Hydrogeophysical data integration at larger scales: Application of Bayesian sequential simulation for the characterization of heterogeneous alluvial aquifers

Knowledge of the spatial distribution of hydraulic conductivity (K) within an aquifer is critical for reliable predictions of solute transport and the development of effective groundwater management and/or remediation strategies. While core analyses and hydraulic logging can provide highly detailed information, such information is inherently localized around boreholes that tend to be sparsely distributed throughout the aquifer volume. Conversely, larger-scale hydraulic experiments like pumping and tracer tests provide relatively low-resolution estimates of K in the investigated subsurface region. As a result, traditional hydrogeological measurement techniques contain a gap in terms of spatial resolution and coverage, and they are often alone inadequate for characterizing heterogeneous aquifers. Geophysical methods have the potential to bridge this gap. The recent increased interest in the application of geophysical methods to hydrogeological problems is clearly evidenced by the formation and rapid growth of the domain of hydrogeophysics over the past decade (e.g., Rubin and Hubbard, 2005).

Using information from telephone panel surveys to predict reasons for refusal

One of the key problems in conducting surveys is convincing people to participate.¦However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine why people refuse. Panel surveys¦provide information from previous waves that can offer valuable clues as to why people¦refuse to participate. If we are able to anticipate the reasons for refusal, then we¦may be able to take appropriate measures to encourage potential respondents to participate¦in the survey. For example, special training could be provided for interviewers¦on how to convince potential participants to participate.¦This study examines different influences, as determined from the previous wave,¦on refusal reasons that were given by the respondents in the subsequent wave of the¦telephone Swiss Household Panel. These influences include socio-demography, social¦inclusion, answer quality, and interviewer assessment of question understanding and¦of future participation. Generally, coefficients are similar across reasons, and¦between-respondents effects rather than within-respondents effects are significant.¦While 'No interest' reasons are easier to predict, the other reasons are more situational. Survey-specific issues are able to distinguish¦different reasons to some extent.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

A follow-up study on the quality of alcohol dependence-related information on the web.

ABSTRACT: In order to evaluate the one-year evolution of web-based information on alcohol dependence, we re-assessed alcohol-related sites in July 2007 with the same evaluating tool that had been used to assess these sites in June 2006. Websites were assessed with a standardized form designed to rate sites on the basis of accountability, presentation, interactivity, readability, and content quality. The DISCERN scale was also used, which aimed to assist persons without content expertise in assessing the quality of written health publications. Scores were highly stable for all components of the form one year later (r = .77 to .95, p < .01). Analysis of variance for repeated measures showed no time effect, no interaction between time and scale, no interaction between time and group (affiliation categories), and no interaction between time, group, and scale. The study highlights lack of change of alcohol-dependence-related web pages across one year.

"MIATA"-minimal information about T cell assays.

Immunotherapy, especially therapeutic vaccination, has a great deal of potential in the treatment of cancer and certain infectious diseases such as HIV (Allison et al., 2006; Fauci et al., 2008; Feldmann and Steinman, 2005). Numerous vaccine candidates have been tested in patients with a variety of tumor types and chronic viral diseases. Often, the best way to assess the clinical potential of these vaccines is to monitor the induced T cell response, and yet there are currently no standards for reporting these results. This letter is an effort to address this problem.

Public Sector Pay in Finland

This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within the public sector.

Avoidance Policies – A New Conceptual Framework

This paper develops a general theoretical framework within which a heterogeneous group taxpayers confront a market that supplies a variety of schemes for reducing tax liability, and uses this framework to explore the impact of a wide range of anti-avoidance policies. Schemes differ in their legal effectiveness and hence in the risks to which they expose taxpayers - risks which go beyond the risk of audit considered in the conventional literature on evasion. Given the individual taxpayer’s circumstances, the prices charged for the schemes and the policy environment, the model predicts (i) whether or not any given taxpayer will acquire a scheme, and (ii) if they do so, which type of scheme they will acquire. The paper then analyses how these decisions, and hence the tax gap, are influenced by four generic types of policy: Disclosure – earlier information leading to faster closure of loopholes; Penalties – introduction of penalties for failed avoidance; Policy Design – fundamental policy changes that design out opportunities for avoidance; Product Register - the introduction of GAARs or mini-GAARs that give greater clarity about how different types of scheme will be treated. The paper shows that when considering the indirect/behavioural effects of policies on the tax gap it is important to recognise that these operate on two different margins. First policies will have deterrence effects – their impact on the quantum of taxpayers choosing to acquire different types schemes as distinct to acquiring no scheme at all. There will be a range of such deterrence effects reflecting the range of schemes available in the market. But secondly, since different schemes generate different tax gaps, policies will also have switching effects as they induce taxpayers who previously acquired one type of scheme to acquire another. The first three types of policy generate positive deterrence effects but differ in the switching effects they produce. The fourth type of policy produces mixed deterrence effects.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

News Shocks and Business Cycles: Bridging the Gap from Different Methodologies

An important disconnect in the news driven view of the business cycle formalized by Beaudry and Portier (2004), is the lack of agreement between different—VAR and DSGE—methodologies over the empirical plausibility of this view. We argue that this disconnect can be largely resolved once we augment a standard DSGE model with a financial channel that provides amplification to news shocks. Both methodologies suggest news shocks to the future growth prospects of the economy to be significant drivers of U.S. business cycles in the post-Greenspan era (1990-2011), explaining as much as 50% of the forecast error variance in hours worked in cyclical frequencies