Surveillance Studies and the Surveilled Subject

Surveillance studies has been somewhat inattentive to the perspective of the surveilled subject. It is the functioning of the surveillance apparatus, not the relatively inconsequential subject, which has tended to frame the focus of surveillance inquiries; leaving understandings of surveilled subjects’ experiences relatively limited. This research addresses this gap in the literature, exploring ways in which surveillance studies might understand the surveilled subject with greater consistency. Participants (N=47) shared their encounters with and perceptions of surveillance in a specific (Pearson International Airport) and general (everyday life) context through semi-structured interviews. The findings suggest that surveilled subjects’ encounters can be understood with some consistency – characterized by consistent criteria across subjects and contexts, and through a consistent theoretical framework across subjects in a specific context. However, consistency should not be confused with uniformity; encounters with surveillance must also be recognized for the extent to which they are nuanced and situated. For example, as this study also highlights, participants’ perceptions of encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport were differentially distributed in relation to identity characteristics (particularly minority status).

Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.