Electronic contracting in aircraft aftercare: A case study

Distributed systems comprised of autonomous self-interested entities require some sort of control mechanism to ensure the predictability of the interactions that drive them. This is certainly true in the aerospace domain, where manufacturers, suppliers and operators must coordinate their activities to maximise safety and profit, for example. To address this need, the notion of norms has been proposed which, when incorporated into formal electronic documents, allow for the specification and deployment of contract-driven systems. In this context, we describe the CONTRACT framework and architecture for exactly this purpose, and describe a concrete instantiation of this architecture as a prototype system applied to an aerospace aftercare scenario.

Towards a Formalisation of Electronic Contracting Environments

The IST-CONTRACT project is in the process of creating an electronic contracting language. One of the goals of this language is that it has formal underpinnings, and formalizations at a number of levels have been created. One of the lowest levels, upon which the other levels are built is the normative level. At this level, we identify how contract clauses (modeled as norms) may evolve over time. In this paper, we describe this formalization, and show how we may associate various states with a norm throughout its lifecycle. We also show how more complex evaluations may be carried out over a norm, and conclude with an example showing the application of the framework over a contract and its associated norms.

Myth and Society: Functions, Uses, and Abuses of Myth in Society

In this work, I will discuss the integral role that myth has in society and then, after presenting several examples of this thesis, I will examine how the integral nature of myth lends itself to certain societal abuses. These abuses often result in unjust social constructs that eventually become attributed to the myth. I would like to proceed in defense of myth; that is, that these constructs are not to be attributed to the myths themselves, rather, society has taken myth and applied it to suit its purposes, ignoring the context in which the myths originated. Hopefully this will raise society's current attitudes toward myth to a level of respect, and will also help to clear myth of its reputation as the origin of injustice and domination.

Testing production functions used in empirical growth studies

We estimate and test two alternative functional forms, which have been used in the growth literature, representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992), and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumental-variable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model.

On the consistency of arbitrary money-demand functions with the Sidrauski and the shopping-time models

This paper investigates which properties money-demand functions have to satisfy to be consistent with multidimensional extensions of Lucasí(2000) versions of the Sidrauski (1967) and the shopping-time models. We also investigate how such classes of models relate to each other regarding the rationalization of money demands. We conclude that money demand functions rationalizable by the shoppingtime model are always rationalizable by the Sidrauski model, but that the converse is not true. The log-log money demand with an interest-rate elasticity greater than or equal to one and the semi-log money demand are counterexamples.

Testing production functions used in empirical growth studies

We estimate and test two alternative functional forms representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the extended neoclassical growth model, and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumentalvariable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model. Our evidence rejects the extended neoclassical growth model in favor of the mincerian specification, with an estimated capital share of about 42%, a marginal return to education of about 7.5% per year, and an estimated productivity growth of about 1.4% per year. Differences in productivity cannot be disregarded as an explanation of why output per worker varies so much across countries: a variance decomposition exercise shows that productivity alone explains 54% of the variation in output per worker across countries.

Conditional labour supply, quantile functions in Brazil

The estimation of labor supply elasticities has been an important issue m the economic literature. Yet all works have estimated conditional mean labor supply functions only. The objective of this paper is to obtain more information on labor supply, by estimating the conditional quantile labor supply function. vI/e use a sample of prime age urban males employees in Brazil. Two stage estimators are used as the net wage and virtual income are found to be endogenous to the model. Contrary to previous works using conditional mean estimators, it is found that labor supply elasticities vary significantly and asymmetrically across hours of work. vVhile the income and wage elasticities at the standard work week are zero, for those working longer hours the elasticities are negative.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.