Evaluation of the welfare impact of regulating mobile termination rates in Portugal

Following the European Commission’s 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, the Portuguese regulatory authority (ANACOM) decided to reduce termination prices in mobile networks to their long-run incremental cost (LRIC). Nevertheless, no serious quantitative assessment of the potential effects of this decision was carried out. In this paper, we adapt and calibrate the Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model of the UK mobile telephony market to the Portuguese reality, and simulate the likely impact on consumer surplus, profits and welfare of four different regulatory approaches: pure LRIC, reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks, “bill & keep”, and asymmetric termination rates. Our results show that reducing MTRs does increase social welfare, profits and consumer surplus in the fixed market, but mobile subscribers are seriously harmed by this decision.

Fishing the key biological components of the bacterium Geobacter metallireducens for optimal biotechnological applications

Os resultados apresentados no capítulo 2 foram incluídos no artigo Dantas JM, Campelo LM, Duke NEC, Salgueiro CA, Pokkuluri PR (2015) "The structure of PccH from Geobacter sulfurreducens – a novel low reduction potential monoheme cytochrome essential for accepting electrons from an electrode", FEBS Journal, 282, 2215-2231.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

US fiscal dynamics in political perspective

Given the importance of fiscal balance for ensuring a sustainable fiscal policy, we conduct an empirical examination of fiscal dynamics in the United States in response to unsustainable budget deviations. We concentrate on the role of political factors, namely the Republican - Democrat presidential divide, in determining the fiscal response to budget disequilibria. Making use of an asymmetric cointegration framework, we explore politically motivated fiscal asymmetries in the US, from Eisenhower to Obama. We conclude that political factors such as the government’s political quadrant and the timing of elections are important determinants of the fiscal response to unsustainable budget deviations.

Travestis brasileiras em Portugal : percursos, identidades e ambiguidades

Os séculos XX e XXI corresponderam ao agudizar de processos globalizantes potenciados pelas novas tecnologias, quer no âmbito comunicacional, quer industrial, sublinhando dinâmicas de desruralização e de construção de tecidos urbanos densos onde o anonimato se tornou possível na vivência de experiências, outrora reconduzidas ao silêncio do sujeito socialmente isolado. A diferença, enquanto experiência vivida, tornou-se comunitariamente possível, surgindo grupos que delimitam geograficamente determinadas áreas urbanas a que correspondem afinidades eróticas ou de práticas sexuais, inicialmente de gays e lésbicas. Quebra-se na prática a uni-direccionalidade entre sexo e género, entre sexo e sexualidade, questionando-se esquemas de relações assimétricas e modelos de pensamento enraizados (heterossexualidade, patriarcado, machismo, etc.). Rubin (1975 in Lewin 2006, in Vance, 1984) propõe a existência de dois sistemas diferenciados de sexo e género que tornam plausível, sob o ponto de vista analítico, a não correspondência entre sexo, género e sexualidade. O paradigma máximo desta autonomia sistémica alcança-se na construção de uma identidade travesti. Esta identidade mutante, mutável e instável parece acompanhar um mundo de fluxos intensos e interdependências múltiplas. É na sociedade global que as travestis encontram espaço para a vivência comunitária da sua experiência, constituindo-se como um grupo com práticas transnacionais, marcado pela mobilidade de género e geográfica, primeiramente dentro das fronteiras brasileiras e depois para a Europa. Cidade, prostituição e migração surgem como factores chave da disseminação geográfica e identitária desta comunidade. Este projecto tomado sob uma perspectiva global mantêm ou reinventa relações com a estrutura, que aparentemente as apaga enquanto actores sociais e da qual, aparentemente, se auto-excluem.

The non-emergency patient transport modelled as a team orienteering problem

This work presents an improved model to solve the non-emergency patients transport (NEPT) service issues given the new rules recently established in Portugal. The model follows the same principle of the Team Orienteering Problem by selecting the patients to be included in the routes attending the maximum reduction in costs when compared with individual transportation. This model establishes the best sets of patients to be transported together. The model was implemented in AMPL and a compact formulation was solved using NEOS Server. A heuristic procedure based on iteratively solving Orienteering Problems is presented, and this heuristic provides good results in terms of accuracy and computation time. Euclidean instances as well as asymmetric real data gathered from Google maps were used, and the model has a promising performance mainly with asymmetric cost matrices.

Resource partitioning and ecomorphological variation in two syntopic species of Lebiasinidae (Characiformes) in an Amazonian stream

ABSTRACTResource partitioning is important for species coexistence. Species with similar ecomorphology are potential competitors, especially when phylogenetically close, due to niche conservatism. The aim of this study was to investigate the resource partitioning among populations of two species of lebiasinids (Copella nigrofasciata and Pyrrhulina aff. brevis) that co-occur in a first-order Amazonian stream, analyzing the trophic ecology, feeding strategies and ecomorphological attributes related to the use of food and space by these species. Fish were captured in May and September 2010. The stomach contents of 60 individuals were analyzed and quantified volumetrically to characterize the feeding ecology of both species. Eleven morphological attributes were measured in 20 specimens and combined in nine ecomorphological indices. Both species had an omnivorous-invertivorous diet and consumed predominantly allochthonous items. Both showed a tendency to a generalist diet, but intrapopulational variation in resource use was also detected. Overall feeding niche overlap was high, but differed between seasons: low during the rainy season and high in the dry season. In the latter, the food niche overlap was asymmetric because C. nigrofasciata consumed several prey of P. aff. brevis, which reduced its food spectrum. The ecomorphological analysis suggests that C. nigrofasciatahas greater swimming capacity (greater relative length of caudal peduncle) than P. aff. brevis, which has greater maneuverability and tendency to inhabit lentic environments (greater relative depth of the body). Our results demonstrate that these species have similar trophic ecology and suggest a spatial segregation, given by morphological differences related to locomotion and occupation of habitat, favoring their coexistence.

Evolution of the gene regulatory network controlling flower dorsoventral asymmetry

Tese de Doutoramento em Biologia de Plantas.

Behavior-based price discrimination in a multi-dimensional preferences market

NIPE WP 04/ 2016

Ciclos económicos en economías abiertas y menos desarrolladas: el papel de los "shocks" en los términos de intercambio.The business cycle in open and less developed economies: the rol of terms-of-trade shocks.

Nuestra preocupación reside en estudiar empíricamente el mecanismo de transmisión internacional de ciclos económicos a economías pequeñas y menos desarrolladas (LDC), evaluando el impacto de los shocks en los términos de intercambio en países dónde existen imperfecciones en el mercado crediticio que imponen severas restricciones en el financiamiento de la inversión doméstica y al crecimiento económico. Primero, analizamos si la cuenta corriente responde de manera asimétrica a movimientos de largo plazo en los términos de intercambio. La hipótesis es que “en los buenos tiempos” cuando se produce una mejora permanente en términos de intercambio (y con ello el nivel de ingreso) los individuos no elevan su consumo en un monto acorde con la mejora de su ingreso (permanente) sino que ahorran una fracción del aumento en su dotación para hacer frente a una reversión en la mejora en los términos de intercambios (aunque ésta sea transitoria) en el futuro. En consecuencia, la cuenta corriente (diferencia entre ingreso y absorción) responde de manera positiva a un shock permanente en los términos de intercambio, ya que el individuo ahorra de manera cautelosa –debido a que sabe que no le prestarán para suavizar consumo - aún suponiendo que en el futuro tendrá una reversión transitoria de su ingreso. Segundo, estudiamos la relación dinámica entre los términos de intercambio y la tasa de interés en la economía pequeña abierta y con imperfecciones en el mercado crediticio (información asimétrica). La hipótesis es que la economía doméstica tiene que soportar una prima de riesgo que eleva el costo de la inversión y retarda el crecimiento (Gertler y Rogoff; 1990). Esta prima de riesgo depende, además, en forma negativa del nivel del colateral que tenga la economía. El colateral es la dotación de recursos naturales, por ejemplo, que la economía posee a los fines garantizar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones contraídas (en el modelo presentado las actividades dónde se invierten son independientes del colateral). La hipótesis establecida indica que los cambios en los términos de intercambio generan un aumento del colateral de la economía y una reducción del riesgo país: aumentos en los términos de intercambio reducen la prima de riesgo de la economía que opera en mercados de capitales con asimetrías de información, y como consecuencia aumentarían los ingresos de capitales. De esta forma, se estaría encontrando una explicación a la denominada “Paradoja de Lucas”. Finalmente, el proyecto estudia la conexión entre dos variables “clave” en la economía de los países emergentes: la relación entre los términos de intercambio y el tipo de cambio real. Argumentamos que los efectos de las mejoras de los términos de intercambio sobre los flujos de capitales externos tienden a ser sobreestimadas si no se consideran los efectos “secundarios” de éstas sobre el tipo de cambio real de la economía pequeña menos desarrollada. En este proyecto se controlan estadísticamente esta relación. La estrategia empírica elegida resulta en aplicar a un panel (constituido por dieciocho países de Latinoamérica) el método generalizado de momentos (GMM) a dos modelos de regresión estadística a los fines de abordar de manera eficiente el problema de la endogeneidad de la variable dependiente que actúa como regresor rezagado. La estrategia de estimación elegida enfatiza el análisis de la relación dinámica de las variables económicas incluidas en el análisis. The paper analyzes the general problem related to the transmission of economic cycles to Small Open Economies. The analysis focuses on terms-of-trade shocks, which are considered one of the major sources of income volatility in developing economies. Specifically, we tackle the problem related to the impact of terms-of-trade shocks in Less Developed SOEs. ‘Less Developed SOEs’ are understood as those countries who have borrowing constraints. First, we put to a test the hypothesis of asymmetric response of current account to terms-of-trade shocks (the impact of the shock on current account differs depending whether it is positive or negative), which originates from considering binding restrictions in international capital markets (Agénor and Aizenman; 2004). Second, we investigate about the main determinants of External Capital Flows (ECF) directed to Developing Countries. We put to a test the Gertler and Rogoff (1990) hypothesis that a “risky rate” arises in that markets because the economy has not sufficient amount of wealth to “collateralize” the capital she needs to borrow to take advantage of the investment opportunities she has and additionally because the lender does not have the chance of observing what the borrowed does with the funds (that is information asymmetry arises because the lender can check the realized output of investment but he can not observe if he really invest in the project or secretly lend abroad). Finally, Following Prasad, E. S., Rajan and R. Subramanian, A (2007) we measure the relationship between external capital flows and domestic currency overvaluation. We run a panel GMM estimation for a set of 18 Latin American Countries during the period 1973-2008.

Totalsynthese der Brevicomine und Studien zum Aufbau von hexacyclischen Hopan-Triterpenen

Cyclizations, Lewis acids, silicon, terpenoids, total synthesis, desymmetrization, enantiselective desymmetrization, ringclosing metathesis, asymmetric ring-closing metathesis, Brevicomin

Intramolekulare Cyclisierungen chiraler, "C-zentrierter" Propargylsilane und enantioselektive Synthesen anellierter Azepine zum Aufbau des BD-Grundgerüstes von Cephalotaxin

Chiral auxiliaries, cyclizations, Lewis acids, Sakurai reaction, annulations, asymmetric induction, azepines, radical cyclization, spiro compounds

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.