Ascending thoracic aorta dimension and outcomes in acute type B dissection (from the International Registry of Acute Aortic Dissection [IRAD])

It is not well known if the size of the ascending thoracic aorta at presentation predicts features of presentation, management, and outcomes in patients with acute type B aortic dissection. The International Registry of Acute Aortic Dissection (IRAD) database was queried for all patients with acute type B dissection who had documentation of ascending thoracic aortic size at time of presentation. Patients were categorized according to ascending thoracic aortic diameters ≤4.0, 4.1 to 4.5, and ≥4.6 cm. Four hundred eighteen patients met inclusion criteria; 291 patients (69.6%) were men with a mean age of 63.2 ± 13.5 years. Ascending thoracic aortic diameter ≤4.0 cm was noted in 250 patients (59.8%), 4.1 to 4.5 cm in 105 patients (25.1%), and ≥4.6 cm in 63 patients (15.1%). Patients with an ascending thoracic aortic diameter ≥4.6 cm were more likely to be men (p = 0.01) and have Marfan syndrome (p <0.001) and known bicuspid aortic valve disease (p = 0.003). In patients with an ascending thoracic aorta ≥4.1 cm, there was an increased incidence of surgical intervention (p = 0.013). In those with an ascending thoracic aorta ≥4.6 cm, the root, ascending aorta, arch, and aortic valve were more often involved in surgical repair. Patients with an ascending thoracic aorta ≤4.0 were more likely to have endovascular therapy than those with larger ascending thoracic aortas (p = 0.009). There was no difference in overall mortality or cause of death. In conclusion, ascending thoracic aortic enlargement in patients with acute type B aortic dissection is common. Although its presence does not appear to predict an increased risk of mortality, it is associated with more frequent open surgical intervention that often involves replacement of the proximal aorta. Those with smaller proximal aortas are more likely to receive endovascular therapy.

Does Israel Follow the Law? A Critical Analysis of Israel's Application of the International Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Occupied Territories

Israel's occupation of territories it captured in 1967 has become one of the longest and most controversial occupations of the last fifty years. Eschewing the traditional political analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper aims to explore whether Israel has adequately applied international law in the occupied territories, in particular, the law of belligerent occupation. The two actors under assessment are the Israeli government, particularly its military which enforces and maintains the law in the territories, and the Supreme Court of Israel, which has the power of review over military actions in the territories. The particular issues of the occupation that are critically analyzed are the general legal framework that Israel established in the territories, Israel's civilian settlement policy in territories, and Israel's construction of a barrier in the West Bank. This paper concludes that Israel has incorrectly applied the legal framework of belligerent occupation by refusing to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention; it has wrongly concluded that the establishment of civilian settlements in the territories conform with international law; yet it has rightly concluded that the construction of the barrier in the West Bank is permissible under international law, in contrast to the conclusion of the much publicized International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on the 'Wall.' Along with these general assessments, the author will also provide some historical and political insight into why the Israeli government and the Supreme Court may have applied the law in the way that they did.