The special rights other than shares in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union. A perspective from the Spanish Law

The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.

The language of others mirrored in thy face: The role of political affiliation in automatic facial effects of language

People tend to automatically mimic facial expressions of others. If clear evidence exists on the effect of non-verbal behavior (emotion faces) on automatic facial mimicry, little is known about the role of verbal behavior (emotion language) in triggering such effects. Whereas it is well-established that political affiliation modulates facial mimicry, no evidence exists on whether this modulation passes also through verbal means. This research addressed the role of verbal behavior in triggering automatic facial effects depending on whether verbal stimuli are attributed to leaders of different political parties. Study 1 investigated the role of interpersonal verbs, referring to positive and negative emotion expressions and encoding them at different levels of abstraction, in triggering corresponding facial muscle activation in a reader. Study 2 examined the role of verbs expressing positive and negative emotional behaviors of political leaders in modulating automatic facial effects depending on the matched or mismatched political affiliation of participants and politicians of left-and right-wing. Study 3 examined whether verbs expressing happiness displays of ingroup politicians induce a more sincere smile (Duchenne) pattern among readers of same political affiliation relative to happiness expressions of outgroup politicians. Results showed that verbs encoding facial actions at different levels of abstraction elicited differential facial muscle activity (Study 1). Furthermore, political affiliation significantly modulated facial activation triggered by emotion verbs as participants showed more congruent and enhanced facial activity towards ingroup politicians’ smiles and frowns compared to those of outgroup politicians (Study 2). Participants facially responded with a more sincere smile pattern towards verbs expressing smiles of ingroup compared to outgroup politicians (Study 3). Altogether, results showed that the role of political affiliation in modulating automatic facial effects passes also through verbal channels and is revealed at a fine-grained level by inducing quantitative and qualitative differences in automatic facial reactions of readers.

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.

Party Size and Constituency Representation: Evidence from the 19th-Century U.S. House of Representatives

Research on congressional parties assumes, but has not directly shown, that party size affects individual members' calculations. Drawing on a key case from the nineteenth-century House the secession-driven Republican hegemony of 1861 this article explores the hypothesis that party voting not only declines but also becomes more strongly linked to constituency factors as relative party size increases. The analysis reveals that the jump in party size coincides with (1) a decrease in party voting among individual continuing members, (2) a strengthening association between some constituency factors and party voting, and (3) patterns of decline in individual party voting that are explained in part by constituency measures.

Organizational Frames for Professional Claims: Private Military Corporations and the Rise of the Military Paraprofessional

Corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other organizational forms are major players in the sodal world. Recently, sociological scholarship on organizations has converged with research on the professions to discuss the ways in which professions are shaped or influenced by different organizational forms. In this article, I borrows from the notion of framing within social movement research to argue that organizational forms frame the bids of aspiring professionals. More specifically, I argue that certain organizational forms-such as that of the modern corporation-can aid would-be professionals in making their claims for professional recognition. Organizations do this, I argue, by providing aspiring professionals with a ready-made setting, rationale, and guarantees that make the newcomers more easily recognizable as professionals to outside audiences. I explore this argument by examining how the corporate form has facilitated private military contractors in their attempts to legitimate and develop this highly controversial new industry. The data are drawn from my interviews with private military contractors, state officials, and other interested parties surrounding private military corporations, as well as from archival data that detail the rise of the private military industry.

The Pursuit of Tangible Happiness: Religion and Politics in a Japanese New, New Religion

The decline of traditional religions in Japan in the past century, and especially since the end of World War Two, has led to an explosion of so-called “new religions” (shin shūkyō 新宗教), many of which have made forays into the political realm. The best known—and most controversial—example of a “political” new religion is Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, a lay Buddhist movement originally associated with the Nichiren sect that in the 1960s gave birth to a new political party, Komeitō 公明党 (lit., Clean Government Party), which in the past several decades has emerged as the third most popular party in Japan (as New Komeitō). Since the 1980s, Japan has also seen the emergence of so-called “new, new religions” (shin shin shūkyō 新新宗教), which tend to be more technologically savvy and less socially concerned (and, in the eyes of critics, more akin to “cults” than the earlier new religions). One new, new religion known as Kōfuku-no-Kagaku 幸福の科学 (lit., Institute for Research in Human Happiness or simply Happy Science), founded in 1986 by Ōkawa Ryūho 大川隆法, has very recently developed its own political party, Kōfuku Jitsugentō 幸福実現党 (The Realization of Happiness Party). This article will analyse the political ideals of Kōfuku Jitsugentō in relation to its religious teachings, in an attempt to situate the movement within the broader tradition of religio-political syncretism in Japan. In particular, it will examine the recent “manifesto” of Kōfuku Jitsugentō in relation to those of New Komeitō and “secular” political parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party (Jimintō 自民党) and the Democratic Party (Minshutō 民主党).

Perinatal care at the limit of viability between 22 and 26 completed weeks of gestation in Switzerland. 2011 revision of the Swiss recommendations

Perinatal care of pregnant women at high risk for preterm delivery and of preterm infants born at the limit of viability (22-26 completed weeks of gestation) requires a multidisciplinary approach by an experienced perinatal team. Limited precision in the determination of both gestational age and foetal weight, as well as biological variability may significantly affect the course of action chosen in individual cases. The decisions that must be taken with the pregnant women and on behalf of the preterm infant in this context are complex and have far-reaching consequences. When counselling pregnant women and their partners, neonatologists and obstetricians should provide them with comprehensive information in a sensitive and supportive way to build a basis of trust. The decisions are developed in a continuing dialogue between all parties involved (physicians, midwives, nursing staff and parents) with the principal aim to find solutions that are in the infant's and pregnant woman's best interest. Knowledge of current gestational age-specific mortality and morbidity rates and how they are modified by prenatally known prognostic factors (estimated foetal weight, sex, exposure or nonexposure to antenatal corticosteroids, single or multiple births) as well as the application of accepted ethical principles form the basis for responsible decision-making. Communication between all parties involved plays a central role. The members of the interdisciplinary working group suggest that the care of preterm infants with a gestational age between 22 0/7 and 23 6/7 weeks should generally be limited to palliative care. Obstetric interventions for foetal indications such as Caesarean section delivery are usually not indicated. In selected cases, for example, after 23 weeks of pregnancy have been completed and several of the above mentioned prenatally known prognostic factors are favourable or well informed parents insist on the initiation of life-sustaining therapies, active obstetric interventions for foetal indications and provisional intensive care of the neonate may be reasonable. In preterm infants with a gestational age between 24 0/7 and 24 6/7 weeks, it can be difficult to determine whether the burden of obstetric interventions and neonatal intensive care is justified given the limited chances of success of such a therapy. In such cases, the individual constellation of prenatally known factors which impact on prognosis can be helpful in the decision making process with the parents. In preterm infants with a gestational age between 25 0/7 and 25 6/7 weeks, foetal surveillance, obstetric interventions for foetal indications and neonatal intensive care measures are generally indicated. However, if several prenatally known prognostic factors are unfavourable and the parents agree, primary non-intervention and neonatal palliative care can be considered. All pregnant women with threatening preterm delivery or premature rupture of membranes at the limit of viability must be transferred to a perinatal centre with a level III neonatal intensive care unit no later than 23 0/7 weeks of gestation, unless emergency delivery is indicated. An experienced neonatology team should be involved in all deliveries that take place after 23 0/7 weeks of gestation to help to decide together with the parents if the initiation of intensive care measures appears to be appropriate or if preference should be given to palliative care (i.e., primary non-intervention). In doubtful situations, it can be reasonable to initiate intensive care and to admit the preterm infant to a neonatal intensive care unit (i.e., provisional intensive care). The infant's clinical evolution and additional discussions with the parents will help to clarify whether the life-sustaining therapies should be continued or withdrawn. Life support is continued as long as there is reasonable hope for survival and the infant's burden of intensive care is acceptable. If, on the other hand, the health car...

Visualization Techniques For The Analysis Of Network Simulation Results

The Simulation Automation Framework for Experiments (SAFE) streamlines the de- sign and execution of experiments with the ns-3 network simulator. SAFE ensures that best practices are followed throughout the workflow a network simulation study, guaranteeing that results are both credible and reproducible by third parties. Data analysis is a crucial part of this workflow, where mistakes are often made. Even when appearing in highly regarded venues, scientific graphics in numerous network simulation publications fail to include graphic titles, units, legends, and confidence intervals. After studying the literature in network simulation methodology and in- formation graphics visualization, I developed a visualization component for SAFE to help users avoid these errors in their scientific workflow. The functionality of this new component includes support for interactive visualization through a web-based interface and for the generation of high-quality, static plots that can be included in publications. The overarching goal of my contribution is to help users create graphics that follow best practices in visualization and thereby succeed in conveying the right information about simulation results.

The contexts of scratching behavior and postconflict behavior in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

Self-directed behavior (SDB), such as scratching, is a reliable indicator of emotional arousal in non-human primates. In contrast, affiliative behavior, such as social grooming, has been shown to have a calming effect in primates and reduce arousal. In order to test whether the expression of SDB was related to arousal, the scratching behavior of eight captive squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) was compared across four social contexts (huddling, proximity to others, solitary and post-conflict). In addition,rates of scratching were examined before and after affiliative behavior during the postconflict context. I tested for this effect by using the post-conflict/matched control(PC/MC) method in which post-conflict (PC) behavior of an animal is compared to thebehavior of the same animal in a baseline, nonaggressive situation or a matched control(MC). Context and associated scratching data were obtained from a total of 98 hours of focal sample data. Scratching was significantly lower while animals were huddling thanthe other two contexts. Scratching rates while solitary were significantly higher than those occurring while animals were in proximity. Scratching was also higher in PC than MC. Following conflict, animals were significantly more likely to make contact withthird parties not involved in aggression. Most of these (79%) were a third party approaching a combatant. Further, scratching rates decreased following post-conflict third party contacts and the decrease was not due to a general decrease in scratching thatmight have been occurring after the aggressive interaction. Huddling behavior appears to reduce arousal in squirrel monkeys and may act as a tension-reduction mechanism. The elevated scratching in the solitary context may suggest that squirrel monkeys may be engaged in activities while solitary, such as vigilant behavior that may increase arousal. The third party post conflict affiliative contacts observed were the first such interactions observed in squirrel monkeys. The fact that these third contacts reduced scratching ratesin the combatants indicates that 'consolation' may have been demonstrated in this species. The overall pattern of results suggested that scratching was reliable behavioral indicator of anxiety in squirrel monkeys. These results indicate that overt behavior can be used to assess emotional states in this and other species, acting as a mediator to understanding how emotions regulate social behavior.

Must We Forgive?: Exploring the Limits and Possibilities of Forgiveness and Resentment

Conflict has marked civilization from Biblical times to the present day. Each of us, with our different and competing interests, and our desires to pursue those interests, have over time wronged another person. Not surprisingly then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and groups¿communities, countries, religious groups, races¿yet it is a complex idea that philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and psychologists have grappled with. Some have argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness is often portrayed as a coping mechanism¿how often we hear the phrase, ¿forgive and forget,¿ as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the complications of disagreement. But forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for forgiveness, is counted as an admirable trait and virtue. This essay will explore the nature of forgiveness, which in Christian dogma is often posited as an unqualified virtue. The secular world has appropriated the Christian notion of forgiveness as such a virtue¿but are there instances wherein offering forgiveness is morally inappropriate or dangerous? I will consider the situations in which forgiveness, understood in this essay as the overcoming of resentment, may not be a virtue¿when perhaps maintaining resentment is as virtuous, if not more virtuous, than forgiving. I will explain the various ethical frameworks involved in understanding forgiveness as a virtue, and the relationship between them. I will argue that within Divine Command Theory forgiveness is a virtue¿and thus morally right¿because God commands it. This ethical system has established forgiveness as unconditional, an idea which has been adopted into popular culture. With virtue ethics in mind, which holds virtues to be those traits which benefit the person who possesses them, contributing to the good life, I will argue unqualified forgiveness is not always a virtue, as it will not always benefit the victim. Because there is no way to avoid wrongdoing, humans are confronted with the question of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its relationship to one¿s character¿forgiveness is a concern of all people at some time if for no other reason than the plain fact that the past cannot be undone. I will be evaluating the idea of forgiveness as a virtue, in contrast to its counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to renounce resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? And what happens when a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to reconcile with the Christian (and now, secularized imperative of) forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive? In an attempt to answer that question I will argue that there are indeed times when forgiveness is not a virtue, specifically: when forgiveness compromises one¿s own self-respect; when it is not compatible with respect for the moral community; and when the offender is unapologetic. The kind of offense I have in mind is a dehumanizing one, one that intends to diminish another person¿s worth or humanity. These are moral injuries, to which I will argue resentment is a better response than forgiveness when the three qualifications cannot be met.

Talents in Migration Processes in the Conditions of the Czech Republic of the Nineties

The transformation of the 1990s has had a bearing on the academic and scientific world, as is becoming increasingly obvious with the changing numbers of foreign students wishing to study in the Czech Republic and of Czech students wishing to study abroad, the virtual collapse of doctoral studies, and the rapidly increasing age of Czech academics (placed at 48 by official sources and at rather more by this research). At the same time there is an apparent lack of interest in analysing and understanding these trends, which Mr. Cermak terms an ostrich policy, although his research showed that academics are in fact both aware and concerned about them. The mid-1990s migration of talent to and from R+D in the Czech Republic is also reflected in the number of talented Czech students studying abroad, who represent the largest and most interesting group of actual and potential migrants. Mr. Cermak's study took the form of a Delphi enquiry participated in by 44 specialists, including experts in the problems of higher education and science policy from the Presidium of the Higher Education Council (n = 23), members of the Council's Science and Research Commission (n = 14), former and current managers of higher education authorities (n = 4) and selected participants of the longitudinal talent research (n = 3). Questions considered included the influence of continuing talent migration from domestic R+D on the efficiency of domestic higher education, the diversification of forms of the brain drain and their impact on other processes in society, the possibility of positive influence on the brain drain processes to minimise the risks it presents, and the use of the knowledge obtained about the brain drain. The study revealed a clear drop of interest in brain drain problems in higher education in the mid-1990s, which is probably related to the collapsed of Czech R+D in the field of talent education. The effects on this segment of the labour market appeared earlier, with a major migration wave in 1991-1993 which significantly "cleared" the area of scientific talent. In addition, prospective talents from the ranks of younger students have not been integrated into domestic R+D, leading to the increasing average age of those working in this field. "Talent scouting" tended to be oriented towards much younger individuals, even in some cases towards undergraduate students. The R+D institutions deprived of human resources considered as basic in a functional R+D system have lost much of their dynamism and so no longer attract not only domestic talent but also talent from other regions. As a result the public, including the mass media and political structures, have stopped regarding the support of domestic science as a priority. This is clear both among the young people who are important for the future development of R+D (support for the education of talented children has dropped), from the drop in the prestige of this area as a profession among university students, and from the lack of explicit support for R+D by any of the political parties. On the basis of his findings Mr. Cermak concludes that there is no basis for the belief that the brain drain will represent a positive force in stimulating the development of the open society. Migration data shows that the outflow of talent from the Czech Republic far exceeds the inflow, and that the latter is largely short-term. Not only has the number of returning Czech professors dropped to half of its level at the beginning of the 1990s, but they also tend to take up only short-term contracts and retain their foreign positions. Recruitment of scientific talent from other countries, including the Slovak Republic, is limited. Furthermore internal contacts between those already involved in R+D have been badly hit by economic pressures and institutional co-operation has dropped to a minimum. There have been few moves to counteract this situation, the only notable one being the Program 250, launched in 1996 with government support to try and attract younger (i.e. under 40) talent into R+D. Its resources are however limited and its effects have not so far been evaluated. The deficit of academic and scientific talent in the Czech Republic is increasing and two major directions of academic work are emerging. Classic higher education science based on the teaching process is declining, largely due to economic factors, while there is an increasing emphasis on special; ad hoc projects which cannot be related directly to teaching but are often interesting to specialists outside the Czech Republic. This is shown clearly by the increase in publishing and in participation in domestic and foreign grant projects, which often serve to supplement the otherwise low salaries in the higher education sector. This tend was also accelerated by the collapse of applied R+D in individual sectors of the national economy and by substantial cutbacks in the Czech Academy of Sciences, which formerly fostered such research. Some part of the output of this research can be used in the education system and its financial contribution does significantly affect the stability of the present staff, but Mr. Cermak sees it as generally unfavourable for the development of talent education. In addition, it has led to a certain resignation on the question of integration into international structures, due to the emphasis on short-term targets, commercial advantages and individualism rather than team work. At the same time, he admits that these developments reflect those in other areas of the transformation in the Czech Republic.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Modes of Diversification in Bulgarian Higher Education: Case Studies in four Disciplines

This project was stimulated by the unprecedented speed and scope of changes in Bulgarian higher education since 1989. The rapid growth of the student population and the emergence of a new private sector in higher education led to tightening governmental control and a growing criticism of autonomy and academic freedom. This raised questions about the need for diversification in the field, about the importance of recent innovations in terms of strategic choices for future development and so of how higher education governance could maintain diversity without the system deteriorating. The group first traced the extent of spontaneous processes of innovation at the level of content, of institutions, and the organisation of teaching and learning processes. They then identified the different parties in the struggle for institutionalisation and against diversification, and promising mechanisms for maintaining diversity in higher education. On this basis they outlined a basis for a wide-ranging public discussion of the issue which may serve as a corrective to the mechanisms of state control. Their work included analysis of the legislative framework laid down in the Higher Education Act, which effectively dispenses with the autonomy of universities. They then surveyed the views of both high-level executives in the field and the academics actually involved in the process, as well as of the "consumers" of the educational product, i.e. the students. In considering diversification, they focused on four different types of programmes, including those where diversification is largely limited to content level (e.g. Law), those where it operates mainly on structural levels (e.g. Industrial Management), those where it is often feigned (e.g. Social Work), and those where it is at best formal and sporadic (e.g. Mechanical Engineering). They conclude that the educational system in Bulgaria has considerable internal resources for development. The greatest need is for adequate statutory regulation of academic life which will provide incentives for responsible academic development of higher education institutions and create conditions for the institutionalisation of academic self-organisation and self-control, which will in turn limit the pathological trends in the diversification processes.

A Sociological Study of the Political Subsystem in Yugoslavia

In this critical analysis of sociological studies of the political subsystem in Yugoslavia since the fall of communism Mr. Ilic examined the work of the majority of leading researchers of politics in the country between 1990 and 1996. Where the question of continuity was important, he also looked at previous research by the writers in question. His aim was to demonstrate the overall extent of existing research and at the same time to identify its limits and the social conditions which defined it. Particular areas examined included the problems of defining basic concepts and selecting the theoretically most relevant indicators; the sources of data including the types of authentic materials exploited; problems of research work (contacts, field control, etc.); problems of analysisl and finally the problems arising from different relations with the people who commission the research. In the first stage of the research, looking at methods of defining key terms, special attention was paid to the analysis of the most frequently used terms such as democracy, totalitarianism, the political left and right, and populism. Numerous weaknesses were noted in the analytic application of these terms. In studies of the possibilities of creating a democratic political system in Serbia and its possible forms (democracy of the majority or consensual democracy), the profound social division of Serbian society was neglected. The left-right distinction tends to be identified with the government-opposition relation, in the way of practical politics. The idea of populism was used to pass responsibility for the policy of war from the manipulator to the manipulated, while the concept of totalitarianism is used in a rather old-fashioned way, with echoes of the cold war. In general, the terminology used in the majority of recent research on the political subsystem in Yugoslavia is characterised by a special ideological style and by practical political material, rather than by developed theoretical effort. The second section of analysis considered the wider theoretical background of the research and focused on studies of the processes of transformation and transition in Yugoslav society, particularly the work of Mladen Lazic and Silvano Bolcic, who he sees as representing the most important and influential contemporary Yugoslav sociologists. Here Mr. Ilic showed that the meaning of empirical data is closely connected with the stratification schemes towards which they are oriented, so that the same data can have different meanings in shown through different schemes. He went on to show the observed theoretical frames in the context of wider ideological understanding of the authors' ideas and research. Here the emphasis was on the formalistic character of such notions as command economy and command work which were used in analysing the functioning and the collapse of communist society, although Mr. Ilic passed favourable judgement on the Lazic's critique of political over-determination in its various attempts to explain the disintegration of the communist political (sub)system. The next stage of the analysis was devoted to the problem of empirical identification of the observed phenomena. Here again the notions of the political left and right were of key importance. He sees two specific problems in using these notion in talking about Yugoslavia, the first being that the process of transition in the FR Yugoslavia has hardly begun. The communist government has in effect remained in power continuously since 1945, despite the introduction of a multi-party system in 1990. The process of privatisation of public property was interrupted at a very early stage and the results of this are evident on the structural level in the continuous weakening of the social status of the middle class and on the political level because the social structure and dominant form of property direct the majority of votes towards to communists in power. This has been combined with strong chauvinist confusion associated with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and these ideas were incorporated by all the relevant Yugoslav political parties, making it more difficult to differentiate between them empirically. In this context he quotes the situation of the stream of political scientists who emerged in the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. During the time of the one-party regime, this faculty functioned as ideological support for official communist policy and its teachers were unable to develop views which differed from the official line, but rather treated all contrasting ideas in the same way, neglecting their differences. Following the introduction of a multi-party system, these authors changed their idea of a public enemy, but still retained an undifferentiated and theoretically undeveloped approach to the issue of the identification of political ideas. The fourth section of the work looked at problems of explanation in studying the political subsystem and the attempts at an adequate causal explanation of the triumph of Slobodan Milosevic's communists at four subsequent elections was identified as the key methodological problem. The main problem Mr. Ilic isolated here was the neglect of structural factors in explaining the voters' choice. He then went on to look at the way empirical evidence is collected and studied, pointing out many mistakes in planning and determining the samples used in surveys as well as in the scientifically incorrect use of results. He found these weaknesses particularly noticeable in the works of representatives of the so-called nationalistic orientation in Yugoslav sociology of politics, and he pointed out the practical political abuses which these methodological weaknesses made possible. He also identified similar types of mistakes in research by Serbian political parties made on the basis of party documentation and using methods of content analysis. He found various none-sided applications of survey data and looked at attempts to apply other sources of data (statistics, official party documents, various research results). Mr. Ilic concluded that there are two main sets of characteristics in modern Yugoslav sociological studies of political subsystems. There are a considerable number of surveys with ambitious aspirations to explain political phenomena, but at the same time there is a clear lack of a developed sociological theory of political (sub)systems. He feels that, in the absence of such theory, most researcher are over-ready to accept the theoretical solutions found for interpretation of political phenomena in other countries. He sees a need for a stronger methodological bases for future research, either 1) in complementary usage of different sources and ways of collecting data, or 2) in including more of a historical dimension in different attempts to explain the political subsystem in Yugoslavia.

The Sociolinguistics of Hungarian Outside Hungary

This study describes the sociolinguistic situation of the indigenous Hungarian national minorities in Slovakia (c. 600,000), Ukraine (c. 180,000), Romania (c. 2,000,000), Yugoslavia (c. 300,000), Slovenia (c. 8,000) and Austria (c. 6,000). Following the guidelines of Hans Goebl et al, the historical sociolinguistic portrait of each minority is presented from 1920 through to the mid-1990s. Each country's report includes sections on geography and demography, history, politics, economy, culture and religion, language policy and planning, and language use (domains of minority and/or majority language use, proficiency, attitudes, etc.). The team's findings were presented in the form of 374 pages of manuscripts, articles and tables, written in Hungarian and English. The core of the team's research results lies in the results of an empirical survey designed to study the social characteristics of Hungarian-minority bilingualism in the six project countries, and the linguistic similarities and differences between the six contact varieties of Hungarian and Hungarian in Hungary. The respondents were divided by age, education, and settlement group - city vs. village and local majority vs. local minority. The first thing to be observed is that Hungarian is tending to be spoken less to children than to parents and grandparents, a familiar pattern of language shift. In contact varieties of Hungarian, analytic constructions may be used where monolingual Hungarians would use a more synthetic form. Mr Kontra gives as an example the compound tagdij, which in Standard Hungarian means "membership fee" but which is replaced in contact Hungarian by the two-word phrase tagsagi dij. Another similar example concerns the synthetic verb hegedult "played the violin" and the analytic expression hegedun jatszott. The contrast is especially striking between the Hungarians in the northern Slavic countries, who use the synthetic form frequently, and those in the southern Slavic countries, who mainly use the analytic form. Mr. Kontra notes that from a structural point of view, there is no immediate explanation for this, since Slovak or Ukrainian are as likely to cause interference as is Serbian. He postulates instead that the difference may be attributable to some sociohistoric cause, and points out that the Turkish occupation of what is today Voivodina caused a discontinuity of the Hungarian presence in the region, with the result that Hungarians were resettled in the area only two and a half centuries ago. However, the Hungarians in today's Slovakia and Ukraine have lived together with Slavic peoples continuously for over a millennium. It may be, he suggests, that 250 years of interethnic coexistence is less than is needed for such a contact-induced change to run its course. Next Mr. Kontra moved on to what he terms "mental maps and morphology". In Hungarian, the names of cities and villages take the surface case (eg. Budapest-en "in Budapest") whereas some names denoting Hungarian settlements and all names of foreign cities take the interior case (eg. Tihany-ban "in Tihany" and Boston-ban "in Boston). The role of the semantic feature "foreign" in suffix-choice can be illustrated by such minimal pairs as Velence-n "in Velence, a village in Hungary" versus Velence-ben "in Velence [=Venice], a city in Italy", and Pecs-en "in Pecs, a city in Hungary" vs. Becs-ben "in Becs, ie. Vienna". This Hungarian vs. foreign distinction is often interpreted as "belonging to historical (pre-1920) Hungary" vs. "outside historical Hungary". The distinction is also expressed in the dichotomy "home" vs. "abroad'. The 1920 border changes have had an impact on both majority and minority Hungarians' mental maps, the maps which govern the choice of surface vs. interior cases with placenames. As there is a growing divergence between the mental maps of majority and minority Hungarians, so there will be a growing divergence in their use of the placename suffixes. Two placenames were chosen to scratch the surface of this complex problem: Craiova (a city in Oltenia, Romania) and Kosovo (Hungarian Koszovo) an autonomous region in southeast Yugoslavia. The assumption to be tested was that both placenames would be used with the inessive (interior) suffixes categorically by Hungarians in Hungary, but that the superessive suffix (showing "home") would be used near-categorically by Hungarians in Romania and Yugoslavia (Voivodina). Minority Hungarians in countries other than Romania and Yugoslavia would show no difference from majority Hungarians in Hungary. In fact, the data show that, contrary to expectation, there is considerable variation within Hungary. And although Koszovo is used, as expected, with the "home" suffix by 61% of the informants in Yugoslavia, the same suffix is used by an even higher percentage of the subjects in Slovenia. Mr. Kontra's team suggests that one factor playing a role in this might be the continuance of the former Yugoslav mentality in the Hungarians of Slovenia, at least from the geographical point of view. The contact varieties of Hungarian show important grammatical differences from Hungarian in Hungary. One of these concerns the variable use of Null subjects (the inclusion or exclusion of the subject of the verb). When informants were asked to insert either megkertem or megkertem ot - "I asked her" - into a test sentence, 54.9% of the respondents in the Ukraine inserted the second phrase as opposed to only 27.4% in Hungary. Although Mr. Kontra and his team concentrated more on the differences between Contact Hungarian and Standard Hungarian, they also discovered a number of similarities. One such similarity is demonstrable in the distribution of what Mr. Kontra calls an ongoing syntactic merger in Hungarian in Hungary. This change means effectively that two possibilities merge to form a third. For instance, the two sentences Valoszinuleg kulfoldre fognak koltozni and Valoszinu, hogy kulfoldre fognak koltozni merge to form the new construction Valszinuleg, hogy kulfoldre fognak koltozni ("Probably they will move abroad."). When asked to choose "the most natural" of the sentences, one in four chose the new construction, and a chi-square test shows homogeneity in the sample. In other words, this syntactic change is spreading across the entire Hungarian-speaking region in the Carpathian Basin Mr. Kontra believes that politicians, educators, and other interested parties now have reliable and up-to-date information about each Hungarian minority. An awareness of Hungarian as a pluricentric language is being developed which elevates the status of contact varieties of Hungarian used by the minorities, an essential process, he believes, if minority languages are to be maintained.