Measures of the welfare cost of inflation: a complete ordering

This paper presents three contributions to the literature on the welfare cost of ináation. First, it introduces a new sensible way of measuring this cost - that of a compensating variation in consumption or income, instead of the equivalent variation notion that has been extensively used in empirical and theoretical research during the past fiftt years. We Önd this new measure to be interestingly related to the proxy measure of the shopping-time welfare cost of ináation introduced by Simonsen and Cysne (2001). Secondly, it discusses for which money-demand functions this and the shopping-time measure can be evaluated in an economically meaningful way. And, last but not least, it completely orders a comprehensive set of measures of the welfare cost of ináation for these money-demand specification. All of our results are extended to an economy in which there are many types of monies present, and are illustrated with the log-log money-demand specification.

The n-dimensional bailey-divisia measure as a general-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of inflation

This paper shows that in economies with several monies the Bailey-Divisia multidimensional consumers surplus formula may emerge as an exact general-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of in ation, provided that preferences are quasilinear.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major differences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values -β=0.985, and ∅=5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% - the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business- cycle fluctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same figures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas(1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major diferences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values = 0:985, and = 5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business-cycle uctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same gures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

A retração do welfare state na Suécia e Dinamarca

O presente trabalho tem como objeto o processo de reforma das políticas públicas de previdência social e saúde ocorridas na Suécia e Dinamarca, a partir dos anos de 1980. Buscou-se analisar se estas transformações se enquadram no que ficou conhecido na literatura como retração do welfare state. Para tanto, propôs-se um arcabouço metodológico capaz de captar os múltiplos aspectos desse fenômeno. Concluiu-se que apesar de incrementais, as mudanças ocorridas apontam na direção de um Estado de Bem Estar mais residual. Essa análise contrasta com o trabalho desenvolvido por Pierson (1994), que ressalta a dificuldade de se colocar em prática uma estratégia bem sucedida de desmanche do welfare state, devido ao viés político negativo dessa medida. Argumentou-se que esses países foram capazes de implementar mudanças impopulares por meio de estratégias distintas: enquanto na Suécia o consenso em torno das reformas permitiu aos partidos evitarem a punição eleitoral, na Dinamarca a alternativa foi a mudança fora da via institucional, no âmbito dos governos regionais e da burocracia, o que fragmentou a oposição e minimizou o efeito negativo destas mudanças.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Bailey's measure of the welfare costs of infiation as a general-equilibrium measure

Lucas (2000) has ShO\nl t hat Baile,\"'s formula for t hc \\'elfare costs of inflatioIl caIl bc rcgardpd as an approximation to t hc gcneral-equilibriuIll IllCaSllH'S \\"hich emerge from thc Sidrauski anrl the shopping-time models, In this paper \\'c shm\' that Baile~"s mcaSllrc can bc cxactly obtairlf'd in tllf' Siclrauski geIleral-equilibri1lIn framp\\'ork under the assUIllption of quasilinpar prefpreIlC'cs, The rpslllt. based on ",heter or not \\'Palt h pffpcts are incorporatccl into t hp analysis, is also helpful in darif\'ing \\'hy Lucas' Illeasurp clerin'd from the Siclrauski model turns 01lt to be aIl upper bOllIlcl to Bailp~"s, T,,'o eXaInplcs arp used to illustratc t he main C'ondusions,

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Unit roots and the welfare gains of cycle smoothing

li consumption is log-Normal and is decomposed into a linear deterministic trend and a stationary cycle, a surprising result in business-cycle research is that the welfare gains of eliminating uncertainty are relatively small. A possible problem with such calculations is the dichotomy between the trend and the cyclical components of consumption. In this paper, we abandon this dichotomy in two ways. First, we decompose consumption into a deterministic trend, a stochastic trend, and a stationary cyclical component, calculating the welfare gains of cycle smoothing. Calculations are carried forward only after a careful discussion of the limitations of macroeconomic policy. Second, still under the stochastic-trend model, we incorporate a variable slope for consumption depending negatively on the overall volatility in the economy. Results are obtained for a variety of preference parameterizations, parameter values, and different macroeconomic-policy goals. They show that, once the dichotomy in the decomposition in consumption is abandoned, the welfare gains of cycle smoothing may be substantial, especially due to the volatility effect.

Welfare characterization of monetary-applied models and three implications

This paper demonstrates that the applied monetary mo deIs - the Sidrauski-type models and the cash-in-advance models, augmented with a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services - imply trajectories which are P8,reto-Optimum restricted to a given path of the real quantity of money. As a consequence, three results follow: First, Bailey's formula to evaluate the wclfare cost of inflation is indeed accurate, if the long-run capital stock does not depend on the inflation rate and if the compensate demand is considered. Second, the relevant money demand concept for this issue - the impact of inflation on welfare - is the monetary base, Third, if the long-run capital stock depends on the inflation rate, this dependence has a second-order impact ou wclfare, and, conceptually, it is not a distortion from tite social point of vicw. These three implications moderatc some evaluations of the wclfare cost of the perfect predicted inflation.