Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisisfrom the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standardmonetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through whichmonetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbankmarket. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed,central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted bystandard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did notallow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design newchannels for liquidity injection.

Fiscal decentralization policies and sub-national government debt in evolving federations

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.

Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal repression

This article examines the debt history of two contenders for European hegemony: 16th-centurySpain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their fiscal behavior using measures of overborrowingand fiscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain ssuccess in avoiding default. Instead, fiscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrowat below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals.

Sovereign risk and secondary markets

Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties.Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will onlyhappen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country.Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk havefocused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countriesmight want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make themvulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Long term debt with hidden borrowing

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive baking sector,that shares information about borrowers, and an alternative hidden lender. We highlight thatthe presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector and that in equilibrium some borrowers obtain funds from both the banking sector and the (inefficient) hidden lender simultaneously. We further show that as the inefficiency of the hidden lender increases, total welfare decreases. By extending the model to examine a partially hidden lender, we further highlight the key role of information.

Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt

To recover a version of Barro's (1979) `random walk'tax smoothing outcome, we modify Lucas and Stokey's (1983) economyto permit only risk--free debt. This imparts near unit root like behaviorto government debt, independently of the government expenditureprocess, a realistic outcome in the spirit of Barro's. We showhow the risk--free--debt--only economy confronts the Ramsey plannerwith additional constraints on equilibrium allocations thattake the form of a sequence of measurability conditions.We solve the Ramsey problem by formulating it in terms of a Lagrangian,and applying a Parameterized Expectations Algorithm tothe associated first--order conditions. The first--order conditions andnumerical impulse response functions partially affirmBarro's random walk outcome. Though the behaviors oftax rates, government surpluses, and government debts differ, allocationsare very close for computed Ramsey policies across incomplete and completemarkets economies.

Cape Verde - Diagnostic Trade Inttegration study Update - 2013

This Report is an update of the Cape Verde Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, titled Cape Verde’s Insertion into the Global Economy, produced and validated by the Government of Cape Verde in December 2008. Like the previous 2008 study, this Cape Verde Diagnostic Trade Integration Study Update provides a critical examination of the major institutional and production constraints that hinder Cape Verde’s ability to capitalize fully on the growth and welfare gains from its integration into the world economy. As a policy report, this study offers a set of priority policies and measures that can be implemented by both the public and private sectors to mitigate and surmount these supply side and institutional constraints. These recommendations are summarized in an Action Matrix. The Report is fruit of the generous support of the multi-donor program the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF). In every crisis there is an opportunity. Four years after the validation of the country’s first Diagnostic Trade Integration Study in 2008, Cape Verde finds itself in a drastically altered external environment. Cape Verde faces a worsened external environment than four years ago, when it was also traversing years of crisis as global food and energy prices escalated. Just as the country was validating its first trade study in late 2008, and celebrating its graduation from the list of Least Developed Countries, the onset of the deepest global recession in recent memory triggered an even worse external situation as the country’s principal source of markets, investments, remittances and aid, the Eurozone, unraveled economically and politically. As the Eurozone crisis spread, it was Cape Verde’s misfortune that the crisis contaminated precisely its biggest Eurozone partners and donors, such as Portugal, Spain and Italy. For such a highly dependent and exposed economy like that of Cape Verde, the deteriorating external sector has had a substantial negative impact on its macroeconomic performance. At the time of the validation workshop and graduation in 2008, no one could have foreseen or predicted the severity of the global crisis that followed. Despite traversing these years of adversity and external shocks, and suffering palpable setbacks, Cape Verde’s economy had proven surprisingly resilient, especially its principal sector, tourism. To its great credit, the country’s economic fundamentals are solid, and have been carefully and prudently managed over the years. For this reason alone, the country has thus far weathered the global and Eurozone crisis. Yet the near and medium term future remains uncertain. The country’s margin for maneuver has narrowed, its options far more limited, and hard choices lie ahead. Thus, there is no better time than now to analyze Cape Verde’s position in the global economy, and to examine the many challenges and opportunities it faces. The first diagnostic trade study outlined an ambitious agenda and set of policy strategies to enhance Cape Verde’s participation in the global economy. Written prior to the global crisis, the study did not, and could not, anticipate the scope and depth of the subsequent global and Eurozone crises. A few short months before the validation of the first DTIS Cape Verde joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has spent these four years adjusting to this status and implementing its commitments. At the same time, the country seeks greater economic integration with the European Union. Since 2008 the government has been investing heavily in the country’s economic infrastructure, focusing especially on fostering transformation in key sectors like agriculture, fisheries, tourism and creative industries. For these and many other reasons, it is both timely and urgent to review the road traveled since 2008. It is an opportune moment to reassess the country’s options, to rethink strategies, and to chart a new way forward that it is practical, implementable, and that builds on the country’s competitive advantages and current successes.

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Cambios en las condiciones de empleo y de salud durante la crisis económica en trabajadores inmigrantes en España

Objetivo: Evaluar la influencia de los cambios en las condiciones de empleo en la saludautopercibida y mental de trabajadores inmigrantes en España, tras un período de tresaños, en un contexto de crisis económica.