Audit report on the Iowa Turkey Marketing Council for the years ended December 31, 2006 and 2005

Audit report on the Iowa Turkey Marketing Council for the years ended December 31, 2006 and 2005

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2007

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2007

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2007

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2007

Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2006 Annual Report

This annual report highlights the many programs and initiatives with which the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division is involved.

Wireless E911 Emergency Communications Fund Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division of the Iowa Department of Public Defense independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements and supplementary information, June 30, 2006.

Audit report on the Wireless E911 Emergency Communication Fund of the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division of the Iowa Department of Public Defense for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa School for the Deaf, Council Bluffs, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa School for the Deaf, Council Bluffs, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2006

A-1a Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2007

A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - July 2007

A-1a Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2007

A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - August 2007

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2007

A-1A - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - 09-07

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.