856 resultados para credit rating agencies, sovereign ratings, sovereign risk, public debt
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This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to euroarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive features of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contributes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later.
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The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU countries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the Banking Union are held in other EU countries.While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum oversight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance (and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.
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The European Union’s regulations governing sovereign debt are based on the principle of equal treatment of all member states. The recommendations we make here concerning changes in European Union sovereign-debt reduction rules take account of national particularities, but are by no means arbitrary in nature. According to the calculations we present here, such reformed regulations would do far more to promote economic growth than would be the case under the Fiscal Compact’s European debt brake. By 2030, real gains in growth will amount to more than 450 billion euros more than the outcome that would presumably be obtained under the European debt brake.
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Water is essential to life; nevertheless ingestion of contaminated water could result in death caused by waterborne diseases such as cholera. Pathogens present in the water can cause diseases, other than those resulting from water ingestion, being registered an increase in the number of case reports in recent years. It is not clear if this increase is due either to a better case reporting system or to an increase in microorganism’s virulence. The generalized use of antibiotics in agriculture and animal farming contributed to their dissemination in the environment which promotes microorganism selection and emergence of resistant strains. This phenomenon can be enhanced by the ability of microorganism to persist within complex communities known as biofilms. In the present work we aim to characterize the microbial population present in ornamental waters and perform a risk assessment for public health resulting from human interaction with it.
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Risk assessment for public health related to exposure to Halogenated Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons present in ludic waters
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Esta tese analisa, entre 2005 e 2013, o impacto das políticas governamentais de resgate sobre o risco do setor bancário nos países da OCDE. Primeiro, em linha com a hipótese de moral hazard, verifica-se que instituições financeiras com expectativa elevada de bailout, assumem riscos mais elevados do que as demais. Segundo, constata-se que, em períodos normais, garantias de socorro às grandes instituições distorcem a competição no setor e incrementa o risco das demais. Durante a crise, entretanto, mostra-se que elevações na expectativa de resgate dos concorrentes de uma instituição, à medida que representa uma redução em sua chance de eventual socorro governamental, diminuem sua tomada de riscos. Adicionalmente, em período de crise também é evidenciado que: reduções na capacidade financeira dos países estão associadas a menor assunção de riscos; em média, o aumento na tomada de riscos é maior nos países com menor spread de Credit Default Swap.
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"Export-Import Bank of the United States, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) are small, highly specialized government agencies which ensure that U.S. firms have access to trade and investment finance."--P.1.
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Hearings held July 9, 1947-Feb. 16, 1948.
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"Serial no. 100-71."
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Includes bibliography.
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Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington, D.C.
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Shipping list no.: 2012-0266-P (pt. 1A), 2012-0262-P (pt. 1B), 2012-0267-P (pt. 1C), 2012-0317-P (pt. 2), 2013-0006 (pt. 3), 2013-0008-P (pt. 4), 2013-0027-P (pt. 5), 2013-0033-P (pt. 6), 2013-0042-P (pt. 7), 2013-0038-P (pt. 9).
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Shipping list no.: 2004-0116-P (pts. 1A-B), 2004-0162-P (pt.2), 2004-0180-P (pt. 3), 2004-0204-P (pt. 4), 2004-0198-P (pt. 5), 2004-0199-P (pt. 6), 2004-0207-P (pt. 7), 2004-0208-P (pt. 8).
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Shipping list no. : 2005-0156-P (pt. 1A), 2005-0131-P (pt. 1B), 2005-0136-P (pt. 2), 2005-0172-P (pt. 3-5, 7), 2005-0185-P (pt. 6), 2005-0168-P (pt. 8), 2006-0066-P (pt. 9).