Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually playthe equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study theconvergence and stability properties of Sj\"ostr\"om's (1994) mechanism, onthe assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibriumusing monotonic learning dynamics and also with fictitious play. Thismechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environmentsusing as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominatedstrategies (only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies isneeded). There are, however, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payoffs maybe very different from those desired by the social choice function. Withmonotonic dynamics we show that many equilibria in all the sets ofequilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that havecompletely mixed initial conditions. The initial conditions that lead tothese equilibria need not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore,even if the dynamics converge to the ``right'' set of equilibria, it stillcan converge to quite a poor outcome in welfare terms. With fictitious play,if the agents have completely mixed prior beliefs, beliefs and play convergeto the outcome the planner wants to implement.

Asessing public policies. The case of education in Europe and the interaction between personal and institutional factors

The paper deals with the comparative study of European citizens satisfaction with thestate of education in their respective countries. Individual and contextual effects aretested applying multilevel analysis. The results show that educational public policies(level of decentralization, degree of comprehensiveness and public spending) as well asthe students social environment (socioeconomic and cultural status) have a soundimpact on the opinions about the state of education.

The biased balance: Observation, formalism and interpretation of a dissymmetric measuring device

This paper studies a balance whose unobservable fulcrum is not necessarilylocated at the middle of its two pans. It presents three differentmodels, showing how this lack of symmetry modifies the observation, theformalism and the interpretation of such a biased measuring device. Itargues that the biased balance can be an interesting source of inspirationfor broadening the representational theory of measurement.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Património e memória: estudo de caso, a ilha de Santiago, Cabo Verde

O presente trabalho de pesquisa centrado na problemática do património e memória, tem como objectivo inventariar e analisar alguns elementos do património material e imaterial da ilha de Santiago Cabo Verde, procurando contribuir deste modo para um conhecimento mais rigoroso da memória e identidade cabo-verdiana. Para tanto, analisamos documentos da Direcção de Obras Públicas, do final do século XIX referente ao arquipélago de Cabo Verde, no Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, mais especificamente Cidade da Praia, revistas e publicações do século XX que reportam a situação da Igreja Matriz e do Palácio do Governo, bem como a questão da Cidade Velha e a evolução contextual das vozes a respeito das ruínas do património caboverdiano ao longo da história de forma atemporal. A história do arquipélago é marcada por intensas calamidades naturais e ecológicas que mobilizam constantemente autoridades, deixa a outros planos nomeadamente a valorização e preservação do património construído. Acerca do património imaterial, Batuque e a Tabanca, buscamos documentários a respeito deste elemento cultural que ainda hoje marca estrutura cultural e social da ilha de Santiago. Queremos pois entender e compreender o processo de construção de um património a partir do seu planeamento, sua génese de criação, em um território africano privilegiando o final do século XIX. Como é construído o património e a relação que o caboverdiano tem com a cultura que lhe foi transmitida? Por outras palavras, como se processou a convivência com um património imaterial, tradicional e de origem africana, contrapondo com a cultura do colonizador e fazendo emergir uma cultura mestiça que caracteriza hoje a sociedade caboverdiana que sobrevive além fronteira?

A characterization of sequential rationalizability

A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.

Endogenous bargaining power

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Imitation of succesful behavior in Cournot markets

In an experimental standard Cournot Oligopoly we test the importance ofmodels of behavior characterized by imitation of succesful behavior. Wefind that the players appear to the rather reluctant to imitate.

A theory of reference-dependent behavior

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.

O Efeito da Contabilização dos Activos Fixos Tangiveis com a Implementação do SNCRF em Cabo Verde

O presente trabalho intitula-se “O efeito da contabilização dos Activos Fixos Tangíveis com a implementação do Sistema de Normalização Contabilística e de Relato Financeiro (SNCRF) em Cabo Verde ” e enquadra-se no âmbito da conclusão da Licenciatura em Contabilidade e Administração – Ramo Auditoria, ministrado pelo ISCEE – Instituto Superior das Ciências Económicas e Empresariais. Tem como objectivo fazer uma análise do efeito da contabilização dos Activos Fixos Tangíveis (Norma de Relato Financeira 7 – NRF7), de acordo com o SNCRF, que vigora em Cabo Verde desde 1 de Janeiro de 2009, dando a conhecer a perspectiva conceptual da mesma e o enquadramento fiscal/ jurídico. Para alcançar o objectivo do trabalho, foram feitas consultas bibliográficas sobre os principais conceitos dos activos fixos tangíveis, tendo por base as normas de contabilidade nacionais e internacionais e normas legais vigentes (SNCRF, RIUR, RIVA). Este trabalho encontra-se dividido em quatro capítulos. No primeiro apresenta o enquadramento contextual, na segunda o enquadramento teórico e legal. Com este capítulo compreender-se-á quando se reconhece um AFT, como se efectua a sua mensuração, depreciações e imparidade, o desreconhecimento e as divulgações a serem efectuados e, ainda, se apresente, sucintamente, o que a lei fiscal cabo-verdiana prevê sobre os investimentos. No terceiro capítulo se desenvolve alguns casos práticos enquadrados na NRF 7 através de factos contabilísticos de uma empresa fictícia e por último aparece o capítulo quatro que será a parte de conclusões. O SNCRF, veio melhorar a qualidade do relato financeiro em Cabo Verde, proporcionando uma informação que seja útil aos utentes. Em relação ao NRF 7, veio prever princípios a ser usados pelas entidades no tratamento dos seus investimentos, permitindo assim que os investimentos sejam escriturados no balanço pelo seu justo valor, evitando possíveis perdas caso a entidade preferir a alienação dos mesmos.

A process approach to the utility for gambling

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gamblingmust be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequentialwhile a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, notof consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is modeled as a process utilitywhich monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences.This allows for a process (dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. Asan illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allaisparadox can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general modelof rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposedand discussed.

Behavioral assumptions and management ability

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions intraining managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with anemphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) is goodfor technical posts but may also lead future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicitsafeguarding, crowding out instinctive relational heuristics and signaling a bad human type topotential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because oftheir diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set ofcooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentativeconfirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the corecourses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates.Controlling for the self-selected average quality of their students and some other schools characteristics, average salaries are seen to be significantly greater for schools whose core MBAcourses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based oneconomics or technical disciplines.

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.