Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

Health Care and Public Transit; Your Ticket to Health Care Access, 2005

Transportation is an important health care issue. The majority of the population here in Iowa have ready access and typically use private automobiles to access health care and other community services. There is also a significant segment of the population that either does not have access to a personal automobile or is not currently capable of driving. This can potentially limit their access to health care, but it has greater health implications because it can also limit access to nutrition and other community services, as well as involvement in social activities. For people unable to drive themselves, the alternatives generally include reliance on family, friends, volunteer groups, and public transit. Many choose transit because it gives them a degree of independence. Public transit is often used to supplement other options even when they are available. It becomes critical in circumstances where the other options don’t exist. In many cases there may be no family available or they may not always be able to get off work when travel needs arise during the workday. Friends may be in similar circumstances and volunteer groups may be either unavailable or overwhelmed. The fact that many patients depend on public transit to get to and from health care appointments makes it beneficial for health care professionals to get to know more about public transit and how it operates here in Iowa.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Toolbox to Address Safety and Operations on School Grounds and Public Streets Adjacent to Elementary and Middle Schools in Iowa, August 2006

This study identified transportation safety issues at existing Iowa school sites through on-site observations, traffic data collection, and through interviews with schools, law enforcement, and traffic engineers. Frequently observed problems, such as crossing at unmarked crosswalks, unloading and loading students on the street side, inattentive student safety patrols, and illegal parking, were documented and solutions were recommended for implementation. The results of the study also conclude that regular communications between school officials, traffic engineers, law enforcement, parents, and school transportation personnel are all critical to promoting safe operations within school zones.

On optimal monetary and fiscal policy interactions in open economies

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a two country model, where taxes on firms sales are optimally chosen and the monetary policy is set cooperatively.It turns out that in a two country setting non-cooperative fiscal policy makers have an incentive to change taxes on sales depending on shocks realizations in order to reduce output production. Therefore whether the fiscal policy is set cooperatively or not matters for optimal monetary policy decisions. Indeed, as already shown in the literature, the cooperative monetary policy maker implements the flexible price allocation only when special conditions on the value of the distortions underlying the economy are met. However, if non-cooperative fiscal policy makers set the taxes on firms sales depending on shocks realizations, these conditions cannot be satisfied; conversely, when fiscal policy is cooperative, these conditions are fulfilled. We conclude that whether implementing the flexible price allocation is optimal or not depends on the fiscal policy regime.

Adoption of financial technologies: Implications for money demand and monetary policy

In this paper we argue that inventory models are probably not usefulmodels of household money demand because the majority of households does nothold any interest bearing assets. The relevant decision for most people is notthe fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether to holdany of such assets at all. The implications of this realization are interesting and important. We find that(a) the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small,(b) the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assetsis positively related to the level of financial assets, and (c) the cost ofadopting financial technologies is positively related to age and negatively relatedto the level of education. Unlike the traditional methods of money demand estimation, our methodology allowsfor the estimation of the interest--elasticity at low values of the nominalinterest rate. The finding that the elasticity is very small for interest ratesbelow 5 percent suggests that the welfare costs of inflation are small. At interest rates of 6 percent, the elasticity is close to 0.5. We find thatroughly one half of this elasticity can be attributed to the Baumol--Tobin orintensive margin and half of it can be attributed to the new adopters or extensivemargin. The intensive margin is less important at lower interest rates and moreimportant at higher interest rates.

Technical inefficiency and public capital in US States: A stochastic frontier approach

This paper estimates a translog stochastic frontier production function in the analysis of all 48 contiguous U.S. states in the period 1970-1983, to attempt to measure and explain changes in technical efficiency. The model allows technical inefficiency to vary over time, and inefficiency effects to be a function of a set of explanatory variables in which the level and composition of public capital plays an important role. Results indicated that U.S. state inefficiency levels were significantly and positively correlated with the ratio of public capital to private capital. The proportion of public capital devoted to highways is negatively correlated with technical inefficiency, suggesting that not only the level but also the composition of public capital influenced state efficiency.

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficientoutcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments,cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumannconjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal forefficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an "agreementto play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what theplayers will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as anillustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin(1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk willnonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-waycommunication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then anaction, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for thepotentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficientplay. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency wereunsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves is only 35%. I also test ahypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects theresults, finding that the decision order is indeed important. WhileAumann s conjecture is behaviorally disconfirmed when the signal isdetermined initially, the signal s credibility seems to be much moresuspect when the sender is known to have first chosen an action, andthe results are not statistically distinguishable from those whenthere is no signal. Some applications and issues in communication andcoordination are discussed.

Labor markets and monetary policy: A new-Keynesian model with unemployement

We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities andunemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy.We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that,under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect onunemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on theimplications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigiditiesin determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment.We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting byfirms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discusshow it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wagerigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Strategy communication and measurement systems

Organizations often face the challenge of communicating their strategiesto local decision makers. The difficulty presents itself in finding away to measure performance wich meaningfully conveys how to implement theorganization's strategy at local levels. I show that organizations solvethis communication problem by combining performance measures in such away that performance gains come closest to mimicking value-added asdefined by the organization's strategy. I further show how organizationsrebalance performance measures in response to changes in their strategies.Applications to the design of performance metrics, gaming, and divisionalperformance evaluation are considered. The paper also suggests severalempirical ways to evaluate the practical importance of the communicationrole of measurement systems.

Economic booms, trade deficits and economic policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by realexchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -whichhave sometimes persisted after the return to the initialexchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector.Those circumstances have typically raised the questionof the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expectedproductivity shock in an economy where the capital stockis non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances.Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfectionstend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause aninefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector.Some stabilization policies are explored.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Micro-insurance through corporate-NGO partnerships in West Bengal : opportunities and constraints

This Practical Note examines the nascent micro-insurance sector in West Bengal, paying particular attention to the corporate- NGO partnership model for micro-insurance distribution,which has been enabled by India's unique regulatory framework. We challenge the popularconstruction of this model as a 'win - win' for all parties by analysing conflicting understandings of micro-insurance schemes and their purposes by insurance companies, NGOs, and poorvillagers. The article also considers the role of the specific political context of West Bengal inconstricting corporate- NGO micro-insurance