Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Protein turnover, ureagenesis and gluconeogenesis.

The major processes discussed below are protein turnover (degradation and synthesis), degradation into urea, or conversion into glucose (gluconeogenesis, Figure 1). Daily protein turnover is a dynamic process characterized by a double flux of amino acids: the amino acids released by endogenous (body) protein breakdown can be reutilized and reconverted to protein synthesis, with very little loss. Daily rates of protein turnover in humans (300 to 400 g per day) are largely in excess of the level of protein intake (50 to 80 g per day). A fast growing rate, as in premature babies or in children recovering from malnutrition, leads to a high protein turnover rate and a high protein and energy requirement. Protein metabolism (synthesis and breakdown) is an energy-requiring process, dependent upon endogenous ATP supply. The contribution made by whole-body protein turnover to the resting metabolic rate is important: it represents about 20 % in adults and more in growing children. Metabolism of proteins cannot be disconnected from that of energy since energy balance influences net protein utilization, and since protein intake has an important effect on postprandial thermogenesis - more important than that of fats or carbohydrates. The metabolic need for amino acids is essentially to maintain stores of endogenous tissue proteins within an appropriate range, allowing protein homeostasis to be maintained. Thanks to a dynamic, free amino acid pool, this demand for amino acids can be continuously supplied. The size of the free amino acid pool remains limited and is regulated within narrow limits. The supply of amino acids to cover physiological needs can be derived from 3 sources: 1. Exogenous proteins that release amino acids after digestion and absorption 2. Tissue protein breakdown during protein turnover 3. De novo synthesis, including amino acids (as well as ammonia) derived from the process of urea salvage, following hydrolysis and microflora metabolism in the hind gut. When protein intake surpasses the physiological needs of amino acids, the excess amino acids are disposed of by three major processes: 1. Increased oxidation, with terminal end products such as CO₂ and ammonia 2. Enhanced ureagenesis i. e. synthesis of urea linked to protein oxidation eliminates the nitrogen radical 3. Gluconeogenesis, i. e. de novo synthesis of glucose. Most of the amino groups of the excess amino acids are converted into urea through the urea cycle, whereas their carbon skeletons are transformed into other intermediates, mostly glucose. This is one of the mechanisms, essential for life, developed by the body to maintain blood glucose within a narrow range, (i. e. glucose homeostasis). It includes the process of gluconeogenesis, i. e. de novo synthesis of glucose from non-glycogenic precursors; in particular certain specific amino acids (for example, alanine), as well as glycerol (derived from fat breakdown) and lactate (derived from muscles). The gluconeogenetic pathway progressively takes over when the supply of glucose from exogenous or endogenous sources (glycogenolysis) becomes insufficient. This process becomes vital during periods of metabolic stress, such as starvation.

Employment risk, unemployment insurance and search strategies: a disaggregated equilibrium approach with application to the Swiss labour market in the 1990-ies

The Organization of the Thesis The remainder of the thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. The next chapter formalizes the envisioned theory into a tractable model. Section 2.2 presents a formal description of the model economy: the individual heterogeneity, the individual objective, the UI setting, the population dynamics and the equilibrium. The welfare and efficiency criteria for qualifying various equilibrium outcomes are proposed in section 2.3. The fourth section shows how the model-generated information can be computed. Chapter 3 transposes the model from chapter 2 in conditions that enable its use in the analysis of individual labor market strategies and their implications for the labor market equilibrium. In section 3.2 the Swiss labor market data sets, stylized facts, and the UI system are presented. The third section outlines and motivates the parameterization method. In section 3.4 the model's replication ability is evaluated and some aspects of the parameter choice are discussed. Numerical solution issues can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of search-strategic behavior in the model economy and its implications for the labor market aggregates. In section 4.2, the unemployment duration distribution is examined and related to search strategies. Section 4.3 shows how the search- strategic behavior is influenced by the UI eligibility and section 4.4 how it is determined by individual heterogeneity. The composition effects generated by search strategies in labor market aggregates are examined in section 4.5. The last section evaluates the model's replication of empirical unemployment escape frequencies reported in Sheldon [67]. Chapter 5 applies the model economy to examine the effects on the labor market equilibrium of shocks to the labor market risk structure, to the deep underlying labor market structure and to the UI setting. Section 5.2 examines the effects of the labor market risk structure on the labor market equilibrium and the labor market strategic behavior. The effects of alterations in the labor market deep economic structural parameters, i.e. individual preferences and production technology, are shown in Section 5.3. Finally, the UI setting impacts on the labor market are studied in Section 5.4. This section also evaluates the role of the UI authority monitoring and the differences in the Way changes in the replacement rate and the UI benefit duration affect the labor market. In chapter 6 the model economy is applied in counterfactual experiments to assess several aspects of the Swiss labor market movements in the nineties. Section 6.2 examines the two equilibria characterizing the Swiss labor market in the nineties, the " growth" equilibrium with a "moderate" UI regime and the "recession" equilibrium with a more "generous" UI. Section 6.3 evaluates the isolated effects of the structural shocks, while the isolated effects of the UI reforms are analyzed in section 6.4. Particular dimensions of the UI reforms, the duration, replacement rate and the tax rate effects, are studied in section 6.5, while labor market equilibria without benefits are evaluated in section 6.6. In section 6.7 the structural and institutional interactions that may act as unemployment amplifiers are discussed in view of the obtained results. A welfare analysis based on individual welfare in different structural and UI settings is presented in the eighth section. Finally, the results are related to more favorable unemployment trends after 1997. The conclusion evaluates the features embodied in the model economy with respect to the resulting model dynamics to derive lessons from the model design." The thesis ends by proposing guidelines for future improvements of the model and directions for further research.

Testing the bivariate distribution of daily equity returns using copulas: an application to the Spanish stock market

In this paper we deal with the identification of dependencies between time series of equity returns. Marginal distribution functions are assumed to be known, and a bivariate chi-square test of fit is applied in a fully parametric copula approach. Several families of copulas are fitted and compared with Spanish stock market data. The results show that the t-copula generally outperforms other dependence structures, and highlight the difficulty in adjusting a significant number of bivariate data series

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

The relationship of capitalization period length with market portfolio composition and betas

Beta coefficients are not stable if we modify the observation periods of the returns. The market portfolio composition also varies, whereas changes in the betas are the same, whether they are calculated as regression coefficients or as a ratio of the risk premiums. The instantaneous beta, obtained when the capitalization frequency approaches infinity, may be a useful tool in portfolio selection.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

The Political Economy of Active Labor-Market Policy

Active labor-market policies (ALMPs) have developed significantly over the past two decades across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with substantial cross-national differences in terms of both extent and overall orientation. The objective of this article is to account for cross-national variation in this policy field. It starts by reviewing existing scholarship concerning political, institutional, and ideational determinants of ALMPs. It then argues that ALMP is too broad a category to be used without further specification, and it develops a typology of four different types of ALMPs: incentive reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment. These are discussed and examined through ALMP expenditure profiles in selected countries. The article uses this typology to analyze ALMP trajectories in six Western European countries and shows that the role of this instrument changes dramatically over time. It concludes that there is little regularity in the political determinants of ALMPs. In contrast, it finds strong institutional and ideational effects, nested in the interaction between the changing economic context and existing labor-market policies.