enterprises. However, very few studies examine a developing country in which the strong link between the market for corporate control and the efficiency of private enterprises assumed by the property rights hypothesis may not be satisfied. Our study of the Indian banking industry confirms our expectation that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, there may not be significant differences in the performance of private and public enterprises. Our analysis highlights the importance of creating appropriate institutions prior to pursuing privatization in developing countries.

Finance and entrepreneurial entry

This paper investigates the determinants of both the volume of finance and the sources of finance of business start-ups in 42 countries. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for 1998-2003, we jointly examine how the institutional business environment and individual characteristics of entrepreneurs affect the financing of entrepreneurs. We find that the property rights system is the most significant determinant of both the total volume of finance and of the use of external finance for the individual start-up project. In addition, our findings suggest that that the supply of informal finance is associated with the higher share of external sources in start-up finance, whereas the size of the formal financial sector appears to play a more important role for the volume of entrepreneurial self-finance. Our results suggest that the use of external finance by start-ups correlates with the extent of financial restrictions in a country in a non-monotonic way. We find that some financial restrictions may enhance the use of external funds by entrepreneurs, yet the sign of this effect reverses and the coefficient becomes stronger for the high level of financial repression by the government. Finally, our findings imply that the characteristics of the start-up finance are also affected by various individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, their growth intentions and ownership structure.

Ownership structure and investment finance in transition economies:a survey of evidence from large firms in Hungary and Poland

Using survey data on 157 large private Hungarian and Polish companies this paper investigates links between ownership structures and CEOs’ expectations with regard to sources of finance for investment. The Bayesian estimation is used to deal with the small sample restrictions, while classical methods provide robustness checks. We found a hump-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and expectations of relying on public equity. The latter is most likely for firms where the largest investor owns between 25 percent and 49 percent of shares, just below the legal control threshold. More profitable firms rely on retained earnings for their investment finance, consistent with the ‘pecking order’ theory of financing. Finally, firms for which the largest shareholder is a domestic institutional investor are more likely to borrow from domestic banks.

Ownership concentration:'Private benefits of control' and debt financing

Building on the ‘law and economics’ literature, this paper analyses corporate governance implications of debt financing in an environment where a dominant owner is able to extract ex ante ‘private benefits of control’. Ownership concentration may result in lower efficiency, measured as a ratio of a firm’s debt to investment, and this effect depends on the identity of the largest shareholder. Moreover, entrenched dominant shareholder(s) may be colluding with fixed-claim holders in extracting ‘control premium’. One of possible outcomes is a ‘crowding out’ of entrepreneurial firms from the debt market, and this is supported by evidence from the transition economies.

Endogenous ownership structure:factors affecting the post-privatisation equity in largest Hungarian firms

Using a data set for the 162 largest Hungarian firms during the period of 1994-1999, this paper explores the determinants of equity shares held by both foreign investors and Hungarian corporations. Evidence is found for a post-privatisation evolution towards more homogeneous equity structures, where dominant categories of Hungarian and foreign owners aim at achieving controlling stakes. In addition, focusing on firm-level characteristics we find that exporting firms attract foreign owners who acquire controlling equity stakes. Similarly, firm-size measurements are positively associated with the presence of foreign investors. However, they are negatively associated with 100% foreign ownership, possibly because the marginal costs of acquiring additional equity are growing with the size of the assets. The results are interpreted within the framework of the existing theory. In particular, following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) we argue that equity should not be treated as an exogenous variable. As for specific determinants of equity levels, we focus on informational asymmetries and (unobserved) ownership-specific characteristics of foreign investors and Hungarian investors.

Innovation, ownership and profitability

This paper considers the relationship between innovation, ownership and profitability for a panel of manufacturing plants in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Previous literature suggests that innovators are persistently more profitable than non-innovators, but little is known about how this link is moderated by external versus domestic ownership. We consider the link between innovation and profits separately for innovators and non-innovators, and for indigenous innovators and non-innovators and externally-owned plants. We also consider the determinants of innovation over the distribution of plant-level profitability, and find that the determinants of profitability – including innovation and external ownership – vary over the distribution from low to high profitability plants. We find support for the view that innovators and non-innovators have different profitability determinants, and that the profitability of externally-owned plants depends on very different factors to that of indigenously-owned enterprises.