EU enlargement to the Balkans: will the leopard change its spots? EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

As the leadership of the European Union hands over the baton to a new management this autumn, will the winds of change blow also through the cobwebs of the EU’s enlargement agenda? Jean-Claude Juncker – the incoming President of the European Commission – has already promised to put the gearbox of further EU widening in neutral for the next five years of his mandate, and has designated the Austrian Johannes Hahn as Commissioner for the re-baptised portfolio of now European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, instructing him to focus on the Union’s political and economic ties with Southern and Eastern Europe, and in particular with the Balkans. Such an approach in the field of enlargement – once crowned the jewel of EU foreign policy – has all the appeal of a damp rag but does not necessarily depart from the festina lente strategy of the recent past. Inside the Union, political appetite and public support for expansion have been fizzling since Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and were then severely curbed in the context of the on-going crisis by growing fears of importing organised crime and migrants from the Balkans. Juncker’s logic of consolidation sounds depressingly similar to what it supposedly replaces and incidentally, it also fits neatly with the unambitious and inward-looking mantra favoured at present in discussions at all levels on the future of European integration, more generally. With the 28-member block determined to catch its breath in the immediate time period, and given that even the forerunner countries in the Balkans – that is, Montenegro and Serbia – will realistically need more than five years to complete their accession talks, what priorities should guide Commissioner Hahn, soon to be Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations – when they get down to business on 1 November?

Bosnia i Hercegowina wobec pytania o tozsamosc. Kosowo - kewstia ostatecznego statusu. Prace OSW 10/2003 = Bosnia and Herzegovina: facing the question of identity. Kosovo - the question of final status. OSW Study 10/2003

In June 2003, during a meeting held in Saloniki, the leaders of European Union member states turned to the presidents and heads of the governments of five Western Balkans nations – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania – assuring them that Brussels sees a future for the entire region in Europe and that, without their membership in the EU, the integration of the continent would not be complete. Of these five – actually six, as Kosovo’s protectorate was represented by a separate delegation: the Prime Minister, President, the Head of the international administration, and a representative of the Serbian party – only Croatia can count on quick integration. The membership of the remaining countries is being spoken of (unofficially) in the perspective of ten to fifteen years. However, no EU diplomat is able to answer the question of how the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, with the EU, will look in practice – these two organisms exist solely owing to the will and efforts of the international community.

Kosowo - przed ostatecznym rozwiazaniem. Proces uregulowania statusu miedzynarodowego = uwarunkowania polityczne i historyczne perspektywy rozwoju sytuacji. Prace OSW 2008. Kosovo before the final decision. Regulation Kosovo's international status - historical and political conditions and prospects for future developments. OSW Study 27/2008

The question of Kosovo's status is currently one of the most important issues in international politics. Since 1999, Kosovo has been an international protectorate which was created in the aftermath of the NATO intervention to stop the brutal pacification of the Albanian insurgency by Serb forces. The province has since de facto become independent of Serbia. Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, which established the protectorate, does not preclude any possible outcome as regards its status. Aware that after the crimes of 1999, any attempt to re-integrate Kosovo into Serbia would lead to a massive Albanian uprising, the West has decided that the best solution would be to award Kosovo internationally supervised independence, while at the same time granting very wide autonomy to the Kosovo Serbs. Serbia and Russia rejected the solution proposed by the West, and so Kosovo became an arena of international rivalry for influence in the Western Balkans as well as another element of rivalry, transcending the regional dimension, between Russia and the West. Russia has been using the Kosovo case to build a new model of its relations with the United States and the EU. Since there is a group of countries sceptical about, or even opposed to, Kosovo's independence within the EU, the Kosovo settlement will be a test of the EU's ability to speak with one voice with regard to its external policy.

The Western Balkans: deadlock in the EU enlargement process. OSW Commentary No. 43, 2010-11-24

On 9 November the European Commission presented the annual reports assessing the progress of the Balkans states in their preparations for EU membership, the enlargement strategy up to autumn 2011, and the assessment of the EU membership applications submitted by Albania and Macedonia. All these documents show that the reform process in the Balkan states has slowed down in comparison to previous years. The main reason for this slowdown is the negative consequences of the global economic crisis for these countries. Nonetheless, the transformation process is continuing, despite these difficulties. Another increasingly serious challenge for integrating the Balkan states is the EU's growing reluctance to enlarge any further. Among other measures, the EU states have blocked the formal acknowledgement of the integration progress (objections have been raised to the submission of membership applications by Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and to granting Albania candidate status), which has significantly prolonged the accession process. In fact, this illustrates the lack of political will to accept new members. The European Commission is aware that the integration process may be blocked, and so in the coming year it is planning to focus on fostering the idea of enlargement among the EU member states. It will also focus on persuading the Balkan states to move on with reforms, especially those designed to strengthen state institutions (administration, the judiciary), even if their progress will not be formally considered during the integration process. The Commission assumes that by the end of next year, the reforms implemented by the Balkan states will be comprehensive enough to persuade the EU states to step up the integration process in subsequent years. However, if the EU member states' standpoint on the enlargement process does not change, the Commission's efforts will not bring about the expected results. Considering that their prospects for EU membership are receding, the Balkan states may not have sufficient motivation to go on with long-term reform efforts. As a result, the transformation process may become impeded, and in the longer perspective, the situation in the entire region may be destabilised.

The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports. An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Mutual relations in the area of sports, which in contemporary international contacts often not only reflect the true nature of political relations but sometimes even affect them, can be a valuable contribution to the analysis of this conflict’s nature. Why did the Transnistrian government, despite the use of anti-Moldovan rhetoric, agree to Transnistrian athletes representing Moldova during the Olympics and in other international competitions? Why does it accept the presence of sports teams from both banks of the Dniester playing in the same leagues? Why does Transnistria, despite being much smaller, predominate in many sports? How is it that Sheriff Tiraspol, the flagship football club of the business and political circles controlling Transnistria, managed to win the Moldovan championship ten times in a row and is the main source of players for Moldova’s national team? Does sport really ‘know no borders’ or perhaps the border on the Dniester is different than seems at first sight?

The ICC Debate and the EU-U.S. Struggle for Influence: The Case of the Balkan-6. ACES Working Paper No. 11, October 2007

The objectives of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) for the countries of the Balkan region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and condition their support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with regards to economic modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for international law. However, this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. Often, instead of dealing with a cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the region are faced with contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was such a case. It centered on whether the countries in the region should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court while in the country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any crimes committed for which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The final outcome was mixed. Three of the countries - Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia - decided not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia - ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the various international non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue that the credibility of actors involved played an important role in determining whether threats coming from the US or the EU were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor of signing BIAs with the US. However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow down the choices of actors. Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the nature of the security context in which these countries exist and operate.

Banking Sector Soundness, Innovation, and Development: Emerging Europe and South Asia. ACES Working Papers, 2012

While most academic and practitioner researchers agree that a country’s commercial banking sector’s soundness is a very significant indicator of a country’s financial market health, there is considerably less agreement and substantial confusion surrounding what constitutes a healthy bank in the aftermath of 2007+ financial crisis. Global banks’ balance sheets, corporate governance, management compensation and bonuses, toxic assets, and risky behavior are all under scrutiny as academics and regulators alike are trying to quantify what are “healthy, safe and good practices” for these various elements of banking. The current need to quantify, measure, evaluate, and compare is driven by the desire to spot troubled banks, “bad and risky” behavior, and prevent real damage and contagion in the financial markets, investors, and tax payers as it did in the recent crisis. Moreover, future financial crisis has taken on a new urgency as vast amounts of capital flows (over $1 trillion) are being redirected to emerging markets. This study differs from existing methods in the literature as it entail designing, constructing, and validating a critical dimension of financial innovation in respect to the eight developing countries in the South Asia region as well as eight countries in emerging Europe at the country level for the period 2001 – 2008, with regional and systemic differentials taken into account. Preliminary findings reveal that higher stages of payment systems development have generated efficiency gains by reducing the settlement risk and improving financial intermediation; such efficiency gains are viewed as positive financial innovations and positively impact the banking soundness. Potential EU candidate countries: Albania; Montenegro; Serbia

EU Facilitated Dialogue: Another exercise in constructive ambiguity. CEPS Commentary, 28 August 2015

Under the auspices of the EU, Belgrade and Pristina have signed new agreements on how to further normalise their relations. Yet these agreements, including on the creation of an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, are the continuation of an exercise in constructive ambiguity, argues Dusan Reljic in this CEPS Commentary. He makes the point that the proper implementation of these much heralded agreements will be something of a challenge.

Russia in the Balkans: How should the EU respond? EPC Policy Brief, 12 October 2015

On 3 September 2015, Russia's 7th Guards Airborne-Assault (Mountain) Division kicked off an exercise near the Black Sea city of Novorossiysk, some 150 km southeast of the annexed Crimean peninsula. The timing was chosen carefully. 'Swift Response', a large-scale drill run by NATO alongside the coastline of Romania and Bulgaria, along with other European locations, had concluded several days earlier. Codenamed 'Slavic Brotherhood', the war games at Novorossiysk involved Belarusian Special Forces and, strikingly, paratroopers from Serbia. Here was a country negotiating its accession to the EU and a recent signatory of a cooperation deal with NATO that was siding with the self-declared competitor of the West.

Digital workers by design? An example from the on-demand economy. CEPS Working Document No. 414/October 2015 Monday, 19 October 2015

Recent organisational and technological changes à la Uber have generated a new labour market fringe: a digital class of workers and contractors. In this paper we study the case of CoContest, a crowdsourcing platform for interior design. Our objective is to investigate how profitable this type of work can be, also from a cross-country perspective, and why professionals choose to supply work on such a platform. Given the low returns, one might expect to see a pattern of northern employer/southern contractor. Yet analysis reveals a more nuanced pattern, in which designers supply their work even if they live in Italy, which is a high-income country. For these designers work on CoContest can make sense if they are new to the labour market and face high entry barriers, although crowdsourcing does not offer them profitable employment full time. The case of Serbia, the second-largest supplier of designers, is different, however. As a result of differences in purchasing power, if the market grows experienced Serbian designers can expect to make a living from crowdsourced contracts.

Vučić’s plebiscite almost slipped on arithmetics. EPC Commentary, 29 April 2016

As largely anticipated, the incumbent Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, secured another four years in power at the snap elections that took place on 24 April. However, the results suggest that Vučić has overplayed his hand with this personal plebiscite: simple arithmetics unmasked his exaggerated hope to wipe out the opposition and consolidate political dominance. This might bode well for political pluralism but voters’ preferences and the affixed party options caution against taking Serbia’s commitment to European integration for granted.

Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations. OSW COMMENTARY No. 214, 2016-06-08

In March 2011, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia started a dialogue that was intended to lead to the normalisation of mutual relations. This process, launched under the pressure of the EU, was aimed at building up confidence between the parties and resolving the everyday problems of the Serbian and Albanian communities, and as a consequence, reducing tension in the Western Balkans. The start of talks between representatives of the antagonist countries was the breakthrough that led to the Kosovo government gaining control over the whole of its territory, the establishment of a border (or ‘administrative boundary line’, as Belgrade calls it), and the start of the process of subordinating the Kosovo Serbian institutions to the authorities in Prishtina. Serbia also lifted its trade blockade on Kosovo, and allowed Prishtina to join the regional organisations. As a result, progress has been made in the process of integration of both states with the EU: Serbia has started accession negotiations, and Kosovo has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

As bolas paradas no futebol jovem – A opinião dos treinadores

As bolas paradas têm ganho importância no futebol nas últimas décadas devido à sua influência no resultado final dos jogos. No entanto no futebol jovem ainda são poucos os estudos neste âmbito. O objetivo deste estudo foi auscultar a opinião dos treinadores acerca da importância das bolas paradas no futebol jovem, nomeadamente as diferenças relativamente ao futebol profissional, os exercícios utilizados no treino, a importância do lado estratégico e como potenciar o aparecimento de especialistas nestes lances. Foram entrevistados seis treinadores com experiência na primeira liga portuguesa de futebol, tendo sido utilizada a entrevista semi-estruturada como instrumento de recolha de dados. A análise e interpretação do conteúdo das entrevistas permitiu identificar que os treinadores consideram que o treino destes lances no futebol jovem deve ter características diferentes do futebol profissional, que os exercícios de treino no futebol jovem devam ser direcionados para a aprendizagem do jogo e dos seus princípios. Quanto ao lado estratégico indicaram que é mais relevante nos escalões mais avançados e nas competições nacionais. Para a potenciação do talento existe a necessidade de maior volume de treino destes lances específicos e também treino individual.

Balkan Vegetation Database: historical background, current status and future perspectives

The Balkan Vegetation Database (BVD; GIVD ID: EU-00-019; http://www.givd.info/ID/EU-00- 019) is a regional database that consists of phytosociological relevés from different vegetation types from six countries on the Balkan Peninsula (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia). Currently, it contains 9,580 relevés, and most of them (78%) are geo-referenced. The database includes digitized relevés from the literature (79%) and unpublished data (21%). Herein we present descriptive statistics about attributive relevé information. We developed rules that regulate governance of the database, data provision, types of data availability regimes, data requests and terms of use, authorships and relationships with other databases. The database offers an extensive overview about studies on the local, regional and SE European levels including information about flora, vegetation and habitats.