Strategic Delegations in Monetary Unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Rules of origin : from analysis to reform

General Introduction This thesis can be divided into two main parts :the first one, corresponding to the first three chapters, studies Rules of Origin (RoOs) in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs); the second part -the fourth chapter- is concerned with Anti-Dumping (AD) measures. Despite wide-ranging preferential access granted to developing countries by industrial ones under North-South Trade Agreements -whether reciprocal, like the Europe Agreements (EAs) or NAFTA, or not, such as the GSP, AGOA, or EBA-, it has been claimed that the benefits from improved market access keep falling short of the full potential benefits. RoOs are largely regarded as a primary cause of the under-utilization of improved market access of PTAs. RoOs are the rules that determine the eligibility of goods to preferential treatment. Their economic justification is to prevent trade deflection, i.e. to prevent non-preferred exporters from using the tariff preferences. However, they are complex, cost raising and cumbersome, and can be manipulated by organised special interest groups. As a result, RoOs can restrain trade beyond what it is needed to prevent trade deflection and hence restrict market access in a statistically significant and quantitatively large proportion. Part l In order to further our understanding of the effects of RoOs in PTAs, the first chapter, written with Pr. Olivier Cadot, Celine Carrère and Pr. Jaime de Melo, describes and evaluates the RoOs governing EU and US PTAs. It draws on utilization-rate data for Mexican exports to the US in 2001 and on similar data for ACP exports to the EU in 2002. The paper makes two contributions. First, we construct an R-index of restrictiveness of RoOs along the lines first proposed by Estevadeordal (2000) for NAFTA, modifying it and extending it for the EU's single-list (SL). This synthetic R-index is then used to compare Roos under NAFTA and PANEURO. The two main findings of the chapter are as follows. First, it shows, in the case of PANEURO, that the R-index is useful to summarize how countries are differently affected by the same set of RoOs because of their different export baskets to the EU. Second, it is shown that the Rindex is a relatively reliable statistic in the sense that, subject to caveats, after controlling for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, it accounts for differences in utilization rates at the tariff line level. Finally, together with utilization rates, the index can be used to estimate total compliance costs of RoOs. The second chapter proposes a reform of preferential Roos with the aim of making them more transparent and less discriminatory. Such a reform would make preferential blocs more "cross-compatible" and would therefore facilitate cumulation. It would also contribute to move regionalism toward more openness and hence to make it more compatible with the multilateral trading system. It focuses on NAFTA, one of the most restrictive FTAs (see Estevadeordal and Suominen 2006), and proposes a way forward that is close in spirit to what the EU Commission is considering for the PANEURO system. In a nutshell, the idea is to replace the current array of RoOs by a single instrument- Maximum Foreign Content (MFC). An MFC is a conceptually clear and transparent instrument, like a tariff. Therefore changing all instruments into an MFC would bring improved transparency pretty much like the "tariffication" of NTBs. The methodology for this exercise is as follows: In step 1, I estimate the relationship between utilization rates, tariff preferences and RoOs. In step 2, I retrieve the estimates and invert the relationship to get a simulated MFC that gives, line by line, the same utilization rate as the old array of Roos. In step 3, I calculate the trade-weighted average of the simulated MFC across all lines to get an overall equivalent of the current system and explore the possibility of setting this unique instrument at a uniform rate across lines. This would have two advantages. First, like a uniform tariff, a uniform MFC would make it difficult for lobbies to manipulate the instrument at the margin. This argument is standard in the political-economy literature and has been used time and again in support of reductions in the variance of tariffs (together with standard welfare considerations). Second, uniformity across lines is the only way to eliminate the indirect source of discrimination alluded to earlier. Only if two countries face uniform RoOs and tariff preference will they face uniform incentives irrespective of their initial export structure. The result of this exercise is striking: the average simulated MFC is 25% of good value, a very low (i.e. restrictive) level, confirming Estevadeordal and Suominen's critical assessment of NAFTA's RoOs. Adopting a uniform MFC would imply a relaxation from the benchmark level for sectors like chemicals or textiles & apparel, and a stiffening for wood products, papers and base metals. Overall, however, the changes are not drastic, suggesting perhaps only moderate resistance to change from special interests. The third chapter of the thesis considers whether Europe Agreements of the EU, with the current sets of RoOs, could be the potential model for future EU-centered PTAs. First, I have studied and coded at the six-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS) .both the old RoOs -used before 1997- and the "Single list" Roos -used since 1997. Second, using a Constant Elasticity Transformation function where CEEC exporters smoothly mix sales between the EU and the rest of the world by comparing producer prices on each market, I have estimated the trade effects of the EU RoOs. The estimates suggest that much of the market access conferred by the EAs -outside sensitive sectors- was undone by the cost-raising effects of RoOs. The chapter also contains an analysis of the evolution of the CEECs' trade with the EU from post-communism to accession. Part II The last chapter of the thesis is concerned with anti-dumping, another trade-policy instrument having the effect of reducing market access. In 1995, the Uruguay Round introduced in the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) a mandatory "sunset-review" clause (Article 11.3 ADA) under which anti-dumping measures should be reviewed no later than five years from their imposition and terminated unless there was a serious risk of resumption of injurious dumping. The last chapter, written with Pr. Olivier Cadot and Pr. Jaime de Melo, uses a new database on Anti-Dumping (AD) measures worldwide to assess whether the sunset-review agreement had any effect. The question we address is whether the WTO Agreement succeeded in imposing the discipline of a five-year cycle on AD measures and, ultimately, in curbing their length. Two methods are used; count data analysis and survival analysis. First, using Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions, the count of AD measures' revocations is regressed on (inter alia) the count of "initiations" lagged five years. The analysis yields a coefficient on measures' initiations lagged five years that is larger and more precisely estimated after the agreement than before, suggesting some effect. However the coefficient estimate is nowhere near the value that would give a one-for-one relationship between initiations and revocations after five years. We also find that (i) if the agreement affected EU AD practices, the effect went the wrong way, the five-year cycle being quantitatively weaker after the agreement than before; (ii) the agreement had no visible effect on the United States except for aone-time peak in 2000, suggesting a mopping-up of old cases. Second, the survival analysis of AD measures around the world suggests a shortening of their expected lifetime after the agreement, and this shortening effect (a downward shift in the survival function postagreement) was larger and more significant for measures targeted at WTO members than for those targeted at non-members (for which WTO disciplines do not bind), suggesting that compliance was de jure. A difference-in-differences Cox regression confirms this diagnosis: controlling for the countries imposing the measures, for the investigated countries and for the products' sector, we find a larger increase in the hazard rate of AD measures covered by the Agreement than for other measures.

Managerial nursing competencies in the expansion of the Family Health Strategy

Abstract OBJECTIVE To relate the managerial competencies required of nurses with the process of change experienced in the expansion of the Family Health Strategy (FHS). METHOD A qualitative research conducted in primary health care in a southern Brazilian city, through interviews with 32 managerial and clinical nurses. The interviews were processed by IRAMUTEQ software. The resulting classes were examined under five managerial competencies to promote change. RESULTS The four classes obtained from data were: the Family Health Strategy expansion process; confrontations and potentialities; mobilization for the change; innovations in medical and nursing consultations. The classes were related to one or more competencies. CONCLUSION The expansion of the Family Health Strategy requires managerial competencies of implementing and sustaining change, negotiating agreements and commitments, using power and influence ethically and effectively, sponsoring and selling new ideas, and encouraging and promoting innovation.

Welfare Impacts of Cross-Country Spillovers in Agricultural Research, 2007

The welfare implications of intellectual property protection (IPP) for private sector agricultural research are analyzed, focusing on the realistic cases in which countries provide different IPP levels, technology spills over across countries, and the public sector is involved in research. A model is developed to determine who benefits from, and who should pay for, the associated research. The paper contains some interesting results on the implications of a harmonization of IPP policies through multilateral agreements or via technology that allows research firms to prevent the copying of plants and animals that express traits that have emerged from their research.

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

State of Iowa Employee Handbook, Revised October 2003

This is your employee handbook. This information is based on Iowa Department of Administrative Services – Human Resources Enterprise (DAS-HRE) rules and policies. Much of the information in this handbook is also covered in the State’s collective bargaining agreements. Where there are differences between a collective bargaining agreement and this handbook, the collective bargaining agreement prevails for employees covered by the agreement. Where there are differences between this handbook and DAS-HRE rules and policies, DAS-HRE rules and policies prevail. Some of the employee benefit plans described in this handbook are subject to legal requirements concerning reporting and disclosure. This handbook contains highlights of those plans. For complete details about benefit plans, consult the benefit handbooks and the official plan documents. In case of any discrepancy, the official plan documents prevail. Of course, changes in laws may affect the benefit programs described in this handbook. The State of Iowa reserves the right to amend the contents of this handbook at any time without prior notice. The provisions of this handbook and other policies do not establish contractual rights or conditions of employment between the State and its employees.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Endogenous bargaining power

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

Balance Between Investment Protection and Sustainable Development in BITs: the Example of Switzerland

The objective of this article is to examine how substantive and procedural rights granted to foreign investors by Swiss bits are gradually being balanced with social and environmental provisions. Switzerland has enjoyed a long bit practice, as it signed its first treaty with Tunisia fifty years ago. Swiss bits rely on the post-establishment model and include usual standards of treatment. From 1981, they also systematically provide for a dispute settlement mechanism for disputes arising between an investor and a host State. Since the Switzerland - El Salvador bit in 1994, sustainable development concerns have been expressly inserted in some Swiss bits, as well as in several recent free trade agreements. Provisions on this theme are however far from being systematic in Switzerland's bit practice and essentially remain declaratory in nature. The trend towards wider inclusion of sustainable development provisions in bits still faces several practical and political challenges.

Will the Convention on Biological Diversity put an end to biological control?

Will the Convention on Biological Diversity put an end to biological control? Under the Convention on Biological Diversity countries have sovereign rights over their genetic resources. Agreements governing the access to these resources and the sharing of the benefits arising from their use need to be established between involved parties. This also applies to species collected for potential use in biological control. Recent applications of access and benefit sharing principles have already made it difficult or impossible to collect and export natural enemies for biological control research in several countries. If such an approach is widely applied it would impede this very successful and environmentally safe pest management method based on the use of biological diversity. The International Organization for Biological Control of Noxious Animals and Plants has, therefore, created the "Commission on Biological Control and Access and Benefit Sharing". This commission is carrying out national and international activities to make clear how a benefit sharing regime might seriously frustrate the future of biological control. In addition, the IOBC Commission members published information on current regulations and perceptions concerning exploration for natural enemies and drafted some 30 case studies selected to illustrate a variety of points relevant to access and benefit sharing. In this article, we summarize our concern about the effects of access and benefit sharing systems on the future of biological control.

Organisational innovations and health care decentralisation: A perspective from Spain

Recent policy developments in public health care systems lead to a greater diversity in health care. Decentralisation, either geographically or at an institutional level, is the key force, because it encourages innovation and local initiatives in health care provision. The devolution of responsibilities allows for a sort of de-construction of the status quo by changing both organizational forms and service provision. The new organizations enjoy greater freedom in the way they pay their staff, and are judged according to their results. These organizations may retain financial surpluses, develop spin-off companies and commission a range of specialised services (such as Diagnostic and Treatment Centres in UK) from providers outside the institutional setting in order to have more access to capital markets. However this diversity may generate a feeling of lack of commitment to a national health service and ultimately a loss of social cohesion. By fiscal decentralisation to regional authorities or planned delegation of financial agreements to the providers, financial incentives are more explicit and may seem to place profit-making above a commitment to better health care. An evaluation of the myths and realities of the decentralization process is needed. Here, I offer an assessment pros and cons of the decentralization process of health care in Spain, drawing on the experience of regional reforms from the pioneering organisational innovations implemented in Catalonia in 1981, up to the observed dispersion of health care spending per capita among regions at present.

R&D cooperation and spillovers: Some empirical evidence

This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationshipbetween R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.

State of Iowa Employee Handbook, Revised October 2003

I hope you will find a great deal of challenge and personal satisfaction in your employment with the State. You have an important role in accomplishing the goals of your department and of state government. The State has a proud tradition built on the excellence of its employees and their work. We challenge you to help maintain and improve upon this tradition. You soon will discover that our pride is contagious! As a state employee, it is very important that you always present the best possible image to the public. Remember to act promptly, be courteous, and treat people, our customers, respectfully. Your actions will make a lasting impression .... be sure it is a positive one. This is your employee handbook. This information is based on Iowa Department of Administrative Services – Human Resources Enterprise (DAS-HRE) rules and policies. Much of the information in this handbook is also covered in the State’s collective bargaining agreements. Where there are differences between a collective bargaining agreement and this handbook, the collective bargaining agreement prevails for employees covered by the agreement. Where there are differences between this handbook and DAS-HRE rules and policies, DAS-HRE rules and policies prevail. Some of the employee benefit plans described in this handbook are subject to legal requirements concerning reporting and disclosure. This handbook contains highlights of those plans. For complete details about benefit plans, consult the benefit handbooks and the official plan documents. In case of any discrepancy, the official plan documents prevail. Of course, changes in laws may affect the benefit programs described in this handbook. The State of Iowa reserves the right to amend the contents of this handbook at any time without prior notice. The provisions of this handbook and other policies do not establish contractual rights or conditions of employment between the State and its employees.

Recepção dos Tratados / Acordos Internacionais na Ordem Jurídica Interna Cabo – verdiana

O presente trabalho monográfico que se intitula “Recepção dos Tratados / Acordos Internacionais na Ordem Jurídica Cabo - Verdiana” enquadra-se no âmbito do curso da licenciatura em Direito, realizado pela Universidade Jean Piaget de Cabo Verde. O presente trabalho consiste em reconhecer a importância dos tratados para a comunidade internacional assim como para a comunidade nacional, com o compromisso de delinear o processo que contribui para o seu surgimento e sua evolução histórica. O tratado, por ser um instrumento utilizado para firmar acordos entre Estados, requer determinados procedimentos complexos, porém importantes para sua conclusão. Esses acordos geram normas, direitos e obrigações, e podem reflectir ou interferir no ordenamento jurídico dos Estados acordantes. Para melhor entendimento serão abordados vários tópicos relacionados com o tema. Com o desenvolvimento da sociedade internacional e a intensificação das relações entre as nações, os tratados tornaram-se a principal fonte de direito internacional existente, e actualmente assumem função semelhante às exercidas pelas leis e contratos no direito interno dos Estados, ao regulamentarem as mais variadas relações jurídicas entre países e organizações internacionais, sobre os mais variados campos do conhecimento humano. Os Estados e as organizações internacionais (e outros sujeitos de direito internacional) que celebram um determinado tratado são chamados “Partes Contratantes” (ou simplesmente “Partes”) a este tratado. As Convenções Internacionais têm por objectivo criar normas jurídicas vinculativas dos sujeitos intervenientes. Por esta mesma razão, é habitual excluir do campo do Direito Internacional os acordos que dão pelo nome de gentlemen's agreements. Estes acordos de cavalheiros são concluídos entre representantes governamentais em seu próprio nome, ou seja, sem intenção de vincular os respectivos Estados.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.