766 resultados para LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP
Development of national statistical systems and the responsibilities of national statistical offices
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Includes bibliography
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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Pós-graduação em Educação - IBRC
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Includes bibliography
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Pós-graduação em Física - IGCE
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Includes bibliography
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Pós-graduação em Geologia Regional - IGCE
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Abstract If there is a geographical area that will be particularly affected by the tragedy of September 11, that will be the international borders of the United States. It is understandable that a country that enters in a state of war after been attacked with enormous losses, reacts by closing its international borders. Such immediate reaction has now been substituted by a more strict control over everything that crosses the border but, a fact remains, the border life is not going to be what it used to before September 11. In the short run, everything that crosses the border has slowed down by new controls. In the long run many things will return to what it was before that Tuesday, but for a long while, life at the border will not be the same. An intense interaction of more than twelve million people from the two sides of the U.S.-Mexico border have made us live in many instances as if the border does not exist. This is the case among many of us in the way we practice our family life. For the planning of weddings, birthdays, reunions, ceremonies, the border is more virtual than real. This is reversed as we get more serious in what it means to the space where institutions, the laws and the governments reminds us that there is a line that marks the beginning and the end of two different nations.
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Includes bibliography.
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Although the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean grew more slowly in 2011 than in 2010, there were some improvements on the employment front. Workers benefited from the region’s satisfactory economic performance in an increasingly complex international setting. The unemployment rate fell from 7.3% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2011 thanks to a halfpercentage- point gain in the urban employment rate. Both rates are at levels that have not been seen for a long time. The proportion of formal jobs with social benefits rose as well, and underemployment declined. The average wage and the minimum wage both increased in real terms, albeit only moderately. Economic performance and the employment situation varied widely among the subregions. The unemployment rate dropped by 0.6 percentage points in South America but 0.4 percentage points in the countries of the northern part of Latin America. In the countries of the Caribbean, the employment rate was up by 0.2 percentage points. The data show that substantial labour market gaps and serious labour-market insertion issues remain. This is especially the case for women and young people, for whom unemployment rates and other labour indicators are still unfavourable. The second part of this report looks at whether the fruits of economic growth and rising productivity have been distributed equitably between workers and companies. Between 2002 and 2008 (the most recent expansionary economic cycle), wages as a percentage of GDP fell in 13 of the 21 countries of the region for which data are available and rose in just 8. This points to redistribution that is unfavourable to workers, which is worrying in a region which already has the most unequal distribution of income in the world. Underlying this trend is the fact that, worldwide, wages have grown less than productivity. Beyond the ethical dimension of this issue, it jeopardizes the social and economic sustainability of growth. For example, one of the root causes of the recent financial crisis was that households in the United States responded to declining wage income by borrowing more to pay for consumption and housing. This turned out to be unsustainable in the long run. Over time, it undermines the labour market’s contribution to the efficient allocation of resources and its distributive function, too, with negative consequences for democratic governance. Among the triggers of this distributive worsening most often cited in the global debate are market deregulation and its impact on financial globalization, technological change that favours capital over labour, and the weakening of labour institutions. What is needed here is a public policy effort to help keep wage increases from lagging behind increases in productivity. Some countries of the region, especially in South America, saw promising developments during the second half of the 2000s in the form of a positive trend reversal in wages as a percentage of GDP. One example is Brazil, where a minimum wage policy tailored to the dynamics of the domestic market is considered to be one of the factors behind an upturn in the wage share of GDP. The region needs to grow more and better. Productivity must grow at a steady pace, to serve as the basis for sustained improvements in the well-being of the populace and to narrow the gap between the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean and the more advanced economies. And inequality must be decreased; this could be achieved by closing the productivity gap between upgraded companies and the many firms whose productivity is low. As set out in this report, the region made some progress between 2002 and 2010, with labour productivity rising at the rate of 1.5% a year. But this progress falls short of that seen in other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (2.1%) and, above all, East Asia (8.3%, not counting Japan and the Republic of Korea). Moreover, in many of the countries of the region these gains have not been distributed equitably. Therein lies a dual challenge that must be addressed: continue to increase productivity while enhancing the mechanisms for distributing gains in a way that will encourage investment and boost worker and household income. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimate that the pace of economic growth in the region will be slightly slower in 2012 than in 2011, in a global economic scenario marked by the cooling of several of the main economic engines and a high degree of uncertainty concerning, above all, prospects for the euro zone. The region is expected to continue to hold up well to this worsening scenario, thanks to policies that leveraged more favourable conditions in the past. This will be felt in the labour markets, as well, so expectations are that unemployment will edge down by as much as two tenths of a decimal point.
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The energy sector is a dominant one in Trinidad and Tobago and it plays an important role in the twin-island republic‟s economy. In 2008, the share of the energy sector in gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to approximately 48% while contributing 57% to total Government revenue. In that same year, the sector‟s share of merchandise exports was 88%, made up mainly of refined oil products including petroleum, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and natural gas liquids (Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, 2009). Trinidad and Tobago is the main exporter of oil in the Caribbean region and the main producer of liquefied natural gas in Latin America and the Caribbean. The role of the country‟s energy sector is, therefore, not limited to serving as the engine of growth for the national economy but also includes providing energy security for the small island developing States of the Caribbean. However, with its hydrocarbon-based economy, Trinidad and Tobago is ranked seventh in the world in terms of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per capita, producing an estimated 40 million tonnes of CO2 annually. Almost 90% of these CO2 emissions are attributed directly to the energy sector through petrochemical production (56%), power generation (30%) and flaring (3%). Trinidad and Tobago is a ratified signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Although, as a non-Annex 1 country, Trinidad and Tobago is not required to cut its greenhouse gas emissions under the Protocol, it is currently finalizing a climate change policy document as well as a national energy policy with specific strategies to address climate change. The present study complements the climate change policy document by providing an economic analysis of the impact that climate change could have on the energy sector in Trinidad and Tobago under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change alternative climate scenarios (A2 and B2) as compared to a baseline situation of no climate change. Results of analyses indicate that, in the short-run, climate change, represented by change in temperature, is not a significant determinant of domestic consumption of energy, electricity in particular, in Trinidad and Tobago. With energy prices subsidized domestically and fixed for years at a time, energy price does not play a role in determining electricity demand. Economic growth, as indicated by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is the single major determinant of electricity consumption in the short-run. In the long-run, temperature, GDP, and patterns of electricity use, jointly determine electricity consumption. Variations in average annual temperature due to climate change for the A2 scenario are expected to lead to an increase in electricity consumption per capita, equivalent to an annual increase of 1.07% over the 2011 baseline value of electricity consumption per capita. Under the B2 scenario, the average annual increase in electricity consumption per capita over the 2011 baseline value is expected to be 1.01%. The estimated economic impact of climate change on electricity consumption for the period 2011-2050 is valued at US$ 142.88 million under the A2 scenario and US$ 134.83million under the B2 scenario. These economic impact estimates are equivalent to a loss of 0.737% of 2009 GDP under the A2 climate scenario and a loss of 0.695% of 2009 GDP under the B2 scenario. On the energy supply side, sea level rise and storm surges present significant risks to oil installations and infrastructure at the Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago (PETROTRIN) Pointe-a-Pierre facilities (Singh and El Fouladi, 2006). However, data limitations do not permit the conduct of an economic analysis of the impact of projected sea level rise on oil and gas production.
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This paper discusses the role of institutions and structural change in shaping income inequality. It is argued that while social expenditure and direct redistribution are crucial for improving income distribution, sustainable equality requires structural change to create decent jobs. The relative importance of these variables in different countries is analyzed and a typology suggested. It is argued that the most equal countries in the world combine strong institutions in favor of redistribution and knowledge-intensive production structures that sustain growth and employment in the long run. Both institutions and the production structure in Latin America fail to foster equality and this explains its extremely high levels of inequality. The last decade witnessed significant advances in reducing inequality in Latin America, but these advances are threatened by slow productivity growth and weak structural change.
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By means of a meta-analysis, this article sets out to estimate average values for the income and price elasticities of gasoline demand and to analyse the reasons for the variations in the elasticities reported by the literature. The findings show that there is publication bias, that the volatility of elasticity estimates is not due to sampling errors alone, and that there are systematic factors explaining these differences. The income and price elasticities of gasoline demand differ between the short and long run and by region, and the estimation can appropriately include the vehicle fleet and the prices of substitute goods, the data types and the estimation methods used. The presence of a low price elasticity suggests that a fuel tax will be inadequate to control rising consumption in a context of rapid economic growth.