On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.

Who owned Earls Colne in 1798....or how to squeeze more from the Land Tax

In this important article Richard Hoyle, one of the country’s leading historians of the early modern period, introduces new perspectives on the Land Tax and its use in the analysis of local communities in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He uses as his case study the parish of Earls Colne in Essex, on which he has already written extensively with Professor Henry French. The article begins with an overview of the tax itself, explaining its history and the procedures for the collection of revenues – including the numerous changes which took place. The sizeable problems confronting any would-be analyst of the data are clearly identified, and Hoyle observes that because of these apparently insoluble difficulties the potential of the tax returns has never been fully realised. He then considers the surviving documentation in The National Archives, providing an accessible introduction to the sources and their arrangement, and describing the particularly important question o f the redemption of the tax by payment of a lump sum. The extent of redemption (in the years around 1800-1804) is discussed. Hoyle draws attention to the potential for linking the tax returns themselves with the redemption certificates (which have never been subjected to historical analysis and thereby proposes new ways of exploiting the evidence of the taxation as a whole. The article then discusses in detail the specific case of Earls Colne, with tabulated data showing the research potential. Topics analysed include the ownership of property ranked by size of payment, and calculations whereby the amount paid may be used to determine the worth of land and the structure of individual estates. The important question of absentee owners is investigated, and there is a very valuable consideration of the potential for looking at portfolio estate ownership, whereby owners held land in varying proportions in a number of parishes. It is suggested that such studies will allow us to be more aware of the entirety of property ownership, which a focus on a single community does not permit. In the concluding paragraph it is argued that using these sources we may see the rise and fall of estates, gain new information on landownership, landholding and farm size, and even approach the challenging topic of the distribution of wealth.

Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.

Ownership Advantages in Cross-border Real Estate Development: Some Evidence from European Markets

Drawing upon European industry and country case studies, this paper investigates the scope and drivers of cross-border real estate development. It is argued that the real estate development process encompasses a diverse range of activities and actors. It is inherently localised, the production process is complex and emphermal, and the outputs are heterogeneous. It analyses a transactions database of European real estate markets to provide insights into the extent of, and variations in, market penetration by non-domestic real estate developers. The data were consistent with the expectation that non-domestic real estate developers from mature markets would have a high level of market penetration in immature markets. Compared to western European markets, the CEE real estate office sales by developers were dominated by US, Israeli and other EU developers. This pattern is consistent with the argument that non-domestic developers have substantial Dunning-type ownership advantages when entering immature real estate markets. However, the data also suggested some unexpected patterns. Relative to their GDP, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and Israel accounted for large proportions of sales by developers. All are EU countries (except Israel) with small, open, affluent, highly traded economies. Further, the data also indicate that there may be a threshold where locational disadvantages outweigh ownership advantages and deter cross-border real estate development.

Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non-expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.