Die Perspektiven des MERCOSUR in den internationalen Beziehungen mit der Freihandelszone Amerikas ALCA, FTAA und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft

Die Perspektiven des MERCOSUR in den internationalen Beziehungen mit der Freihandelszone Amerikas ALCA/FTAA und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft Rita de Cassia Carvalho de Carvalho Abstract In dieser Arbeit wird MERCOSUR, Gemeinsamer Markt des Südens, als ein politischer Integrationsprozeß zwischen Entwicklungsländern, der mit der Integrationsherausforderung i. S. des wandelnden Völkerrechts, konfrontiert ist, vorgestellt. Damit sind die rechtspolitischen Perspektiven für MERCOSUR eng mit der Trilogie EU, ALCA und WTO verbunden. Aus integrationsrechtlichem Blickwinkel entwickelte sich MERCOSUR zu einem sui generis Integrationsprozeß mit der Gewährleistung der vier Marktfreiheiten nach dem EU-Vorbild. Im MERCOSUR-Recht herrscht die Zwischenstaatlichkeitsklausel. Die Herren der Verträge und Träger von Kompetenz-Kompetenz i. S. v. pouvoir constituant sind die Mitgliedsstaaten. Obwohl die fehlende Rechtssicherheit die Vertiefung des Gemeinsamen Marktes gefährdet, bietet die Übernahme des EU-Modells keine Lösung, weil die Problematik eher bei der schwachen Rechtsdurchsetzung in den Entwicklungsländern zu finden ist. Angesichts der ALCA-Logik, d. h. im Handels-, Investitions- und Dienstleistungswesen wettbewerbs¬fähig zu werden, dafür aber Rückschritte in Umwelt-, Sozial- und Arbeitsrechtsstandard hinnehmen zu müssen, übernimmt MERCOSUR die aktive Hauptrolle in Lateinamerika in den Verhandlungen mit den USA. In der WTO-Ordnung mit einer quasi-obligatorischen Gerichtsbarkeit, welche kaum Umwelt- und Menschenrecht einbezieht, sollte MERCOSUR die Politik des dritten Weges mit anderen Entwicklungsländern führen um einen Weg mit quasi der Entwicklung und Umsetzung einer neuen Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsordnung, die Umwelt- und Menschenrecht garantieren soll, zu gewährleisten.

Campaigning Against Europe? The Role of Euroskeptic Fringe and Mainstream Parties in the 2009 European Parliament Election

In this article, we analyze political parties' campaign communication during the 2009 European Parliamentary election in 11 countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). We study which types of issues Euroskeptic fringe and Euroskeptic mainstream parties put on their campaign agendas and the kind and extent of EU opposition they voice. Further, we seek to understand whether Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties co-orient themselves toward each other within their national party systems with regard to their campaigns. To understand the role of Euroskeptic parties in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, we draw on a systematic content analysis of parties' posters and televised campaign spots. Our results show that it is Euroskeptic parties at the edges of the political spectrum who discuss polity questions of EU integration and who most openly criticize the union. Principled opposition against the project of EU integration, however, can only be observed in the UK. Finally, we find indicators for co-orientation effects regarding the tone of EU mobilization: In national political environments where Euroskeptic parties strongly criticize the EU, pro-European parties at the same time publicly advance pro-EU positions.

Populist Communication in the Context of European Parliament Elections 2014

Over the last decade European democracies have been facing a challenge by the rising force of new populist movements. The emergence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe created new fertile soil for the strengthening of old-established – and the development of new – populist parties in several EU-member states. José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, emphasized his increased unease concerning these developments when he was speaking at the annual Brussels Think Tank Forum on 22. April 2013: “I am deeply concerned about the divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart the political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crisis; […]” (Barroso 2013). Indeed, European elites seem to be increasingly worried by these recent developments which are perceived as an impending stress test of the Union and the project of European integration as a whole (Hartleb 2013). Sure enough, the results of the recent European Parliament Elections 2014 revealed a great support for populist political parties in many societies of EU-member countries. To understand the success of populist parties in Europe it is crucial to first shed light on the nature of populist party communication itself. Significant communicative differences may explain the varying success of populist parties between and within countries, while a pure demand-side approach (i.e. a focus on the preferences of the electorate) often fails to do so (Mudde 2010). The aim of this study is therefore to analyse what different types of populist communication styles emerge during the EP election campaign 2014 and under which conditions populist communication styles are selected by political parties. So far, the empirical measurement of populism has received only scarce attention (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). Besides, most of the existing empirical investigations of populism are single case studies (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008) and scholars have not yet developed systematic methods to measure populism in a comparative way (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). This is a consequence of a lack of conceptual clarity which goes along with populism (Taggart 2000; Barr 2009; Canovan 1999) due to its contextual sensitivity. Hence, populism in Europe should be analysed in a way that clarifies the concept of populism and moreover takes into account that the Europeanization of politics has an influence on the type of populist party communication, which is intended in the course of that study.

Europeanization in parliament and in the press

Europeanization challenges national democratic systems. As part and parcel of the broader internationalization of politics, Europeanization is associated with a shift from policymaking within majoritarian, elected representative bodies towards technocratic decisions among non-majoritarian and non-elected bodies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2008, Lavenex 2013). It is thus said to weaken the influence of citizens and parliaments on the making of policies and to undermine democratic collective identity (Lavenex 2013, Schimmelfennig 2010). The weakening of national parliaments has been referred to as “de-parliamentarisation” (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008) and has nurtured a broader debate regarding the democratic deficit in the EU. While not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has not remained unaffected by these changes. As discussed in the contribution by Fischer and Sciarini, state executive actors take the lead in Switzerland's European policy. They are responsible for the conduct of international negotiations, they own the treaty making power, and it is up to them to decide whether they wish to launch a negotiation with the EU. In addition, the strong take-it or leave-it character of Europeanized acts limits the room for manoeuver of the parliamentary body also in the ratification phase. Among the public, the rejection of the treaty on the European constitution has definitely closed the era of “permissive consensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009). However, the process of European unification remains far remote from the European public. In Switzerland, the strongly administrative character of international legislation hinders public discussion (Vögeli 2007). In such a context, the media may serve as cue for the public: By delivering information about the extent and nature of Europeanized policymaking, the media enable citizens to form their own opinions and to hold their representatives accountable. In this sense media coverage may not only be considered an indicator of the information delivered to the public, but it may also enhance the democratic legitimacy of Europeanized policymaking (for a similar argument, see Tresch and Jochum 2005). While the previous contributions to this debate have examined the Europeanization of Swiss (primary and secondary) legislation, we take a closer look at two additional domestic arenas that are both supposed to be under pressure due to Europeanization: The parliament and the media. To that end, we rely on data gathered in a research project that two of us carried out in the context of the NCCR Democracy.1 While this project was primarily interested in the mediatization of decision-making processes in Switzerland, it also investigated the conditional role played by internationalization/Europeanization. For our present purposes, we shall exploit the two data-sets that were developed as part of a study of the political agenda-setting power of the media (Sciarini and Tresch 2012, 2013, Tresch et al. 2013): A data-set on issue attention in parliamentary interventions (initiatives, motions, postulates,2 interpellations and questions) and a data-set on issue attention in articles from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). The data covers the years 1995 to 2003 and the coding of issues followed the classification system developed in the “Policy Agendas Project” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

Ought Baron de Rothschild to sit in parliament? : an imaginary conversation between Judaeus & Amicus Nobilis

by Barnard van Oven

Pre-Election Positions and Voting Behaviour in Parliament: Consistency among Swiss MPs

This article examines the determinants of positional incongruence between pre-election statements and post-election behaviour in the Swiss parliament between 2003 and 2009. The question is examined at the individual MP level, which is appropriate for dispersion-of-powers systems like Switzerland. While the overall rate of political congruence reaches about 85%, a multilevel logit analysis detects the underlying factors which push or curb a candidate's propensity to change his or her mind once elected. The results show that positional changes are more likely when (1) MPs are freshmen, (2) individual voting behaviour is invisible to the public, (3) the electoral district magnitude is not small, (4) the vote is not about a party's core issue, (5) the MP belongs to a party which is located in the political centre, and (6) if the pre-election statement dissents from the majority position of the legislative party group. Of these factors, the last one is paramount.